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Introduction: The need for research in countering 
violent extremism policy and practice
Sara Zeiger
Senior Research Analyst, Hedayah
Anne Aly
Director, Countering online Violent Extremism Research (CoVER) Program
Associate Professor, Curtin University
CHAPTER 1
This volume reports on the range of  papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The 
Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of  Excellence for Counter-
ing Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian 
Government, Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).  The Conference was also sponsored in 
part by the European Commission and the United States Department of  State. The event was attended 
by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE 
Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, 
Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of  its kind in the region, the 
2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and 
former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE.  The intention 
for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of  cutting-edge 
CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers 
on a global scale. 
the Need for CVE Research
In an age where the threat of  terrorism from non-
state actors is on the rise and traditional counter-
terrorism policies do not seem to be reducing ter-
rorism worldwide (Crelinsten, 2009), governments 
are looking towards strategies, policies and pro-
grams to interrupt radicalization and recruitment 
into violent extremism and terrorism. These inter-
ventions are known as preventing or countering 
violent extremism (P/CVE) or countering violent 
extremism and radicalization that lead to terror-
ism (VERLT) by a number of  international stake-
holders and governments.  For the purposes of  the 
Conference and this edited volume, the concept 
of  CVE refers to the programs and policies for 
countering and preventing radicalization and re-
cruitment into violent extremism and terrorism as 
part of  an overall counter-terrorism strategy and 
framework.  This definition is inclusive of  strate-
gic, non-coercive counterterrorism programs and 
policies including those involving education and 
broad-based community engagement; more tar-
geted narrative/messaging programs and coun-
ter-recruitment strategies; disengagement and 
targeted intervention programs for individuals en-
gaging in radicalization; as well as de-radicaliza-
tion, disengagement and rehabilitation programs 
for former violent extremist offenders. 
KEYwoRdS: research, countering violent extremism, prevention, counter-terrorism
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Practitioners and policymakers working on CVE 
have indicated that a strong evidence-base is nec-
essary in order to improve the development and 
implementation of  effective CVE policies and 
programs. The subject has received international 
policy-level attention from multiple countries and 
international stakeholders.  International counter-
terrorism policy documents such as the UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 2129 (2013) reaffirming 
the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate 
(CTED) mandate invites CTED to “engage and 
enhance its partnerships with… academia and 
other entities in conducting research and infor-
mation-gathering, and identifying good practices” 
(UNSCR 2129, 2013, p. 7). Several of  the main 
framework documents of  the Global Counterter-
rorism Forum (GCTF) produced by their CVE 
Working Group also emphasize the need for 
research and field studies to identify drivers of  
violent extremism and emerging threats, and 
to better inform policy and program decision- 
making.1  Moreover, the Follow-On Action Agenda 
of  the White House Summit to Counter Violent 
Extremism Ministerial Meeting that took place in 
February 2015 also cites promoting local research 
and information-sharing on the drivers of  radical-
ization and violent extremism as one of  the main 
action points for follow-up after the Summit.2  
The existing literature on CVE also suggests that 
more research is needed to better drive policy 
and programming design, specifically research 
that investigates the processes of  radicalization 
in local contexts.  In a literature review on CVE 
conducted for the Australian government, Nasser-
Eddine et. al (2011) emphasized that the major-
ity of  the CVE literature consists of  commentary 
and critique, but does not include an empirical 
research base to the data.  While there are many 
studies that outline processes of  radicalization 
(Horgan, 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & 
Taylor, 2011; Taylor & Horgan, 2006) there are 
far less studies that present and analyze primary 
data within a framework based in localized con-
texts of  radicalization and recruitment. Such local 
knowledge is crucial for successfully designing in-
terventions that counter these processes. 
A further point is to be made regarding access to 
high quality research in the field of  CVE. Despite 
increased efforts at collaboration between gov-
ernments and researchers, there is a need for a 
constructive platform through which researchers 
doing relevant work on CVE can communicate 
and share their current findings to the interna-
tional CVE community (to include practitioners 
and policymakers alike). Such a platform is use-
ful to share relevant data, good practices, research 
methods, and lessons learned amongst relevant 
actors, and to increase the cooperation between 
those working on the research side of  CVE and 
those writing and implementing policies and 
programs. 
Events Supporting CVE Research Con-
ference 2014
 
In the lead-up to the CVE Research Conference 
2014, two preparatory meetings took place that fed 
into the Conference. In September 2014, the Aus-
tralian Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Coun-
ter Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University in 
partnership with Curtin and Massey Universities, 
hosted a two-day regional Policy Forum in Syd-
ney.  The Forum focused on securing tangible out-
comes and policy recommendations around five 
key themes. Each theme was addressed in a closed 
workshop sponsored by various government and 
non-government stakeholders:
1. Managing Foreign Fighters: Finding the Best 
Government and Community Approaches
2. The Social Impacts of  Violent Extremism: 
New Solutions for Community-Based CVE
3. Finding a New Risk Assessment Model for Po-
lice
4. Developing National Strategies for Sustaining 
Resilient Communities
5. Social Media and CVE – Understanding 
What we Do and Don’t Know
1   2 
1   See specifically the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 2; the Abu 
      Dhabi Memorandum on Good Practices for Education and Countering Violent Extremism, Good Practice 5.
2    The draft versions of  the Follow-On Action Agenda from the White House Summit on CVE were kindly shared with the authors by the 
      US government.
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Collectively the five workshops examined the cur-
rent situation, identified gaps, and highlighted 
opportunities and recommendations for moving 
forward. 
Also in preparation for the conference, Hedayah 
organized an expert workshop on “Research 
Trends in Countering Violent Extremism” where 
researchers in CVE assessed the current research 
landscape in CVE and identified potential gaps 
and follow-up projects for the CVE community 
at large.  The expert workshop focused on three 
main topics: disengagement and deradicalization, 
education and CVE, and narratives and counter-
narratives.  The discussions also revealed the lat-
est research in three regional groupings, limited, 
of  course, by the time allocated to the meeting. 
The outcomes of  the meeting were captured in 
six research briefs, informed the CVE Research 
Conference 2014 scope and agenda, and were re-
ported at the Conference. Some of  the main find-
ings of  the expert workshop included:
1. There is a need for more clarity on definitions, 
concepts and framing related to countering 
violent extremism research (Zeiger, 2014a).
2. Standards for both data collection and ethics 
should be established by a central authority 
for research on CVE (Zeiger, 2014a).
3. More empirical research is needed to test un-
derlying assumptions of  how poverty, educa-
tion, good governance and democratization 
relate to violent extremism (Zeiger, 2014b).
4. More empirical research should be conducted 
on the needs of  the local community in re-
lation to countering violent extremism pro-
gramming. For example, community attitudes 
should be assessed before public awareness 
campaigns and tools to prevent radicalization 
are disseminated.  Similarly, community at-
titudes should be assessed before designing a 
reintegration program for former violent ex-
tremist offenders or returning foreign fighters 
(Zeiger, 2014a; Zeiger, 2014b).
5. More empirical research is needed on how so-
cial media affects behavior of  individuals in a 
general sense before making assumptions on 
how the process of  online radicalization can 
be thwarted (Zeiger, 2014c). 
6. More empirical research is needed on how the 
community is affected by both the radicali-
zation narrative of  violent extremists as well 
as the narrative and actions of  governments 
(Zeiger, 2014c).
CVE Research Conference 2014 Contri-
butions
The CVE Research Conference 2014 was organ-
ized by regional panels in order to help identify 
some of  the main challenges, risks and lessons 
to be learned and applied based on local knowl-
edge and research. Within this regionally based 
structure, the panels also covered several themes 
including radicalization, social media, de-radicali-
zation and recruitment and across different forms 
of  violent extremism.  The Conference essays 
are presented in this volume according to several 
broad thematic groupings.  Part 1 of  this volume 
includes the essays that investigate and elaborate 
on the push and pull factors that lead to radicali-
zation and recruitment, the so-called “drivers” 
of  radicalization.  Part 2 presents the essays and 
discussions that focus on countering the narrative 
of  violent extremism.  Part 3 is devoted to contri-
butions dealing with the disengagement, deradi-
calization and reintegration of  former violent ex-
tremists.  Finally, Part 4 concludes with two case 
examples of  CVE programming that involve the 
broader community in the CVE efforts.  
Part 1: Assessing the Local Push and 
Pull Factors Leading to Radicalization 
and Recruitment
One of  the crucial challenges in preventing and 
countering violent extremism begins with identi-
fying the drivers—the push and pull factors—that 
cause individuals to join violent extremist groups 
and participate in violent extremism (Denoeux, 
2009; USAID, 2011). “Push factors” refer to the 
environmental grievances and socioeconomic 
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differences that drive an individual to violent 
extremism such as poverty, unemployment, clan 
marginalization, sectarianism, government 
oppression, or lack of  opportunity.  “Pull factors” 
refer to the psychosocial benefit or attraction of  
violent extremism that fills an individuals’ need 
such as monetary incentives, sense of  protection 
or safety, protection or safety for their family, sense 
of  belonging, revenge for injustice or a death, 
personal empowerment or religious rewards. This 
section elaborates on the local push and pull fac-
tors in many different contexts, including Western 
European and non-Western foreign fighters trave-
ling to Iraq and Syria, Al-Shabaab fighters in the 
Horn of  Africa, the threat of  violent extremism 
in Burkina Faso, terrorism and crime in Central 
Asia, and right-wing extremist groups in Canada.
In “Western European Foreign Fighters in 
Syria: An Overview,” Peter Neumann provides a 
snapshot of  the profiles of  Western European 
Foreign Fighters traveling to Syria to join the 
Syrian/Iraqi conflict, with a particular focus 
on those joining the so-called “Islamic State” 
and Jabhat al Nusra.  He provides crucial 
insight into the number of  fighters joining 
the conflict, the draw and reasons for these 
individuals to join, and a snapshot of  the threat 
of  Western European foreign fighters on their 
home countries. He concludes with several 
policy recommendations concerned with how to 
deal with the different types of  foreign fighters 
returning from the conflict: from those that are 
dangerous, to those that are disturbed and to those 
that are disillusioned with the conflict.
Hamed El Said’s essay “Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters: Terrorists or freedom fighters?” looks at 
the drivers of  radicalization in the Arab World, 
particularly with respect to those joining the 
Islamic State of  Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but also 
more broadly.  The fieldwork undertaken for 
this project occurred in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, 
Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Mauritania and 
Sudan from 2012-2014.  The fieldwork consisted 
of  interviews and biographical data of  formers and 
interviews with state officials in those countries that 
worked directly with formers and current violent 
extremists. 
The essay titled “From Policy to Practice: 
Findings and lessons learned from a research-based 
pilot countering violent extremism programme in 
the Horn of  Africa” by Martine Zeuthen outlines 
the preliminary results from the Strengthening 
Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) pro-
gram in the Horn of  Africa, with field data pri-
marily from Kenya, Somaliland and Puntland. 
The study focuses on drivers of  radicalization and 
recruitment for those fighters joining Al-Shabaab. 
One particular aspect of  the study aims to 
compare the recruitment narrative of  the Somali 
Diaspora population traveling to visit Somalia 
versus the narrative of  the host (Somali) popula-
tion. A second aspect of  the study investigates the 
capacity of  women’s organizations in Puntland 
and Somaliland to prevent violent extremism. 
A third aspect evaluates the social and political 
aspects of  the local context to highlight the main 
drivers of  radicalization and recruitment. The 
chapter concludes with several recommendations 
for future policy and program development. 
Peter Romaniuk investigates the potential driv-
ers of  radicalization and recruitment in Burkina 
Faso, and evaluates the likelihood of  violent ex-
tremism (VE) to take root in that context in his 
chapter “Assessing violent extremism: The case 
of  Burkina Faso.”  Based on field research in 
Burkina Faso, Romaniuk highlights the push and pull 
factors that suggest that Burkina Faso could be 
vulnerable to violent extremism in a significant 
way, but also outlines the potential sources of  
resilience among the local population that can be 
reinforced in order to better prevent an upsurge of  
violent extremism in the country.
In her chapter on “Terrorism/Crime Nexus in 
Central Asia: Implications for countering violent 
extremism and terrorism,” Mariya Omelicheva 
argues that the threat of  violent extremism in 
Central Asia is not only tied to religious 
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fundamentalism, but that assessments of  radicali-
zation and recruitment in the region and effective 
responses should consider the nexus between ter-
rorism and transnational crime.  She argues that 
many of  the networks of  both violent extremism 
and organized crime are often overlapping, and 
that the push and pull factors that lead an indi-
vidual to these activities are often similar in the 
context of  Central Asia. For example, Omelicheva 
lists remoteness from central authorities, lack of  
allegiance to government, and lack of  economic 
opportunities and rule of  law as some of  the push 
factors that lead to both the rise of  organized 
crime and terrorism.  Omelicheva recommends 
that in order to better tackle the problem of  violent 
extremism in Central Asia, policies and programs 
should better account for the complex nature of  
the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, 
and stop treating all forms of  organized violence 
as products of  religious radicalization.
Concluding the section on push and pull factors 
James O. Ellis III’s essay “Right-Wing Extrem-
ism in Canada” outlines the history and appeal 
of  right-wing extremism in the Canadian context. 
After contextualizing right-wing extremism in a 
broader discourse on violent extremism and ter-
rorism, Ellis highlights the crucial elements to the 
development of  right-wing extremism in Canada. 
Ellis also focuses on three particular right-wing 
groups: the Klu Klux Klan (KKK), the Church 
of  the Creator (COTC) and Skinheads. He wraps 
up his essay with a few policy recommendations 
for how to best analyze the threat of  right-wing 
extremism, and their potential for violence. 
Part 2: Countering the Narrative of 
Violent Extremists
With the increased activity of  violent jihadi groups 
like ISIS on social media and its ability to broad-
cast its message through online and traditional 
media channels to a wide audience in a number of  
languages, there is increased international atten-
tion and call for action to counter these messages. 
For example, the United States and the United 
Arab Emirates recently announced the launch of  
a strategic communications center to counter-mes-
sage against ISIS called the Sawab Center, based 
in Abu Dhabi (“Launch of  the Sawab Center,” 
2015).  However, the communications challenge 
is not only limited to ISIS: all violent extremists 
adopt strategic communications strategies as an 
integral component of  their strategic and tacti-
cal capabilities.    This section discusses the latest 
research on CVE messaging in different contexts: 
ISIS, white power extremism in Australia, and 
violent extremism in Southeast Asia (Indonesia/
Malaysia).
In “Challenging the Narrative of  the ‘Islamic 
State,” Alex Schmid discusses twelve claims made 
by the terrorist group, the self-proclaimed “Islamic 
State,” and possible narratives and alternatives to 
challenge the narrative.  Schmid argues that this 
challenge should take place in public and open 
forums using diverse types of  media (TV, radio, 
public speeches and statements, social media, on-
line forums) and with a number of  credible mes-
sengers. 
The essay “Countering Online Violent 
Extremism in Australia: Research and prelimi-
nary findings” by Anne Aly and Kosta Lucas 
examines the nexus between online content and 
radicalization towards violent extremism, spe-
cifically reporting the preliminary findings from 
an ongoing research project through the Curtin 
University Countering Online Violent Extrem-
ism Research (CoVER) program.  The research 
framework draws on existing theories within the 
fields of  media, messaging and counter-terrorism, 
and investigates 1) the ways in which the audience 
interacts with the messages received, and 2) the 
medium and conditions in which these messages 
exist online. Based on preliminary analysis of  the 
findings, the research concluded that the content 
of  the narrative alone is not the only variable that 
should be accounted for in developing a counter-
narrative.  
The chapter titled “Countering the Terrorist 
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Narrative: Issues and challenges in contesting 
such spaces” by Thomas Samuel outlines the logic 
of  the terrorists’ narrative in a three step process 
that highlights 1) the injustices occurring in many 
parts of  the world, 2) there is a need to act, and 
3) violence is the only possible response.  Drawing 
on his experiences interviewing former terrorists 
in Southeast Asia, Samuel also offers suggestions 
for a useful and successful counter-narrative to 
this process. He argues that the elements of  a suc-
cessful counter-narrative should include analyzing 
the objectives of  the terrorist organization and the 
performance of  the group against those objec-
tives, highlighting the shortcomings and pitfalls. 
Part 3: disengagement, deradicalization 
and Reintegration of Former Fighters
Another major concern in the field of  CVE is 
how to disengage, deradicalize and reintegrate 
ex-offenders and ex-fighters back into the main-
stream population, either after returning from the 
battlefield, or during and after serving their term 
in prison. This section presents the latest research 
from five different contexts with regards to disen-
gagement, deradicalization and reintegration pro-
grams: the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Colom-
bia, Denmark and Germany.
Clarke Jones examines the process of  radicali-
zation and disengagement in the context of  the 
Philippine prison system in “Testing the Notion 
that Prisons are Schools for Terrorism: Exam-
ining radicalization and disengagement in the 
Philippine Corrective System.” He uses the case 
studies of  two correctional systems, one being the 
New Bilibid Prison, which integrates the violent 
extremist offenders into the general prison popu-
lation, and the other the Metro Manila District 
Jail, which segregates the violent extremist of-
fenders from the main prison population. In his 
research,  Jones has found that the violent extrem-
ist offenders present in the integrated prison have 
relatively little influence on the mainstream prison 
population in terms of  radicalization and recruit-
ment into violent extremism, and the gang system 
within the prison actually appears to reduce the 
terrorist ideology.  
Moving to a European case, Orla Lynch discusses 
both the theoretical and practical differences in 
the terms “desistance” and “deradicalisation” in 
her piece titled “Desistance and Deradicalisation: 
The case of  Northern Ireland.”  Drawing from 
case examples of  Northern Ireland and the peace 
process that occurred there, Lynch contextualizes 
the discussion of  desistance from terrorism in a 
broader criminological framework—noting that 
terrorist activities are not always violent acts, but 
also include major crimes such as money laun-
dering and weapons trade as well as other minor 
criminal offenses.
 
The essay by Ines Marchand and Marie Denov 
titled “The Evolving Identities of  Former Child 
Soldiers in Colombia” summarizes the research 
findings from interviews during training program 
for former child solders. The research highlights 
some of  the main reasons these individuals joined 
the fighting forces in Colombia, including ab-
duction, coercion, lack of  education and/or job 
opportunities, financial rewards, as well as power 
and/or self-worth.  From a gender perspective, 
some young girls also joined because they were 
valued as equal to men.  The research also carries 
some connotations for the reintegration process 
for former soldiers, noting that former fighters 
often struggle with their own identity after 
reintegration, as the community does not always 
accept them back.  
Rounding out the section on disengagement, 
deradicalization and reintegration, Daniel Koe-
hler describes the important role of  families in his 
essay titled “Family Counseling, De-radicalization 
and Counter-Terrorism: The Danish and Ger-
man programs in context.”  Koehler argues that 
families are important in terms of  identifying ear-
ly signs of  radicalization as well as in intervening 
before an individual commits an act of  terrorism. 
Koehler highlights two existing family counseling 
models in Europe as examples of  CVE interven-
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tion programming in Denmark and Germany.  
Part 4: Involving the Community in 
Countering Violent Extremism
The final section presents two case studies from 
the United States that evaluate different CVE 
interventions that focus on different aspects of  a 
community.  One essay focuses on engaging with 
non-state actors within the community, namely 
families, community leaders and youth.  The other 
essay presents community engagement and CVE 
from a law enforcement perspective, highlighting 
the differences in community policing for CVE 
and community policing in general.  While the 
cases in this section are limited to a US-context, 
the research has direct links to programming and 
policy that could be applied outside the context of  
the United States. 
The essay by Michael Williams, John Horgan and 
William Evans titled “Lessons from a US Study 
Revealing the Critical Role of  ‘Gatekeepers’ in 
Public Safety Networks for Countering Violent 
Extremism” highlights which individuals in the 
community might be best poised to intervene in 
the process of  radicalizatoin of  an individual. 
The study draws from evidence from two loca-
tions: Los Angeles and metro Washington, D.C. 
Based on semi-structured interviews and online 
surveys, the research highlights that peers are the 
most crucial gatekeepers, more so than teachers, 
clergy or family members.    
Stevan Weine and Ahmed Younis’ essay “Devel-
oping CVE Programs through Building Com-
munity Policing Capacities,” reports on research 
into law enforcement and criminal justice ap-
proaches to CVE in the context of  Los Ange-
les.  The researcher worked with the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) to highlight some of  
the key differences between community policing 
techniques, and community policing for CVE-
purposes. Among the challenges to CVE commu-
nity policing is that of  community buy-in.  Often 
the Muslim community in LA felt that the police 
department’s CVE programs were intrusive and 
discriminatory, and that radicalization was not al-
ways a priority for the communities that were be-
ing engaged by the police force. 
Conclusion
As global trends impact on the every changing nature of  the threat of  violent extremism, so should the 
research that supports the development of  new programs and policies. The CVE Research Conference 
2014 presented a platform for the continued discussion around the latest data available in academic and 
practitioner-focused research. The essays in this volume, it is hoped, will continue to impact and influence 
the development of  effective CVE programming and good practice.
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CHAPTER 2
The presence of  Western Europeans among the militant extremist groups that are participating in the 
Syrian/Iraqi conflict – especially the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra – has been the subject of  much 
attention. Yet, media reporting on the subject is often anecdotal and sensationalist. The purpose of  this 
paper is to provide an evidence-based overview of  the phenomenon, addressing key questions such as: how 
many have traveled; what messages compel them to go; what do they do in Syria/Iraq; and – of  course – 
what will happen when they return. 
This paper draws on relevant academic literature, credible reporting, and – of  course – the in-depth 
research carried out by researchers at the International Centre for the Study of  Radicalisation (ICSR), 
which included the creation of  a nearly 700 strong database containing the social media profiles of  West-
ern fighters, more than 50 interviews and/or conversations with fighters (typically via private messaging 
services) and field research in Turkish border towns from where the majority of  foreign fighters transfer 
into Syria. This paper will only be able to offer a snapshot of  what is a complex and fast-evolving phenom-
enon, and therefore the policy recommendations – with which the paper will conclude – need to be read 
with this caveat in mind.
Since April 2013, ICSR has regularly published 
estimates on the numbers of  foreign fighters in 
Sunni extremist organization in the Syrian (now 
Syrian/Iraqi) conflict. The latest figures were 
released by the ICSR team at the Munich Security 
Conference in February 2015 (Neumann, 2015). 
They show that the number of  Western European 
fighters has risen from 500 in April 2013 to nearly 
4,000 – an eight- fold increase in less than two 
years. The largest European countries – France 
(1,200), Britain (500-600), and Germany (both 
500-600) – account for more than half  of  the 
total. But it is smaller, especially northern Euro-
pean, countries that seem to be disproportionally 
affected:  Belgium (440), the Netherlands (200-
how many western Foreign European 
Foreign Fighters?
250), Sweden (150-180), Denmark (100-150), and 
Austria (100-150) have all produced as many – in 
some cases, more – foreign fighters per capita than 
their larger neighbors. Also represented are Spain 
(50-100), Italy (80), Finland (50-70), Norway (60), 
Switzerland (40), and Ireland (26) (Countries with 
less than 10 fighters were not listed.) 
Grasping the scale of  mobilization can be 
difficult. In each of  the countries above, the 
Syrian/Iraqi conflict has produced more foreign 
fighters than any single conflict since the Spanish 
Civil War in the 1930s. In many countries, es-
pecially the smaller ones, it has mobilized more 
than in all of  them combined. Western Europe-
KEYwoRdS: foreign fighters, Syria, radicalization
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ans now represent around 20 per cent of  the 
estimated current total of  18,000 fighters from 
outside Syria and Iraq. What’s more, the conflict 
is well on track to becoming the most significant 
mobilization of  Sunni foreign fighters since the 
Second World War. According to the Norwegian 
researcher Thomas Hegghammer (2010, p. 61), 
only the struggle against the Soviet occupation 
of  Afghanistan in the 1980s has attracted more 
foreigners – up to 20,000 – albeit over an entire 
decade.
The Afghanistan analogy is important. It was 
during the Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s that 
many of  the individuals who went on to form al 
Qaeda first met, gained military training and came 
up with the idea of  creating a network of  fighters 
that could be deployed wherever “Muslim lands” 
were occupied or “apostate” dictators needed 
to be overthrown. From Bosnia and Algeria to 
Chechnya and the Philippines, the so-called “Arab 
Afghans” were featured in nearly every conflict in 
the Muslim world in the 1990s and 2000s (Hamid 
& Farrall, 2015). Even the September 11 attacks in 
2001 can be traced to Afghan networks (Wright, 
2007), underlining the longevity of  the potential 
threat; if  the analogy is accurate, some of  the 
foreigners that are fighting in Syria and Iraq today 
will be of  concern for a generation to come.  
     
what messages make them go?
Western Europeans have been drawn into the 
conflict for different reasons. For younger men in 
particular, the notion of  adventure clearly seems 
to be important. The conflict offers a once in a 
lifetime opportunity to “hang out with the broth-
ers”, fight for a cause, and – possibly – become 
a hero. In 2013, many Western fighters in Syria 
were posting pictures and videos that articulated 
the notion of  a “5 star jihad.” They showed young 
European men standing on the battlefield, RPG’s 
over their shoulders, maiming and killing the 
enemy, but also sitting next to swimming pools, 
playing snooker in abandoned villas, and eating 
chocolate bars and potato chips. The message was 
simple: come and join us, this will be the greatest 
adventure of  your life. Indeed, the “5 star jihad” 
theme was so successful that some groups had to 
make statements, explaining what the struggle was 
all about and telling recruits that they were not 
welcome unless they took their faith seriously. 
Among the most compelling narratives, especially 
in the first two years of  the conflict, was the idea 
of  “fighting against existential threat,” which has 
been an important mobilizing theme for foreign 
fighters across cultures and ages (Malet, 2013). 
Countless videos and speeches were articulating the 
idea of  a Shiite conspiracy – led by Syrian presi-
dent Bashar al Assad, and supported by the gov-
ernments of  Iran and Iraq as well as the Leba-
nese Hezbollah – intent on eliminating the Sunni 
people of  Syria. Pictures showing Sunni civilians 
being killed, tortured and raped resonated strong-
ly with many of  the European fighters that we 
have monitored through social networks. They 
not only created a sense of  anger – both at Assad 
for carrying out these crimes, and the West for be-
ing silent and passive – but also one of  urgency. If  
calling oneself  Muslim had any meaning, so the 
argument went, this was the moment to show it. 
Fighting in Syria was seen as legitimate and defen-
sive, and had nothing to do with terrorism. Nor, 
in fact, was it initially perceived as anti-Western, 
since the United States and European countries 
had declared their opposition to Assad as well. 
 
Gradually, though, the (more or less defensive) 
notion of  saving one’s “brothers and sisters” from 
being exterminated has made way for a more 
offensive idea, that of  (re-)creating a Caliphate. 
Ever since extremist groups have started holding 
territories in the north and east of  Syria and cre-
ated their own systems of  governance and imple-
menting, the prospect of  helping to migrate to, 
build, and live in a perfect “Islamic State” has 
fueled the imagination of  many Western recruits. 
Even before the “Islamic State” declared its cali-
phate, many Europeans who had moved to Syria 
burned their (Western) passports, making it clear 
that they had no intention of  returning to their 
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home countries. The quick military victories dur-
ing the summer of  2014 seemed to confirm the 
sense of  destiny and momentum among potential 
recruits, demonstrating that they were involved 
in a historical mission – the re-building of  the 
Caliphate – that “people in a thousand years” 
would still be talking about. It became an attractive 
vision both for ideologically hardened extremists 
and those who were looking to fill their lives with 
meaning and significance (Kruglanski & Orehek, 
2010, p. 153-166).
Finally, since the beginning of  coalition airstrikes 
in August 2014, we have seen evidence of  the tra-
ditional “West vs. Islam” rhetoric which had been 
difficult to apply to a conflict in which Western 
powers were trying hard not to become involved. 
Going to Syria and Iraq has, yet again, become a 
means of  fighting America which, they argue, is 
hoping to “occupy and colonize” Muslim lands. 
       
what do they do in Syria?
Having decided to become “migrants,” virtually 
all potential fighters make their way to Turkey 
from where they transfer into Syria. Before join-
ing the group, they typically have to stay in safe 
houses on either side of  the border and subject 
themselves to various checks and tests. The pur-
pose is to find out whether recruits’ motivations 
are sincere and to what extent they can be useful 
to the group. Over the course of  the conflict, the 
groups have become more rigorous, and we know 
of  cases where recruits had to “apply” to several 
groups before eventually being able to join. 
Although the vast majority of  (male) recruits have 
ambitions to become fighters, not every foreign-
er is used in combat. This is particularly true for 
Westerners and Europeans of  whom only a small 
minority has any military training or experience, 
which – in any case – tends to pale in compari-
son to the Chechens, Libyans, or Iraqis who have 
fought in insurgencies gaining reputations for be-
ing physically fit and battle-hardened. Europeans 
often do jobs based on their civilian skills and 
training. If  someone used to work as a car me-
chanic, he will be used in a similar capacity by 
the “Islamic State,” fixing technical equipment or 
teaching people how to operate military equip-
ment. If  he is good with computers or writing, he 
may join the social media department, helping to 
produce videos and websites aimed at intimidat-
ing Western audiences and promoting the group’s 
message back in a Western context. 
Where Europeans are used in the military proper, 
it is often for low-level military duties that require 
little skills and come with no great responsibilities. 
They receive one or two weeks military training 
and are then deployed on guard duty, standing at 
fixed positions for hours on end, often with spe-
cific instructions not to fire their weapons but alert 
other, presumably more experienced, operators 
should threats arise. For many Western fighters, 
this is a source of  frustration. They often arrive in 
Syria with high expectations, thinking they will be 
involved in combat and take part in daring raids 
and adventures. The mundane realities of  (low 
level) military service has caused some to feel un-
dervalued and become disillusioned. In a number 
of  cases, people have volunteered to act as couri-
ers, going back to their European home countries 
to raise money and buy essential equipment, as 
illustrated in Der Generalbundesanwalt v. Ismail 
Issa, Mohammed Ayubi, and Ezzedinne Issa, ‘An-
klageschrift’ (2014).
The lack of  fighting and language skills – many 
Europeans do not speak Arabic – limits their util-
ity in military terms. On the other hand, it is pre-
cisely those recruits who are frequently used for 
excessively violent operations: acts of  torture, be-
headings, and – of  course – suicide operations. 
From the groups’ perspective, foreigners who do 
not speak the local language, have no ties to lo-
cal populations, and have come to Syria on purely 
ideological grounds are also the most dependent 
and, therefore, obedient. While doing fieldwork 
near the Syrian border, several fighters told us that 
Syrians would often refuse to become involved in 
executions and suicide operations arguing that 
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these tactics had “nothing to do with the kind of  
Islam that’s been practiced in Syria for centuries.” 
Foreigners, by contrast, are disproportionately 
represented among the suicide bombers, and have 
a near monopoly when it comes to involvement in 
beheadings and executions.  
   
what happens when they return?
One of  the most contentious questions among 
European policymakers is how to deal with 
fighters who return to their home countries. Yet 
it is far from certain how many will return, and 
how many of  those will pose a terrorism threat. 
Significant numbers will die. For example, among 
the British fighters, for whom we track death 
notices, the share of  “martyrs” has risen to as 
much as 10 per cent of  the national contingent 
(Gani & Mallik, 2014). Others will try to stay in 
the conflict zone, having married or become com-
mitted to the idea of  building the “Islamic State.” 
Yet others will attempt to move to other conflict 
zones, migrate to places where jihadist groups have 
affiliated themselves to al Qaeda or the “Islamic 
State,” or – simply – get stuck in Turkey and other 
transit countries. This doesn’t render them harm-
less, quite the contrary, but it is unlikely they will 
pose an immediate threat to their home countries.     
      
Of  those who manage to return, a “dangerous 
minority” will commit acts of  terrorism. The two 
rigorous academic studies that have examined the 
“veteran effect” among “jihadist” foreign fight-
ers in previous conflicts both found that a ma-
jority of  returnees (88 per cent and 75 per cent 
respectively) do not become involved in terrorism 
(Hegghammer, 2013 pp. 1-15; Klausen & Roach, 
2014), while the minority (12 and 25 per cent) 
tends to be more dangerous: they often have mili-
tary skills (however rudimentary), are brutalized, 
and have become part of  international networks 
– all factors that make terrorist plots more viable 
and lethal (Hegghammer, 2013 pp. 1-15; Klausen 
& Roach, 2014). It is hard to predict to what ex-
tent these findings will be replicated in the cur-
rent conflict. The notion of  a wider struggle for 
a “Caliphate” and growing Western involvement 
may increase the share of  those who are deter-
mined to carry on the struggle after their return, 
while smart government responses and a political 
backlash against groups like the ‘Islamic State’ 
may help to reduce it. The number of  variables 
is endless, and the future dynamics of  the conflict 
impossible to foresee.  
  
Whatever the long-term trends, the issue is no 
longer an abstract problem. Nearly every Europe-
an country from where recruits have “migrated” 
to Syria has now seen a first wave of  returnees. 
For Germany, the number of  Syria returnees was 
put at 150 (“Syrien-Rückkehrer,” 2014), while 
in Britain, officials have recently mentioned a 
figure of  300, half  of  that country’s contingent 
(Adesina, 2015). In practically every country in 
Europe, criminal charges have been brought 
against Syria returnees, most notably in Belgium 
where 46 people have been charged in a single 
trial (Bartunek, 2014). Belgium is also the country 
where a Syria returnee, Mehdi Nemmouche, has 
killed four people at a Jewish museum, and anoth-
er attack is said to have been stopped by a police 
operation that killed two of  the plot’s ringleaders, 
both Syria ‘veterans’(“Brussels Jewish Museum 
Killing,” 2014; Traynor, 2015).  
Our own observations suggest that there might be 
three distinct groups of  returnees based on their 
motivations and experience as part of  the conflict. 
They can be summed up in three D’s. The first – 
the dangerous – have further radicalized and ac-
quired the skills and determination to carry on, 
rejecting the idea that there exists a distinction 
between fighting Assad and fighting the West – 
or in the West. The second – the disturbed – suf-
fer from combat related stress and other mental 
health issues, often as a result of  witnessing – or 
being personally involved in – excessive acts of  
violence. The final group – the disillusioned – no 
longer supports the organizations and/or causes 
they were involved in and want to re-integrate into 
their home societies. This doesn’t imply that they 
have ceased being (cognitive) extremists but that – 
for the time being – the risk of  becoming involved 
in political violence is low (Neumann, 2013).
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Policy recommendations
As this overview has shown, the current Western foreign fighter population in Syria and Iraq is not a 
monolithic entity. They differ in motivations, roles and experiences during their time in Syria, as well as 
their reasons for returning. It makes no sense, therefore, to pretend that they can all be tarred with the same 
brush. Doing so would not be smart, nor would it make European countries any safer. 
While there are strong reasons to stop more people from joining the conflict – for example, by 
temporarily confiscating their passports – the response to returnees needs to be determined by the risk they 
pose. Where Syria “veterans” are believed to be dangerous, prosecution leading to prison may be the only 
viable option. Society needs to be protected from the “disturbed” too, though this may involve psychologi-
cal and, where needed, psychiatric treatment. The “disillusioned,” in turn, may respond to de-radicalisa-
tion, intervention and exit programs, such as the ones that already exist in countries like Britain, Germany, 
Sweden, and Denmark. Most important, though, countries need to develop reliable instruments for assess-
ing – and monitoring – the risk, according to which people are categorized as one or the other.
Regardless of  the nature of  a country’s response, the numbers presented in this paper should make it clear 
that the foreign fighter issue represents one of  the greatest challenges for European intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies for years to come. It will be one for European societies too: no matter how good 
a country’s response, there is little doubt that the conflict will have consequences on the streets of  Eu-
rope too. People’s resilience will determine if  the dangerous among the Syria “veterans” can succeed in 
spreading division and hate not only abroad but also at home.    
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CHAPTER 3
During the Fourth Review of  the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in summer 2014, it was becoming 
apparent that the issue of  Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) has become a global concern, consuming the 
attention of  a large number of  the world’s politicians, policy-makers and security personnel. During the 
Review, United Nations Member States expressed “grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed 
by foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of  residence 
or nationality for the purpose of  the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist 
acts or the providing or receiving of  terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict, and 
resolving to address this threat” (United Nations, 2014). Although the flow of  national foreign fighters 
across national territories to participate in war-active zones is not a new phenomenon, and is a problem 
present in various regions of  the world as we will see later in this essay, the issue that seems to concern most 
Members of  the international community at the moment is the issue of  FTFs in Syria and Iraq. This was clearly 
expressed by Member States during the Fourth Review, which was followed by the 2078 Resolution that 
called upon all Member States to stem the flow of  FTFs through collaboration with the United Nations. 
The focus on FTFs in Syria and Iraq is not surprising. To begin with, the number of  FTFs in Syria and 
Iraq is much larger than anything seen before. A new report by the United Nations 1267 Monitoring Team 
concluded that “More than 25,000 foreign fighters from some 100 countries are linked to al Qaeda and Is-
lamic State, with Syria and Iraq comprising a veritable international finishing school for extremists” (“Syr-
ia, Iraq,” 2015). Put differently, the phenomenon of  FTFs today affects more than half  of  United Nations 
Member States. Second, the level of  brutality expressed by some of  the groups which FTFs are joining in 
Syria and Iraq is unprecedented by any other rebel groups. This includes decapitation, kidnapping, assas-
sination, suicide bombing, burning detainees alive, destroying archeological and historical heritage, and 
brutal killings of  the perceived ‘enemy.’ The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, described 
such acts as “unspeakable atrocities,” (“Ban Ki-Moon,” 2015) adding that “I am especially outraged by the 
reports from Iraq of  brutal killing of  civilians by ISIL” (Berwani, 2014). 
But the concern regarding FTFs for many countries is over the question of  what will happen to them, or rather 
what they will do after their return to their home countries: How radicalized will they be by then, particularly af-
ter experiencing, if  not participating in the fighting themselves in Syria and Iraq? How many of  them represent 
a real and present danger to their home countries and societies after returning from war-zones? How many of  
them will be genuine repents and how many will attempt to perpetrate terrorist acts? What is the best approach 
to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into their society and families? What exactly should we do with them? 
Obviously, much of  our actions and policies will depend on the answers to these important questions. For now, 
most of  us simply do not “know what to do with them” (“Emrah and his Brothers,” 2015).
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This essay thus fills an important gap in the literature by discussing the issue of  FTFs in Syria and Iraq. 
In particular, it focuses on exactly how much knowledge we actually have about these individuals, asking 
“where do they come from?”, “what motivates them to fight?” and “what causes them to repent and re-
turn home?” The essay ends with a small section on the main challenges that the international community 
faces/will face in rehabilitating and reintegrating those FTF returnees. The essay concluds with a sum-
mary and recommendations. 
Information obtained directly from Member States, particularly regarding the number and characteristics 
of  FTFs, represent the major source of  information for this essay. This information has been obtained dur-
ing country visits or direct contacts with officials in those states via telephone calls or emails. The essay also 
relies on other official publications published by the UN, national governments and the media to support 
its analysis. 
what do we Know About FtFs: where 
do they Come From?
The only area where the issue of  FTFs phenom-
enon commands some sort of  an agreement is 
over the relatively large number of  those fighters 
and where they come from. While agreeing how-
ever that the number of  FTFs in Syria and Iraq 
is relatively large, there is a disagreement over 
their exact numbers. The most recent estimate is 
the one given by the United Nations Monitoring 
Team, which was mentioned in the previous sec-
tion and which put the number of  FTFs at more 
than 25,000 from over 100 countries. However, 
the report adds that 25,000 is the total number of  
FTFs all over the world, and that there are “some 
22,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq” alone 
(Nichols, 2015).
Such ambiguities characterize most reports 
on FTFs. In his recent (2014) report on FTFs, 
Richard Barrett, the former head of  the 1267 
Monitoring Team and currently senior vice 
president in the Soufan Group, gives completely 
different statistics for FTFs in Syria and Iraq:
It is reasonable to conclude that at least 12,000 foreign-
ers have fought in Syria over the first three years of  the 
war. This compares with an equally imprecise estimate 
of  10,000 for the whole ten-year period of  the Afghan 
‘jihad’ against Soviet occupation plus the period of  Tali-
ban rule from 1996 to 2001 (Barrett, 2014, p. 14).
Our own estimates, obtained directly from the 
capitals of  the countries where most FTFs origi-
nate, are closer to the figures given by Barrett. 
These are given in Table 1 below. The Table gives 
an idea about why it is so difficult to agree on one 
figure related to FTFs in Syria and Iraq. For a 
start, these numbers are not stable: they keep on 
changing on an almost weekly basis, and mostly 
in an upward direction. According to Belgium of-
ficials, two individuals leave Belgium on a weekly 
basis to join the fighting in Syria. That is, on aver-
age eight Belgians leave for Syria on a monthly 
basis, and 96 leave on a yearly basis. So far, and 
as Table 1 demonstrates, the number of  FTFs in 
Syria and Iraq can be modestly estimated at just 
over 13,000. These figures, as already stated ear-
lier, are obtained directly from counter terrorism 
officials in the capitals of  countries from whence 
those fighters came. They can therefore be taken 
as the most accurate available to date on FTFs. 
Even our figures (in Table 1) are not problem-
free. This is not only because these figures keep on 
changing constantly, but also because they include 
the number of  FTFs from countries for which 
there is no relevant documentation. There is an-
other unknown number of  FTFs who come from 
52 other countries known to have FTFs going to 
Syria and Iraq, but for whom any figures are una-
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vailable. Those countries, however, are not known 
to have large numbers of  FTFs (Barrett, 2014, 
p. 14). There is a consensus that the countries 
represented in Table 1 are the largest providers of  
FTFs in the world today.
It is obvious from Table 1 that the largest number 
of  FFs come from the Arab World. In particular, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco are 
the four largest providers of  FTFs in the Middle 
East and the Levant. These four countries alone 
provide more than 90 per cent of  all Arab FTFs 
in Syria and Iraq. 
It is equally interesting to note that the largest 
number of  FTFs joining the war in Syria and 
Iraq come from the Arab North African region 
(Tunisia and Morocco). If  the unknown number 
of  Algerian and Libyan fighters is included, then 
the prominence of  North Africa as a provider of  
FTFs becomes even more significant. 
Tunisia and Morocco are particularly interesting 
cases. The latter skilfully avoided the political up-
heavals and instabilities associated with Arab re-
volts which started in late 2010 and seems to have 
peacefully achieved a calm transition to a more 
politically open system. The former, however, is 
the country where the Arab Revolt began before it 
spread to other Arab States. All observers today re-
gard Tunisia as a country: “stand[ing] as an excep-
tion in the Arab world for having peacefully com-
pleted a democratic electoral process, four years 
after the downfall of  its dictator” (“The Guardian 
view,” 2014). Some now fear that the large exodus 
of  such a large number of  FTFs might unsettle 
the country’s democratic transition and destabi-
lize its political system, particularly if  these fight-
ers return home with more radicalized ideas and 
ideologies. Certainly, such fears have been inten-
sified following the recent “assault on the Bardo 
Museum in March 2015” (Durac, 2015). This was 
preceded by violence in the wake of  a prominent 
leftist politician’s assassination in early Febru-
ary 2013, namely Chokri Belaid.  Such incidents 
have not only “triggered a showdown within the 
tAbLE 1: Numbers and Origins of 
Foreign Fighters
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ruling Islamic Ennahda Party between its moder-
ate and fundamentalist wings but also deepened 
the hostility between secularists and Islamists 
within Tunisian society” (Ottaway, 2013). There 
is evidence to believe that some members of  the 
Museum attackers were trained abroad, particu-
larly in Libya. It is no exaggeration therefore to 
say that the issue of  FTFs might be one of  the 
most serious challenges facing Tunisia’s, and other 
Arab states’ nascent democratic processes. 
Second, Europe also provides a large number of  
FTFs, second to the Arab States. So far, Europe 
has provided more than 2600 FTFs to Syria and 
Iraq. This moves the fight closer to Europe. Since 
the conflict in Syria began in 2011, European 
fighters have been travelling less to such once-
popular areas like Afghanistan, the mountains of  
Pakistan and Somalia and are instead going in 
increasing numbers to Syria and Iraq, which is 
only a few hours flight away from the EU. Little is 
still known about what motivates those fighters to 
leave the EU and join the war in Syria. This has 
led to the launching currently of  several new stud-
ies on the motivations of  FTFs, including by the 
United Nations itself, which launched probably 
the largest study on FTFs earlier this year. In time, 
this will help improve our understanding for the 
FTFs phenomenon and will help in developing 
more effective strategies to stem the flow of  FTFs. 
However, make no mistake about it: the radicaliza-
tion of  European FTFs did not happen overnight. 
These home-grown European fighters are the 
products of  European societies and they should 
be seen as such. A great deal of  the explanation 
for their radicalization and motivation to migrate 
to Syria and Iraq must be found in their home Eu-
ropean countries. This is the case to a large extent, 
although not solely. External factors can, and have 
intensified the pressure to migrate to the region. 
As a German observer put it, they leave Germany, 
and other European countries, “because they are 
unsuccessful there” and because they “want to 
make history, if  not in Germany then in the Mid-
dle East, as the first generation in a new caliphate, 
Source: All figures for 2014 from 
Barrett, 2014. The rest are taken 
directly from officials of governments 
in those capitals. 
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even though… most of  them are theological and 
ideological illiterates” (Ozlem, 2015). 
Third, it is not clear who these FTFs are joining 
while in Syria. It is true that three designated ter-
rorist organizations have attracted the overwhelm-
ing majority of  foreign fighters. These are: Ahrar 
al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of  
Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS). However, not 
only has in-fighting so far characterized the re-
lationship between these three main groups, but 
there are foreign fighters who are also joining oth-
er groups too, like the Kurdish Beshmerqha, the 
Syrian regime’s army, Hezbollah, the Shi’ats, and 
Yazidiz, and the Christian minorities. There are 
also FTFs who are joining other war-zone areas 
in different parts of  the world. The total number 
of  FTFs that are currently involved in fighting for 
one group or another around the world, accord-
ing to the same UN Report mentioned earlier, 
exceeds 30,000 individuals. As a Canadian re-
searcher noticed: “There are also dozens of  other 
Canadians who have fought in Sri Lanka, Soma-
lia, Israel, and Afghanistan with largely nationalist 
motivations. Thus far, very few of  them have been 
involved with terrorist attacks on Canadian soil.” 
We return to this last point in the next section. 
Fourth, there is a relatively large number of  fe-
male FTFs among this new wave of  violent ex-
tremists. According to the ICCT (2015), there are 
at least “550 Western women in IS-controlled ter-
ritory” today, twenty per cent of  which are Brit-
ish. These are mostly young women who have left 
their homes and families to travel to Syria and 
Iraq to join ISIS. This does not include the num-
ber of  Arab women who joined one of  the major 
rebel groups in Syria and Iraq, whose numbers 
are equally difficult to estimate. 
Finally, there is a relatively increasing number of  
FTFs who are also voluntarily choosing to return 
to their homes and families after spending some 
time in Syria and Iraq. They are disillusioned 
fighters who have chosen to return to their Eu-
ropean countries after being disenchanted with 
what they saw and with their experience with the 
groups they fought for while in Syria and Iraq. 
Their exact number is also inaccurately reported, 
but they easily exceed 1,400 so far around the 
world (Table 1).
Reformed Fighters or Potential Killers?
As more are expected to return to their home so-
cieties, the key questions which today occupy the 
minds of  most state officials and security person-
nel are the following: Who are those returning 
FTFs? What threat do they pose to their home 
societies? How radicalized have they become or 
are they? In a recent article on FTFs, a German 
journalist captured those key questions: “Are they 
reformed fighters? Or are these young men po-
tential killers, members of  terrorist sleeper cells 
who pose a mortal threat to their home, European 
countries?” (Ozlem, 2015). Obviously, the answer 
to the above-mentioned questions, in addition 
to the question of  what to do with the returning 
FTFs, will shape our actions and policy responses. 
They are the subject of  the next section.
It is much harder for female FTFs to return home 
once they have entered a war-zone area like Syria 
or Iraq. Once there, their movement is far more 
restricted, often requiring permission from their 
husbands or care-takers, their movements are 
more easily spotted and the logistics of  departing 
a war zone is far more strenuous and complicated 
not only due to physical and geographical reasons, 
but also due to limited knowledge of  the place 
and limited connections they often harbor whilst 
there, which could facilitate their return to their 
home country. Not surprisingly, the number of  fe-
male fighters who have already returned to their 
homes is very limited. This is certainly the case 
when compared with the number of  male FTFs 
returnees. 
The motivations for joining the war in Syria and 
Iraq varies so greatly that it is almost impossible to 
make any sweeping generalizations. Those should 
be avoided. What is important to remember here, 
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as the anthropologist Scott Atran told the United 
Nations Security Council recently:
There’s nothing all that unusual about ISIS members. 
Perhaps understandably, people like to sweep members of  
groups like ISIS into undesirable categories, saying that 
they’re all crazy or psychotic, for example. But time and 
time again, research has shown this to be false; normal-
seeming people join radical movements all the time and 
do remarkably vicious things once they’re there. The same 
holds for ISIS members (Atran, 2015).
As alluded to earlier in this essay and pointed out 
by other scholars like Mark Sageman, for exam-
ple, whenever and wherever there were injustices, 
whether real or perceived, certain individuals mo-
tivated by empathy, compassion, idealism, and the 
desire to help others take action to correct what 
they perceive as injustices. This was the case in 
Nazi Germany, Cuba’s Castro, South Africa un-
der the apartheid, Afghanistan during the Russian 
invasion, and Israel in its wars against the Arabs 
(Sageman, 2008). Israel calls the equivalent of  
its own FTFs “Lone Soldiers.” Today, the Israeli 
Army itself  “reports 4,600 foreign Lone Soldiers 
currently serving” in its ranks, “over one-third of  
whom are American (it is unclear how many hold 
dual citizenship)” (Malet, 2014).
Although research on FTFs remains at its infan-
cy, there is an agreement that: “As many scholars 
have noted, there is no one single profile of  these 
individuals – their ethnic, cultural, economic, and 
religious backgrounds are varied and diverse.” 
The same applies for female FTFs. A recent re-
port the London-based Institute of  Strategic Dia-
logue described the 100 known female FTFs in 
the following words: “It really debunks the stereo-
types,” said ISD senior researcher Erin Saltman. 
“The ages range from 13 to 40, with a range of  
education and professions and families. It’s very 
complicated” (Shubert 2015).
Some are no doubt motivated by ideology. This 
is perhaps the case with the very top leadership 
of  ISIS and Al-Nusra. But, most of  the foot sol-
diers lack even basic knowledge of  Islam and have 
more varied and diversified motivations. As Scott 
Atran stated in his Security Council speech: 
None of  the ISIS fighters we interviewed in Iraq had 
more than primary school education, some had wives and 
young children. When asked ‘what is Islam?’ they an-
swered ‘my life.’ They knew nothing of  the Quran or 
Hadith, or of  the early caliphs Omar and Othman, but 
had learned of  Islam from Al Qaeda and ISIS propa-
ganda, teaching that Muslims like them were targeted 
for elimination unless they first eliminated the impure 
(Atran, 2015). 
Such calls to radicalize and recruit individuals are 
more likely to succeed in countries characterized 
by injustices, bad governances, marginalization of  
groups, and social, political and economic exclu-
sion, and marginalization. Syria, Iraq, Afghani-
stan, Somali, and places characterized by foreign 
occupation are prime examples of  such places. 
Even in the case of  FTFs from Western countries, 
such as the European Union and Australia for ex-
ample, it has been pointed out time and again that 
the failure of  integration policies in such places 
facilitate recruitment and radicalization.  It is now 
officially recognized that the rise of  Islamophobia 
in these countries is compounded by the fact that 
Muslim communities are among the most disad-
vantaged in terms of  economic opportunities, ed-
ucational level, political representation, wage dif-
ferentiation, and job opportunities. What matters 
is not simply the conditions of  the individuals who 
join violent extremist groups, but rather the com-
munities where they come from. In short, both 
internal and external factors combine to radical-
ize and recruit for violent extremist actions and 
organizations.
Such radicalizing conditions were, and continue 
to be available in Iraq and Syria under al-Maliki 
and Assad: 
First cause is al Maliki’s wrong policy towards the Sun-
ni minority. After the withdrawal of  the US forces from 
Iraq, al Maliki started to resort to more authoritarian 
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leadership than before. He excluded Sunnis from power 
and favored Shias. He began to get rid of  any opposing 
voices, particularly Sunnis, in the government, starting 
by arresting his Sunni vice president Hashimi (Laissouf  
2014).
Young age and the role played by group dynamics 
and friendship networks in influencing their deci-
sion to fight abroad are seen to be common char-
acteristics of  almost all foreign fighters. This is 
the case with FFs coming from Canada, the UK, 
Australia, Germany and the USA to mention just 
a few examples. According to one source, about 3 
out of  every 4 people who join Al Qaeda or ISIS 
do so through friends, most of  the rest through 
family or fellow travelers in search of  a meaning-
ful path in life. It is rare, though, that parents are 
ever aware that their children desire to join the 
movement (Atran, 2015).
As pointed out earlier, some FTFs have either re-
turned to their home countries, or are trying to re-
turn home. Countries’ responses and attitudes to-
wards returning FTFs have varied. Most countries 
have so far issued new regulations that criminal-
izes FTFs, ramps up security measures and further 
empowers security personnel. Such approaches 
are not likely to make us safer today. They deal 
with the symptoms, but do not address the root 
causes of  the problem. They might prevent an in-
dividual from joining a war abroad by arresting 
him/her, but they will not stop others from trying. 
Nor do they tell us anything on why individuals 
choose to leave prosperous societies to join un-
certainty and even die fighting a foreign war. It 
is doubtful whether such reactive approaches can 
arrest more people than the ones they could end 
up radicalizing.   
Before criminalizing the acts of  FTFs in summer 
2014, 150 Jordanian fighters returned home, after 
being disillusioned and descanted with their expe-
rience in Syria. After the new regulations were in-
troduced, not one single fighter returned. In other 
words, simply ramping up security measures and 
criminalizing their acts is pushing FTFs in one 
direction: dead-enders. Such policies are bound 
to further radicalize them, their friends and their 
family members (El-Said, 2015). 
Many countries have not criminalized the acts of  
FTFs who continue to be free to move in and out 
of  those countries as they wish. Sweden and Nor-
way are among those countries. Those countries 
today appear less vulnerable to violent extremism 
than those which ramped up their security forces 
and criminalized FTFs’ acts and actions. As the 
Canadian academic pointed out, “Thus far, very 
few of  them [returning FTFs] have been involved 
with terrorist attacks.” And most terrorist attacks 
that have been committed by FTFs have actually 
taken place in countries that ramped up their se-
curity measures and criminalized FTFs’ acts as a 
countenance measure. These include Australia, 
Canada, Belgium, France and the UK (El Said, 
2015).  
At least three challenges are faced by returning 
FTFs and their home countries. Dealing with 
these challenges can go a long way towards fash-
ioning effective reintegrating and rehabilitation 
policies and programs.
First, returning FTFs return home because of  
their disillusionment and disappointment with 
life abroad and the tactics of  those organizations 
they fought for. They provide an excellent way to 
counter the narrative of  radicals and undermine 
recruitment of  youth into violent extremist or-
ganizations. Once they return to their countries, 
however, their peaceful reintegration is faced with 
a mountain of  challenges. One of  the challenges 
they face was publicized in a letter a German FTF 
returnee addressed to the Interior Ministry of  the 
state of  North Rhine-Westphalia: “I don’t have a 
job or a qualification, and I have zero prospects in 
the job market” (Ozlem, 2015). Most also have no 
savings or assets to fall back on after their return 
and the new ramping up of  legislations which 
criminalizes FTFs only makes their reintegration 
more difficult.  The same German FTF gives a 
good indication of  how policy-makers should re-
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act to his case: Please “help people like me.”
Second, in addition to legislative obstacles, the re-
turning FTFs face continuous pressure from the 
radical violent extremist movements and ideo-
logues not to repent, not to give up on their be-
liefs, and to try to convince them that their per-
severance will soon be rewarded. They know that 
detained FTFs will eventually be released and, if  
not rehabilitated and successfully reintegrated, 
they will continue to remain vulnerable to violent 
extremist acts and ideologies.  They continue to 
compete therefore with state and its apparatus for 
the hearts and minds of  returning FTFs. This is 
not simply a matter of  a counter narrative exer-
cise. 
In fact, our counter narrative is very negative and 
in some cases is actually counter-productive. Is it 
realistic that our counter narrative is focused on 
telling our youth that “do you know that ISIS 
decapitates peoples” heads and that they commit 
crimes? Is that where you want to go?” Do they 
not know that?  A teenage girl from a Chicago 
suburb who was stopped by the FBI from flying 
to Syria responded to such a question by saying 
“Well, what about the barrel bombings that kill 
thousands? Maybe if  the beheading helps to stop 
that” (Atran, 2015). Only by making a real differ-
ence for the youth on the grounds and providing 
them with dignified alternative opportunities we 
can successfully counter the violent extremist nar-
ratives. 
Finally, returning FTFs face challenges from their 
own wider society. Marginalized, stigmatized and 
labelled by misinformed and misplaced reactive 
regulations and the media, most members of  so-
cieties want nothing to do with them. This places 
greater pressure on the communities where these 
fighters come from, and particularly from their 
mothers and family members who are concerned 
for their safety. The implications of  this calls for a 
stronger engagement with all community members.
Conclusion
FTFs are the product of  their own societies in the first place. Their radicalization and participation in wars 
abroad is caused by pressures faced in their own societies first, combined with external pressures to do 
the right thing and help others. Their reintegration back into their own societies faces serious challenges. 
Reactive regulatory policies are one major challenge. The lack of  proper understanding for the condi-
tions conducive to radicalization and participation in foreign wars is another. A third challenge is lack of  
alternative dignified opportunities, coupled with a society that wants very little with them. There is a need 
to reinvest in and reactivate the Prevent pillar of  our strategies, which relies more on community engage-
ment as one of  the most powerful soft instruments available to immune our societies from the dangers of  
radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism. This essay also makes a strong case for the promotion 
of  good governance, the rule of  law and human rights as the key pillar of  any prevention of  violent ex-
tremism. In addition to promoting good governance, the rule of  law and human rights, solving prolonged 
and unresolved conflicts, particularly in countries where the ancestors of  most FTFs originate from will go 
along way towards reducing the external drivers of  radicalisation. In short, there is a need to move from 
countering terrorism to preventing violent extremism, not only in Western societies but also in the Middle 
East and North Africa where most of  FTFs either come or originated from.
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CHAPTER 4
The essay will take as its starting point the European Union (EU)-funded Strengthening Resilience to 
Violent Extremism (STRIVE) Horn of  Africa programme. STRIVE is a pilot designed to test assump-
tions around what works in countering violent extremism (CVE) in the Horn of  Africa, as well as to build 
the evidence base to support recommendations for future programming. This essay will outline the four 
core areas underpinning STRIVE – a) law enforcement and civil-society relations, b) the role of  women, 
c) the role of  diaspora, and d) youth marginalisation – and consider these in the context of  a summary of  
recent findings from research and pilot activities around recruitment to violent groups and radicalisation 
in the region. The essay will emphasise research methodologies, considerations and challenges within an 
overall framework of  moving from policy to practice. Finally, the essay will stress the fact that a narrow CVE 
focus is new in the Horn of  Africa and that there is a significant need for more methodological innovation, 
creative programming and flexible donors, with many research gaps to be filled. STRIVE Horn of  Africa 
(HoA) is the first in a series of  global, EU funded research-based pilot programmes focusing on CVE.
background
STRIVE HoA is implemented by the British-
registered think tank the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI), which specialises in defence and 
security policy. STRIVE is implemented from the 
regional RUSI office in Nairobi. The purpose of  
STRIVE is to develop best practice to implement 
and monitor CVE programmes in the HoA. The 
starting point for the programme is that CVE is 
not the responsibility of  any one institution. Vari-
ous actors have a role to play in the continuum be-
tween civil society and law enforcement in order 
to contribute to countering the process of  radicali-
sation towards use of  violence and to facilitating 
returning fighters’ re-integration. 
STRIVE is focused around four result centered 
areas, all primarily preventative in nature. The 
areas are:
•	 Result	Area	1:	Building the regional capac-
ity of  security sector and law enforcement au-
thorities to engage with civil society in fighting 
violent extremism. 
•	 Result	 Area	 2: Strengthening the capacity 
of  women’s organisations in Puntland and So-
maliland to fight violent extremism.
•	 Result	area	3: Increasing the understanding 
of  the challenges faced by EU-born Somali 
Youth in Somaliland.
KEYwoRdS: violent extremism, radicalisation, recruitment, prevention, youth, women, diaspora, law enforcement, civil 
society, empirical research.
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•	 Result	area	4: Increasing the understanding 
of  the drivers of  radicalisation among youth 
in Kenya.
Geographically, STRIVE covers Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Puntland, South Central Somalia and Somaliland, 
with a primary initial focus on Kenya, Puntland 
and Somaliland. STRIVE is a 36-month pilot and 
was initiated in January 2014. The first period was 
utilised to establish the office and undertake re-
search into the four result areas before initiating 
series of  2-3-month pilot activities testing the pro-
gramme’s underlying assumptions. 
CVE research in the hoA
When analysing the process of  radicalisation to-
wards the use of  violence, socioeconomic vulner-
abilities and motivating factors can only be un-
derstood in relation to local, regional and global 
politics. Therefore, research must place the pro-
cess of  radicalisation within such a framework, 
bearing in mind that the politics are constantly 
changing and will contribute to changing pat-
terns of  radicalisation and recruitment to violent 
groups, and to changing overall narratives relating 
to these elements. 
This section is based on examples from research 
undertaken as a part of  STRIVE. The research 
aims to inform understanding of  radicalisation 
process in each specific location and support the 
development of  pilot activities which are as re-
sponsive as possible to the current situation.
the Role of the diaspora
The first example looks at the role of  Diaspora 
in Somaliland and explores the assumption that 
Diaspora youth are vulnerable to recruitment 
by violent groups when visiting Somaliland from 
abroad. The research was carried out by a team 
based in Hargeisa and the researchers responsible 
for data collection had a connection or affiliation 
to the areas where they collected the data. Differ-
ent team members collected data in different areas 
to increase access. They were in daily contact and 
briefed each other on progress and preliminary 
findings. The research was led by a senior inter-
national consultant specialising in research into 
sensitive issues. 
The data was collected according to a semi-struc-
tured interview guide developed in collaboration 
with the STRIVE team, but was constantly adapt-
ed to the specific interview. The research team 
introduced the study in interview situations as a 
study on social, educational, religious and cultural 
trends in Somaliland in order to mitigate any risk 
for the research team and to allow for increased 
confidence on the part of  the interviewee. It was, 
however, agreed with the team that interviews 
should be concluded if  the interviewee was reluc-
tant to participate. On occasions, the interviews 
were repeated and took shape as conversations 
over several meetings.
The findings from the study were rich, but for 
the purposes of  this essay the main relevant find-
ing was that youth amongst the host population 
is equally vulnerable to being attracted to the ex-
ternal narrative, and that the host population in 
some cases was inspired by the Diaspora narrative 
and promotion of  violence, rather than vice versa. 
This finding points to the fact that conservative 
and traditional practice of  religion is different to 
radicalisation and Islamic extremism, which in 
Somaliland appears to be a modern phenomenon. 
One of  the key lessons drawn from the findings 
was the need to adapt the programme to focus on 
relations between the two groups, rather than en-
gaging with one primarily. 
the Role of women in Violent Extremism 
and Countering Violent Extremism in 
Somalia
The second example looks at improving un-
derstanding of  the role of  women in violent ex-
tremism and consequently in countering violent 
extremism. The aim behind the project is to un-
derstand how mothers, sisters, wives, girlfriends, 
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cousins and peers are engaged (if  at all) in the pro-
cess of  recruitment, and how they are affected by 
or contribute to radicalisation. The assumption is 
that they must be aware when a relative or friend 
changes their views, behaviour and/or social net-
work. The studies strove to unpack what they do 
with this information and how a project focusing 
on countering violent extremism could engage 
with women as a part of  a preventative effort.
At the time of  writing, a study in Somaliland and 
one in Puntland are ongoing. The studies are being 
carried out by local researchers in Somaliland and 
Puntland and are limited to pre-agreed locations. 
The study was designed in collaboration with the 
researchers, and interviewees included teachers, 
madrasa teachers, imams, women’s groups, elders, 
women’s representatives in community groups 
and knowledgeable persons in each location. As 
such, the studies were not necessarily with affected 
women themselves, so a follow-up study with them 
would be useful for further analysis.
The preliminary findings indicate that women 
are engaged in a subtle manner in both locations. 
Their social relations and interactions in the com-
munity are utilised by groups using violence as a 
means to express their views to influence and re-
cruit, sometimes without the women being aware 
of  this. Often the women are approached by indi-
viduals appearing stereotypically religious in their 
appearance and with religious authority from a 
nearby mosque. The women are financially com-
pensated for engaging with nearby households to 
get their children to attend a certain madrasa or 
collect money for a certain mosque. 
Sometimes the women’s engagement is more di-
rect, involving hosting travelling members of  the 
movement and assisting with hidden operations. 
The research also shows that women are per-
ceived to be less likely to be involved than men, so 
engaging women can be a safer way of  operating. 
The programming lessons from the research show 
that the challenges are significant, but that a start-
ing point could be working with women’s organi-
sations active in these locations to raise their un-
derstanding of  the problem and work with them 
to develop innovative ways of  building relations 
with other women and to help them to discover 
the signs of  radicalisation. Over time, women’s 
organisations could support the establishment 
of  networks of  trusted individuals who the com-
munity can go to air concerns, share experiences 
and, when necessary, to raise awareness with the 
authorities through individuals appreciative of  the 
need for preventative efforts. Building such trust 
requires time, however.
Factors to Radicalisation and Recruitment
The third example is a non-field-based review and 
analysis of  the situation in South-Central Soma-
lia. The study was intended as preparatory work 
for a later field study, which is yet to be under-
taken. The assumption underpinning the study is 
that recruitment to Al-Shabaab in south central 
Somalia is changing. 
The changing political, military and financial cir-
cumstances have seen the death of  commander 
Godane and the consequent restructuring of  the 
group’s internal management and organisational 
hierarchy under Ahmed Umar, as well as weak-
ened territorial control, particularly with the loss 
of  Barrowe as a key access point to the sea.
The study was led by the RUSI team in Nairobi 
and used a USAID-inspired framework to iden-
tify push and pull factors; push factors comprising 
socioeconomic factors that make individuals look 
for alternatives, and pull factors being those that 
attract people to the violent group (Table 2).
The study also highlighted the need for an 
understanding of  how varied recruitment process-
es can be in Somalia. Many fighters are recruited 
on a clan basis, for political and protection rea-
sons; from a CVE perspective this is important, 
because radicalisation is believed to have very 
little importance in such recruitment processes. 
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A less-collective form of  recruitment is more inter-
esting from a radicalisation perspective as, in this 
case, recruitment constitutes an individual choice 
often made as part of  a desire to challenge the 
clan system and elders; radicalisation and a desire 
to contribute to international jihad is at the heart 
of  such recruitment. Finally, there may be a trend 
of  forced recruitment, which again must be con-
sidered separately, and as such addressed unique-
ly.  Needless to say, further field- based research is 
required to more comprehensively understand the 
three recruitment dynamics described, in order to 
be able to inform programming.
In summary, the desk study raises new questions, 
including: 
• Will the Al-Shabaab narrative change?
• Will the organisation remain unified (or break 
into factions)?
• How will the new leader be positioned?
• Will the organisation become less ideologically 
driven and more locally focused, or vice versa?
• Will a link to the Islamic State of  Iraq and as-
Sham (ISIS) be established? Might hardliners 
push for new alliances?
These and many more questions will only be an-
swered with time, but in a preliminary consider-
ation it is likely that perceptions of  Al-Shabaab 
are changing. They are no longer perceived to be 
“winners” and their message might be harder to 
sell. They may start engaging to a greater extent 
in criminal activity for funding purposes, which is 
likely to reduce public support. And, if  they seek 
new funding streams, new donors might force 
them to adapt their ideology to allow this. There 
is also a risk of  more coercive recruitment and the 
group’s internal management may be in flux. 
Finally, the study highlights the fact that despite 
these changes, Al-Shabaab are still in significant 
control in rural areas, and maintain control of  in-
frastructure and roads. They continue to impose 
taxation to maintain their financial support. They 
are in close collaboration with actors who affect 
markets by controlling the supply chain. The un-
derlying clan conflicts that Al-Shabaab is utilising 
to their advantage remain unresolved.
From a programming perspective, this desk re-
search simply presents the recommendation that 
there is a need to understand the situation better 
before tailoring CVE activities in this area, and 
tAbLE 2: Push and Pull Factors in Somalia
*
*African Union Mission in Somalia
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also that working in a context where armed con-
flict is on-going may not be suitable for this type of  
primarily preventative activity – in South Central, 
in the shorter term, it may be necessary to work 
more actively with defectors, through reintegra-
tion, psychosocial support and work with law en-
forcement. 
Regionally, the described development poses new 
challenges in terms of  returning fighters. In par-
ticular, Kenya has seen an influx of  returning 
fighters, similarly there have been defectors within 
Somalia. The legal framework and reintegration 
options are still being developed, and responsibili-
ties assigned, in both Kenya and Somalia. 
Simultaneously, particularly in Kenya, individual 
recruitment to local radical cells and associated 
violent groups is on the increase, with these indi-
viduals posing a less predictable threat than those 
recruited to Al-Shabaab directly.
Research Challenges
CVE is a new field with poorly developed defini-
tions and wide-ranging political connotations. It 
is a very sensitive topic to research, which is hard 
to translate into Kiswahili and Somali. Such re-
search may pose risks to:
• Researchers collecting data in places where 
it is a challenge to put in place good support 
structures; 
• The quality of  information; 
• Entities publicising the information. 
Local researchers might be more willing to take 
risks in order to deliver the research and may go 
further in encouraging interviewees to answer, 
which can put all actors under pressure. There is 
significant pressure to produce findings and rec-
ommendations that are actionable within concrete 
initiatives, so that donors, governments and imple-
menting actors can be seen to be doing something 
about the problem. Finally, there is a need for an 
in-depth understanding of  local politics and cir-
cumstances to enable researchers and institutions 
to understand subtleties in the findings and be 
able to interpret and communicate them.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations for other Researchers 
STRIVE as a research-based pilot is fortunate to be able to undertake research as activities are implement-
ed. This allows for real-time learning and for constant improvements to understanding and the testing of  
ideas. Some examples include data collection around training activities to help gauge understanding and 
approaches to the process of  capacity-building; panel focus groups of  listeners to radio programmes to as-
sist in understanding whether messaging is coming across and whether it is relevant; interviews with men-
tees and peers to help the team to understand the situation in a particular location and whether STRIVE 
is reaching those at risk for radicalisation in the mentorship programme.
The paper concludes with a number of  recommendations:
• CVE programming should integrate real-time research and data collection into activities to be 
responsive to constantly changing circumstances and to continue learning.
• Working with researchers with local connections and language/dialect is necessary to improve 
access and trust. This simultaneously requires more management.
• It takes time to build trust to talk about issues related to violence and to plan well, as follow-up 
interviews may be needed.
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• It is important never to talk directly about “terrorism” or “violent extremism” if  it is not brought 
up by the interviewee – instead, focusing on local issues and concerns to gauge the issue.
• Information is power and there is a war going on – it must be expected that people will contest 
findings.
• Delivery of  analysis should be managed and considered as a part of  the objective of  influencing 
debate.
• Recommendations should be made which are specific to each actor, in light of  their different roles 
(government, civil society, media, international actors, etc.).
assessing Violent Extremism: The case 
of Burkina Faso
Peter Romaniuk*
Senior Fellow, Global Center on Cooperative Security
Associate Professor of Political Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City 
University of New York
CHAPTER 5
The terms “violent extremism” (VE) and “countering violent extremism” (CVE) are recent additions to 
the lexicon of  counterterrorism. The importance of  extremist ideas in processes of  terrorist recruitment 
and radicalization has been known for some time. But it is only in the last decade that a more sustained 
focus on the ideational aspects of  terrorism has emerged and that CVE as a field of  policy and practice 
has become more coherent.
As the field has grown, we can observe variation in the way states “do” CVE, both in terms of  substance 
and process. Regarding the latter, if  we take an aggregate-level view, we can discern an ideal type “CVE 
policy cycle,” similar to those in other areas of  public policy. That is, states have tended to respond to VE 
through a four-stage process of: assessment; policy development; implementation and; evaluation. At pre-
sent, some stages of  this policy cycle are better developed than others. For example, policy development 
and implementation have advanced quickly at the national level and have been facilitated by the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) CVE Working Group which has elaborated “good practices” in several 
areas within the CVE domain.1 In contrast, efforts to evaluate CVE measures have been more modest to 
date (Dawson, Edwards and Jeffray, 2014; Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat, 2013; Romaniuk and 
Chowdhury Fink, 2012).
The “CVE policy cycle” is described in depth elsewhere.2  This chapter focuses on the “assessment” phase 
and describes a study of  violent extremism in Burkina Faso that I recently coauthored with Augustin Loada 
(Loada and Romaniuk, 2014), who was then Executive Director of  the Centre for Democratic Governance 
in Ouagadougou (www.cgd-igd.org). The chapter reflects upon the process and findings of  our assessment 
of  VE in Burkina Faso, which is vulnerable to VE although the threat is not imminent.
Violent Extremism and burkina Faso: 
theory and method
Burkina Faso is perhaps far from an obvious choice 
in undertaking an assessment of  VE. The problem 
of  VE is more urgent in neighboring Mali, where 
regional extremist groups were only pushed back 
after military intervention by France in 2013, fol-
lowed by ECOWAS and United Nations deploy-
ments. Similarly, extremism in nearby northeast-
ern Nigeria is capturing more headlines as Boko 
Haram continues its insurgent campaign in brutal 
fashion, giving rise to concerns that violence may 
KEYwoRdS: violent extremism; countering violent extremism; Burkina Faso; resilience
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spread to Cameroon and Chad. Further, the risks 
of  instability and identity-based conflict may seem 
higher in Niger and Côte d’Ivoire than in Burkina 
Faso.
Why study VE in Burkina Faso? Pragmatically, 
our case selection was donor-driven,3 as is much 
research (both on and off the public record) that 
has informed the CVE debate to date. But there 
are sound methodological and policy reasons to 
pursue VE assessments in countries that do not 
have a well-known VE problem and in Burkina 
Faso in particular. For example, compared to its 
neighbors and other regional states, the relative 
absence of  VE in Burkina Faso represents an 
outcome of  particular interest. In this way, this 
case can yield insights into the factors that sup-
press or otherwise mitigate against VE. Thus, to 
study Burkina Faso is to “select on the dependent 
variable,” an approach social scientists generally 
avoid. Still, this approach may be useful in the ear-
ly stages of  a research program (to understand the 
“potential causal paths and variables leading to 
the dependent variable of  interest”), where cross-
case comparisons will follow (George and Bennett, 
2005, p.23).
There are also policy-relevant reasons to study VE 
in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso contributes both 
military and police personnel to the UN Multi-
dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA) and has suffered several fatali-
ties as a result of  those deployments. Prior to MI-
NUSMA, Burkina Faso cooperated with France 
when it launched its initial intervention in Mali 
(Operation Serval) in 2013. Similarly, Burkina 
Faso is a participant in US-led counterterrorism 
initiatives in the region under the Trans-Sahel 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Some 
CVE-related programming has already been ad-
vanced in Burkina Faso under the US Agency for 
International Development’s (USAID) “PDEV II” 
(Peace through Development) initiative. We also 
found that Burkinabe authorities have been alert 
to the potential spillover effects of  regional ex-
tremism and have trained and redeployed troops 
domestically for this purpose, with donor support. 
Short of  a formal counterterrorism or CVE strat-
egy, the Burkinabe authorities have advanced a 
series of  measures that might fall under the defini-
tion of  “CVE.” In light of  these developments, a 
systematic study of  VE in Burkina Faso is timely.
We framed our assessment around three straight-
forward research questions: what is the extent of  
VE in Burkina Faso?; what are the origins of  VE 
in Burkina Faso or its likely sources? and; what are 
the sources of  resilience against VE in Burkina 
Faso? These were designed to establish a baseline 
regarding the nature, extent and causes of  VE in 
the country which could then be leveraged pro-
spectively, to provide empirically-based insights 
into VE in Burkina Faso in the short and medium 
term. We felt it important to address the concept 
of  resilience specifically, to capture the dynamics 
that make Burkina Faso unique among regional 
states and to inform future efforts to advance 
CVE measures, which should consider indigenous 
mechanisms for conflict prevention. In order to 
answer these questions we utilized the “drivers 
of  VE” approach that was initially developed for 
USAID (Denoeux with Carter, 2009a, 2009b). As 
noted above, this approach alerts analysts to the 
broad range of  factors – socioeconomic, political 
and cultural – that may play a role in processes of  
radicalization. 
In terms of  research methods, there are many 
forms of  data, and many possible ways to gather 
it, that may be utilized in assessing VE. In our 
case, we gathered original data through interviews 
and focus groups in five locations across the coun-
try – Ouagadougou, Dori, Ouahigouya, Bobo-Di-
oulasso and Fada N’Gourma. In Dori, we visited 
a nearby refugee camp hosting Tuaregs displaced 
by the fighting in Mali. Through our fieldwork 
we were able to engage more than 130 people in 
in-depth discussions about VE and resilience in 
Burkina Faso. In selecting our interview subjects, 
we adopted a basic snowballing approach and also 
 3 
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leveraged existing networks. From my perspective, 
working with a local research partner was critical, 
in terms of  identifying and gaining access to re-
search subjects and performing field work, as well 
as in understanding the data in its local context. 
Our sample of  interviewees reflected a general 
cross-section of  Burkinabe society and included 
government officials, civil society and religious 
leaders, and students and other civilians. We also 
met with members of  the diplomatic community 
in Ouagadougou. In order to facilitate discus-
sion, we used several open-ended interview ques-
tions and undertook the interviews on a not-for-
attribution basis. We did not record interviews but 
relied on extensive notes and post-interview dis-
cussions among the research team. Although we 
were not able to conduct survey research, we met 
with NGOs that undertake such work. Further, 
we utilized secondary sources for descriptive con-
tent and to triangulate facts and claims gathered 
through our primary data collection. We drew 
upon Afrobarometer data (my coauthor is the Na-
tional Partner for Burkina Faso) as well as several 
recent NGO reports, some of  which utilized sur-
vey research (for example, Bertrand, Sindayigaya 
and Deceukelier, 2013). Overall, we had a large 
pool of  data to draw on.
An important note here is that our desk and field 
research was undertaken between November 
2013 and April 2014, prior to the most recent po-
litical developments in Burkina Faso. In October 
2014, President Blaise Compaoré, who had ruled 
the country as military dictator and civilian presi-
dent for a total of  27 years, introduced a bill to 
modify constitutional limits on presidential tenure 
and allow him to run again at the end of  his term 
in 2015. This sparked massive protests in Ouaga-
dougou and across the country. Although the bill 
was withdrawn, the protests persisted. Compaoré 
subsequently resigned on 31 October and fled to 
Côte d’Ivoire. At that time, too, the constitution 
was suspended. With the Presidential Guard for-
mally in control, two weeks of  meetings among 
political opposition parties, members of  civil so-
ciety organizations, and religious and traditional 
leaders, as well as the defense and security forces, 
yielded a charter for political transition. Under 
that charter, an interim administration – with Lt. 
Col. Zida from the Presidential Guard as Prime 
Minister – has been put in place with elections to 
be held in November 2015. At the time of  drafting 
this chapter my coauthor on the assessment, Au-
gustin Loada, was serving in the interim cabinet 
as Minister for Public Service, Labor and Social 
Security.
In policy terms, these developments give cause for 
optimism about the prospects for democratic tran-
sition in Burkina Faso. Later, I discuss whether 
and how such a transition might impact levels of  
VE. For present purposes, these occurrences un-
derscore that assessments reflect a snapshot based 
on the available evidence. In this regard, our as-
sessment provides a baseline against which any 
future variation in levels of  VE can be measured. 
For example, the impact of  political transition on 
levels of  VE is an open question, on which this 
case should shed some light.
burkina Faso: Vulnerable to VE but no 
imminent threat
The principal finding of  our assessment is that 
Burkina Faso is vulnerable to VE but that the threat 
is not imminent. That is, structural conditions in 
Burkina Faso are such that there is a prevalence 
of  “push factors,” which increase the risk of  VE. 
However, we found a relative absence of  “pull fac-
tors,” with the result that a broadly stated vulner-
ability has not translated into specific threats. At 
the same time, we identified numerous sources of  
resilience in Burkina Faso, deriving from both the 
state and from civil society. I address these points 
in turn.
Push	factors: The protests that broke out across 
Burkina Faso in October 2014 were an apt illustra-
tion of  deeply held grievances among the Burki-
nabe populace. While many observers – and, no 
doubt, many of  those in the streets – were perhaps 
surprised that the protests prompted Compaoré’s 
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sudden resignation and departure, few doubted 
the breadth and depth of  popular disaffection 
with his rule. Grievances arising from the political 
and economic situation in Burkina Faso had been 
documented in the past (for example, Internation-
al Crisis Group, 2013) and had yielded occasional 
large-scale protests in the preceding years. The is-
sue of  presidential term limits was a frequent top-
ic of  discussion over the course of  our research. 
With 2015 looming (when Compaoré’s final term 
would end), there was a clear sense that something 
would happen, either to amend or override the 
constitution and entrench “system Compaoré,” or 
to somehow precipitate the end of  the Compaoré 
era. Towards the end of  2013 and at the begin-
ning of  2014, political uncertainty was palpable.
The specific grievances that led to this situation 
were abundantly apparent to us. In terms of  po-
litical drivers, our interviewees gave particular 
emphasis to high levels of  corruption in Burkina 
Faso and the corresponding lack of  official ac-
countability, giving rise to a sense of  impunity for 
well-connected elites. A debate about “incivisme” 
(incivility) had arisen in Burkina Faso as a re-
sponse to an increase in ad hoc incidents of  unrest 
and low-level rioting triggered by relatively minor 
events, such as traffic accidents. For many of  our 
interviewees, this was indicative of  a decline in the 
regulatory capacity of  the state as well as chang-
ing social norms about expressing disaffection in 
public. At their core, political grievances derived 
from the dominance of  the political system by the 
same ruling elites for almost three decades. To put 
this in perspective, consider that almost half  of  
Burkina Faso’s population of  more than 18 mil-
lion people is under the age of  14; as a result, a 
majority of  Burkinabes have known no other gov-
ernment than that led by Compaoré. 
The widening gap between Burkinabes’ expecta-
tions and the persistently poor quality of  govern-
ance is of  course made worse by socioeconomic 
conditions. Burkina Faso is a poor, unequal coun-
try with a rapidly growing population, about 90 
percent of  whom engage in subsistence agricul-
ture, while almost half  live below the poverty line. 
Thanks to the expansion of  the mining sector, 
Burkina Faso regularly records an annual rate of  
GDP growth around 1.6 percent (Luning, 2008; 
Koussoubé at al., 2014). But this is “growth with-
out [a] trickle down effect,” and wealth remains 
concentrated among those at the top (Koussoubé 
at al., 2014). All other socioeconomic indicators 
(including unemployment, literacy, fertility, infant 
and maternal health, etc.) make clear why Burkina 
Faso is near the very bottom of  the Human De-
velopment Index – 183rd out of  the 186 countries 
ranked in 2013 (United Nations Development 
Program, 2013).
In sum, macro-level data attests to the kinds of  
exclusion and marginality, relative deprivation 
and unmet economic needs that have been identi-
fied as possible drivers of  VE. Our interviewees 
also identified socioeconomic tensions. For exam-
ple, the governance of  land resources has been 
contentious in both urban and rural settings. Re-
garding the former, Ouagadougou has expanded 
quickly in recent years. This has sometimes oc-
curred informally, with local-level officials alleg-
edly engaging in clientelism and self-enrichment. 
Outside of  the city, there is competition for land 
use between farmers and herders, which is over-
laid with a cleavage between ethnic groups. In ar-
eas surrounding mining developments, we heard 
a range of  community-level grievances pertaining 
to access to food, water and housing, the state of  
the environment, and opportunities for education, 
training and employment. “Artisanal” (informal) 
mining had provided an income for many locals, 
especially women, and that opportunity has often 
been lost. Our interviewees noted several exam-
ples of  protests occurring among communities ad-
jacent to mines.
Education is a further point of  socioeconomic 
contention, with concerns raised about the quality 
of  teaching, poor infrastructure and the adequacy 
of  curricula in relation to the job market. The 
Burkinabe education system tends to reproduce 
the existing social order and the poor often prefer 
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informal schools (including Koranic schools) over 
the public system, or they withdraw their children 
altogether. We heard that the higher education sys-
tem is in a state of  malaise. Students face a range 
of  barriers in completing their degrees, including 
a shortage of  teachers, poverty, inadequate social 
services, strikes and overlapping academic years. 
Those that do graduate find scarce employment 
opportunities. The gap between students’ expec-
tations and the harsh reality of  their situation has 
again led to protests.
Regarding potential cultural drivers of  VE, Burki-
na Faso is similar to its neighbors in that it is both 
multiethnic and multi religious (some 60 percent 
of  the population is Muslim). However, Burkina 
Faso is unique in that identity-based conflict is less 
prevalent than elsewhere, although some such ten-
sions persist. Some of  our interviewees perceived 
breaches in the policy of  official secularism in 
small ways (such as the display of  Christmas trees) 
and large (e.g. that lawmakers tend to reproduce 
Christian values, or that identity matters in decid-
ing upon official appointments). Education came 
up again in this context as several interviewees 
noted that Koranic schools are unregulated and 
that their curricula is not harmonized with those 
in the public system. As a consequence, graduates 
of  Koranic schools face particular difficulties in 
the job market and sometimes have few options 
but to continue their studies abroad, often in the 
Gulf  states.
Government responses to intercommunal tension 
are perceived to be tepid. Officially sanctioned 
interreligious dialogues are seen as elitist and lack 
credibility. The government has been hesitant to 
intercede in disputes where the rights of  differ-
ent groups clash. Where firebrand preachers have 
come to light, the failure to respond has given rise 
to claims of  appeasement. There is a gap in that 
no study or database on the public record compiles 
basic information on churches, mosques and other 
places of  worship. This would be a first step in im-
proving the ability of  the state to manage intercom-
munal relations towards tolerance and cohesion.
Overall, we discerned a prevalence of  structural 
conditions – push factors – that increase the vul-
nerability of  Burkina Faso to VE. At the same 
time, writing prior to the October 2014 protests 
and the subsequent commencement of  the peri-
od of  political transition, we emphasized that the 
gravest threat to stability in Burkina Faso came 
not from VE but from uncertainty surrounding 
the political situation in the country. Now that a 
transitional administration is in place, and with a 
view to the November 2015 elections, that concern 
can be seen in a different light. Indeed, the largely 
peaceful nature of  the transition so far seems to 
have generated a broad sense of  goodwill, which 
is a necessary first step in addressing the structur-
al-level grievances described here. Still, all future 
governments in Burkina Faso will face the steep 
challenge of  acting to improve living conditions 
for the populace: a secondary benefit of  this will 
be to reduce vulnerability to VE.
Pull	factors:	Despite the prevalence of  push fac-
tors in Burkina Faso, we found no imminent threat 
of  VE. Push factors alone do not produce VE but 
rather combine with factors at the group and in-
dividual level to yield a VE outcome. In assess-
ing these factors, we deduced a typology of  path-
ways through which VE might enter or emerge in 
Burkina Faso: as a spillover effect from regional 
extremism; as a result of  radicalization among 
groups and individuals domestically and; through 
the influence of  foreign extremists (i.e. from out-
side the region). Here, I elaborate our findings 
with regard to these three pathways.
Our interviewees expressed concern about the up-
tick in regional extremism and the likelihood that 
Burkina Faso would be affected. The deployment 
of  Burkinabe forces as part of  MINUSMA, and 
President Compaoré’s role at the time as a media-
tor among the combatants in Mali (which includ-
ed hosting leaders of  the Tuareg armed group, 
the National Movement for the Liberation of  
Azawad), were seen by some as increasing Burkina 
Faso’s vulnerability. Similarly, some interviewees 
expressed concern that Burkina Faso’s decision to 
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host refugees from the fighting in Mali might in-
crease the likelihood of  extremist infiltration.
Despite these concerns, we found only scant evi-
dence that VE has crossed the border from Mali 
or elsewhere. We read some reports and heard an-
ecdotes about individual Burkinabes attempting to 
raise funds and acquire weapons for Boko Haram 
in Nigeria. We similarly heard that French forces 
apprehended several Burkinabes in Mali. Some 
interviewees in Ouahigouya related an account of  
a local man that left to fight with MUJAO. He was 
apparently drawn in through organized recruiters 
that offered a cash incentive (CFA 300,000, about 
USD 560) for his participation. He completed his 
tour, returned home and used the money to open 
a small business, we were told. At no stage was it 
suggested that he was ideologically motivated. In-
terestingly, this method of  recruitment – and the 
same sum of  money – was known among the Tu-
areg refugees we spoke with, who noted that MU-
JAO had taken a similar approach in Mali. We 
also heard that following the uptick in violence in 
Mali, some well-resourced Tuaregs began to ap-
pear in border towns and gained attention locally 
for their extremely conservative religious views. In 
Dori, local religious leaders drew upon their net-
works to engage the newcomers and we found no 
evidence that their presence prompted locals to 
radicalize.
We found no direct evidence of  small group- or 
self-radicalization initiated within Burkina Faso. 
Our interviewees emphasized the fundamentally 
tolerant nature of  intercommunal relations, point-
ing out that intrafaith tension among Muslims is 
more likely than interfaith tension between Mus-
lims and others. At the same time, many noted a 
trend towards increasingly conservative religious 
practices. This is said to pertain among believers 
of  all faiths but is most visible among young Mus-
lim men, who grow beards and wear their trousers 
short. Among some interviewees, this trend corre-
lates with the growing debate on “incivisme.” We 
found a few examples of  young Muslims mobiliz-
ing as Muslims and participating in protests. But 
these examples clearly fall far short of  radicaliza-
tion.
Regarding foreign extremists, we found some 
evidence that people from outside the region 
with very conservative views had been present in 
some of  the towns we visited. The government is 
clearly alert to the possibility that radical (Muslim) 
preachers may attempt to visit from abroad and 
visa controls have been instituted to prevent this. 
But we found no evidence of  Burkinabes radical-
izing after having contact with any such foreign 
preacher. Similarly, we found no examples of  
Burkinabes traveling to fight in extremist conflicts 
outside of  the region, such as Iraq and Syria.
Sources	 of 	 resilience:	 The absence of  pull 
factors over the course of  our research led us to 
conclude that VE is not an imminent threat in 
Burkina Faso. In a country experiencing politi-
cal transition and facing significant development 
challenges, vulnerability to VE should be seen in 
context. But it should not drop off the agenda. 
Rather, as Burkina Faso makes advances towards 
democratization and development, maintaining 
low levels of  VE will be critical. To this end, we 
identified multiple sources of  resilience, deriving 
both from the state and from civil society.
In our assessment, the Burkinabe state is in need 
of  broad and deep reform. Nonetheless, we sug-
gest that the state also furnishes several sources of  
resilience. For all of  their shortcomings, national 
institutions over the period of  Compaoré’s rule 
did not have the effect of  precipitating sustained 
identity-based conflict. To the contrary, there was 
some evidence that state mechanisms for dialogue 
and conflict resolution had some integrative ef-
fects, even if  they also attracted skepticism. The 
government effectively exercises territorial control 
and has advanced a series of  counterterrorism 
and CVE-related measures. The press in Burkina 
Faso is generally adheres to standards of  social 
responsibility. While this involves self-censorship, 
hate speech and incitements to violence – which 
have been so destructive elsewhere – are largely 
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absent. Over time, the state has had some suc-
cess in cultivating a sense of  Burkinabe national 
identity that has resonance among the populace. 
Annual events celebrate Burkinabe diversity amid 
national unity. Burkina Faso compares favorably 
to its neighbors in this regard and the idea of  na-
tionhood provides some basis for preserving toler-
ance and social cohesion.
Hopefully, the political transition that is cur-
rently under way, and the forthcoming elections 
in November 2015, will build upon these sources 
of  state-based resilience. If  that occurs, they will 
complement sources resilience in civil society. Our 
interviews made clear that Burkinabes perceive 
themselves to be tolerant and place a high value on 
social cohesion – indeed, many clearly view this as 
an integral part of  Burkinabe identity. Interview-
ees pointed out that many families are ethnically 
and religiously mixed and that this is a bulwark 
against intercommunal tension. Informal social 
institutions that have broken down in neighbor-
ing countries – such as “joking relationships” (la 
parentée à plaisanterie), wherein members of  dif-
ferent groups may exchange insults in jest – persist 
in Burkina Faso. Civil society, religious and tradi-
tional leaders also espouse tolerance as a general 
rule and act in the interests of  social cohesion. We 
found examples of  networks among faith leaders 
to identify and counsel those with extremely con-
servative views. We also found examples of  NGOs 
in the development field undertaking projects with 
a methodology so as to bring together members 
of  different communities, and youths in particu-
lar. We gained the impression that there are both 
precedents and partners in civil society that can be 
drawn upon in nurturing resilience and building 
peace.
In concluding our assessment, we recommended 
that stakeholders find ways to preserve and enhance 
sources of  resilience. We suggested that the govern-
ment articulate a Burkinabe concept of  laïcité while 
rededicating itself  to standards of  good governance 
and anti-corruption measures. Among civil society 
groups, horizontal networks should be supported to 
ensure that interreligious dialogues resonate at the 
local level. Burkina Faso’s international partners 
should consider vulnerability to VE in determining 
geographic priorities and methodologies for deliv-
ering aid and other assistance. While the question 
of  the link between security and development has 
attracted a lot of  attention in policy circles, Burkina 
Faso is a case where these goals should be integrat-
ed: just as underdevelopment increases vulnerabil-
ity to VE, the spread of  VE would have negative 
effects for development.
Conclusion
CVE has emerged recently and quickly. This trajectory will be maintained for a good while yet, rendering 
the CVE policy cycle more visible. This chapter is an initial attempt to accumulate knowledge about the 
first step in that cycle, the assessment phase.
Our assessment of  VE in Burkina Faso found that there is vulnerability but no imminent threat – a preva-
lence of  push factors but a relative absence of  pull factors. The ongoing political developments in the 
country necessarily affect our findings. Still, I would argue that our recommendations, such as those de-
scribed above, maintain relevance for the transitional administration and the post-November 2015 govern-
ment, as well as for civil society and Burkina Faso’s international partners. In concluding, it is apt to ask 
how the transition might affect levels of  VE.
An initial point is that the protests – which included some rioting, looting and the use of  force to control 
crowds – are an indication of  instability and, perhaps, heightened vulnerability. In reporting on these 
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events, and the period of  uncertainty before transitional charter was agreed, US and other media outlets 
frequently drew attention to this vulnerability by noting that Burkina Faso is an important ally in regional 
counterterrorism efforts. On the flip side, the largely peaceful nature of  the transition, and the fact that 
the charter was a negotiated settlement among diverse stakeholders, underscores the vitality of  the sources 
of  resistance described above. In this way, a peaceful transition ameliorates some of  the push factors we 
identified, reducing vulnerability to VE. Indeed, it is a significant achievement that the transition has pro-
ceeded without an apparent rise in identity-based conflict. To maintain this record, it is useful to recall the 
many ways in which CVE overlaps with established fields of  practice, such as peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution. To fulfil the promise of  Burkina Faso’s transition will require such broad expertise and, criti-
cally, the ongoing engagement and commitment of  the international community. Despite their location in 
one of  the world’s most difficult regions, Burkinabes may be on the verge of  replacing dictatorship with 
democracy. This would be a landmark occurrence and a powerful statement against extremism.
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CHAPTER 6
Ever since the dissolution of  the Soviet Union, Central Asia1 has struggled with a host of  socio-economic 
and political challenges. Bad governance, weak law-enforcement, corruption, unsound social policies, and 
an uneven distribution of  wealth are among the multitude of  problems that have contributed to and have 
been affected by the rise of  violence in the region. This violence has taken many forms, of  which religious-
ly driven terrorism and insurgency has received considerable attention. The risks associated with Islamist 
radicalization of  Central Asian societies are a recurring theme of  political and academic discourses in 
Central Asia and beyond. While there is no consensus on the extent of  radicalization and the magnitude 
of  threat that it poses to security of  Central Asian nations, the prevailing opinion is that religious funda-
mentalism has made a forceful comeback in the post-Soviet Central Asia, and that the threat of  violent 
extremism is both widespread and growing across the region.2
 
The argument advanced in this research note is more nuanced. The nature of  “terrorist” violence that has 
plagued parts of  Central Asia is more complex than previously described. Not every incident of  violence 
described as “terrorist” attacks by mass media and local governments has been driven by religious extrem-
ist motivations, while radicalization of  organizations that pursue political goals is not limited to Islamist 
groups. A comprehensive understanding of  the relationship between different forms of  organized violence 
must be attained if  effective policies aimed at preventing and combating violent extremism are to be devel-
oped and implemented in Central Asia.
 
To demonstrate the complex nature of  violence subsumed under the rubric of  religious extremism and 
terrorism, this paper points out the phenomenon of  convergence of  terrorism and drug trafficking in Cen-
tral Asia. The neighbors of  Afghanistan, Central Asian republics have been increasingly used as a transit 
territory for Afghan opioids bound for Russia and Western Europe (Burnashev, 2007). By some estimates, 
25-30% of  drugs produced in Afghanistan (primarily heroin) are transported through the Northern route, 
although known as the Silk Route (Burnashev, 2007; Madi, 2004; UNODC, 2012). The terrorism/crime 
nexus has given rise to violent attacks where the identity of  perpetrators (criminal, insurgent, or criminal-
insurgent) and motivations for the use of  force (political, profit-related, or both) are fused or uncertain. 
The concept of  the terrorism/crime nexus and evidence that supports the coexistence and collaboration 
of  Islamist organizations with organized criminal groups highlight the fact that Islamist radicalization, 
1 For the purpose of  this research note, Central Asia refers to the five post-Soviet republics of  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan.
2 It is important to note that recent studies of  Islam in Central Asia have criticized these assessments (see, for example, Heathershaw and 
Montgomery, 2014). Central Asian states are bastions of  moderate and traditional Islam, and the rise of  radical and militant forms of  
Islam have been exaggerated by both the governments and the Islamists.
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deciphering the Nature of organized 
Violence in Central Asia  
The problem of  religious extremism and terrorism 
in Central Asia has been associated with activi-
ties of  several Islamist groups, such as the Islamic 
Movement of  Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Ji-
had Union (IJU), the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), Jund al-Khilafah (JaK) (Sol-
diers of  the Caliphate), Hizb ut-Tahrir, Akrami-
ya, Hizb an-Nusra, and Tablighi Jamaat, among 
others. While some of  these groups (IMU/IJU, 
ETIM, and JaK) have a record of  violence and in-
surgent operations inside and outside the region, 
others (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Akramiya, and Hizb an-
Nusra) officially eschew violent means for accom-
plishing their goals. The IMU and Akramiya are 
the two organizations that are native to the region, 
while all other radical groups have foreign origin. 
Tajikistan recently saw the emergence of  another 
foreign radical group, Jamoati Ansorulloh. With 
links to graduates from Pakistani madrasas, the 
new organization has called for jihad against the 
Tajik government of  President Rahmon.
According to the National Consortium for the 
Study of  Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) Global Terrorism Database (2012), a 
total of  85 terrorist incidents took place in Cen-
tral Asian republics since 1998 to the present (see 
Figure 1). The majority of  those attacks (29.4%) 
targeted government, 20% were aimed at police, 
14% - private citizens and property, 8.2% - dip-
lomatic representatives of  foreign governments, 
and 5.1% - business. Islamists claimed responsi-
bility in less than 10% of  terrorist incidents (IMU 
was identified as a perpetrator of  violence in 3.5% 
FIGuRE 1: Terrorist Attacks in Central Asia
Source: A National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
  Terrorism Database (2012). Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Note:  Tajikistan is excluded from the figure due to the larger number of terrorist accidents registered 
 during the Civil War period skewing the presentation of results. In 1994-95, Tajikistan had over 
 30 terrorist incidences, and in 1997- 42.  
terrorism, and drug-related crimes share socio-economic and political root causes. Therefore, for coun-
terterrorism, counter-extremism, and anti-drug policies to be successful they must be viewed as parts of  a 
broader comprehensive framework of  preventive measures and responses to organized violence and crime. 
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cases; IJU – 5.9%; the Soldiers of  the Caliphate 
– 2.4%; and ETIM – 1.2%). In 71.8% of  cases, 
the perpetrator of  violence was unknown. This, 
in turn, raises a question about the perpetrator’s 
identity.
Upon a closer examination, the majority of  reg-
istered terrorist attacks took place in the areas 
with frequent drug seizures (UNODC, 2014). 
For example, the capital cities of  Central Asian 
states have experienced high volume of  trafficking 
in drugs, and they have also borne the brunt of  
terrorist violence. Other locations with high drug 
trafficking and terrorism include Osh city and 
province, including the Kara-suu valley in Kyr-
gyzstan, the Gorno-Badakhshan province with its 
capital Khorogh and Sughd province with capital 
Khujand in Tajikistan, and the Fergana valley, Sa-
markand, and Namangan in Uzbekistan.
This overlap of  terrorism and drug trafficking 
suggests several possibilities for terrorist/criminal 
convergence in the region: (1) terrorist and drug 
trafficking groups operate within the same areas, 
utilize similar routes for the movement of  people 
and transportation of  illicit goods, and rely on the 
same networks of  corrupt state and local agen-
cies, while maintaining their strategic independ-
ence; (2) terrorist groups resort to drug trafficking 
for financing their activities in pursuit of  political 
goals; or (3) criminal organizations turn to anti-
government violence for advancing their econom-
ic aims. While the precise nature of  the terror-
ism/drug trafficking nexus is difficult to ascertain, 
partly because Central Asian governments tend to 
portray all violent attacks on the government or 
military posts as activities of  jihadists, the avail-
able evidence is indicative of  the presence of  all 
forms of  convergence between drug trafficking 
and terrorism (Omelicheva, 2014).
It is well established, for example, that the IMU 
was a leading trafficker of  opiates from Afghan-
istan, especially under the leadership of  Na-
mangani (Madi, 2004; Makarenko, 2002).  The 
IMU’s incursions in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, which 
have been portrayed as an attempt of  a radical 
Islamist movement’s intrusion into Uzbekistan for 
overthrowing the secular government of  President 
Karimov, pursued a different purpose, namely, se-
curing drug trafficking route from Afghanistan. 
The stockpiles of  opium and heroin had built up 
in the Afghan territory following one of  the largest 
harvests of  opium and waited to be transported to 
Russia and Western Europe (Madi, 2004; Maka-
renko, 2002). It remains likely that the remnants 
of  the IMU fighting in the Taliban insurgency and 
its splinter groups (e.g., IJU) continue engaging in 
drug trafficking to secure funding required for ac-
complishing distinctly political objectives in the 
absence of  other financial and operational sup-
port. It comes to no surprise that official reports 
of  the Central Asian governments announcing 
detentions, liquidations, or trials of  Islamic mili-
tants or drug traffickers often contain charges for 
both kinds of  crime. Tajikistan’s officials, for ex-
ample, often report arresting traffickers who turn 
out to be the IMU members. In an infamous case 
of  the escape of  25 high-profile prisoners from a 
detention center in Dushanbe in 2010, all convicts 
had been sentenced on charges related to both ter-
rorism and drug trafficking. Some of  the escapees 
reportedly had ties with the IMU. 
A spike of  violence in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakh-
shan region in 2012, which the Tajik government 
has portrayed as the jihadist resurgence, further 
exemplifies the complex nexus of  Islamist vio-
lence and crime. Gorno-Badakhshan’s security 
chief  – Abdullo Nazarov – was killed in July 2012. 
His deputy – Tolib Ayombekov – was charged 
with the slaying. The Tajik government poured 
hundreds of  troops into the region during a week-
long operation against the alleged “militants.” Al-
though, Mr. Ayombekov was not captured, at least 
22 locals and many soldiers were killed. While the 
apprehension of  Mr. Ayombekov was the declared 
purpose of  the dispatch of  security forces in the 
region, it is also possible that the government 
used Mr. Nazarov’s death as a pretext for unseat-
ing the local warlords loyal to the slayed security 
chief. It is also telling that Mr. Ayombekov and 
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his men fought for the Pamiris during the Tajik 
Civil War and continue providing local patronage. 
They have also been implicated in the smuggling 
of  tobacco, gems, narcotics, and possibly humans 
(Trilling, 2014). In the wake of  the military op-
eration, the Tajik government announced that it 
captured 40 militants, including eight Afghans, 
implying that the Afghan Taliban was involved in 
the fighting. However, it is very unlikely that the 
predominantly Sunni Taliban would have much 
in common with the Pamiri ethnic groups that ad-
here to Shia Islam. If  there were any links, those 
would have to do with drug trafficking and other 
illicit trade (Owen, 2012; Trilling, 2014). 
The convergence of  violent religious extremism 
and drug trafficking-related violence is not surpris-
ing as both Islamic radicalization and drug-relat-
ed crimes are driven by similar factors. All forms 
of  organized violence in Central Asia take place 
in ungoverned or difficult-to-govern areas provid-
ing ample opportunities for illicit activities, vio-
lence, and crime (Patrick, 2006). The challenges to 
governing these territories may be linked to their 
geographic/topographic characteristics (e.g., long 
common borders between Central Asian repub-
lics and Afghanistan, which are difficult to police 
effectively due to the mountainous topography of  
the area). In Tajikistan, fighting between Tajik se-
curity forces and armed groups of  drug dealers 
and/or insurgents often occur on the banks and 
islands of  the Panj river that forms the border be-
tween Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The territorial 
rights of  some islands in the Panj river and further 
west in the Amu Darya are disputed because both 
rivers often change their courses. The challenges 
to governance could also stem from the general 
weaknesses of  the central government, which are 
common in conflict and post-conflict zones as well 
as states characterized by factionalized politics 
and sectarian divisions. 
Central Asian enclaves, most of  which are lo-
cated in the Ferghana valley, exemplify territories 
with weak central rule. The power vacuum, lack 
of  allegiance to and remoteness from the central 
authorities, and lawlessness make these areas per-
fect for transit of  insurgents and narcotics. Absent 
strong governance, economic opportunities, and 
the rule of  law, these areas provide conditions 
conducive not only for the rise of  “new crime” 
and “new terrorism,” but also for convergence 
between international terrorist organizations and 
transnational organized crime groups. Corruption 
and poverty that are inevitable corollaries of  the 
weak rule make these phenomena more likely in 
the region.
Another major contributor to both Islamist radi-
calization and drug-related activities is the lack of  
opportunities for people, a problem common to 
weakly governed and “governable” parts of  Cen-
tral Asia. The poor economic situation creates 
scores of  unemployed or underemployed indi-
viduals who must find additional ways to support 
themselves and their families. Such individuals of-
ten become willing collaborators for traffickers or 
the rank-and-file members of  extremist groups. In 
Central Asia, organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir 
are able to convince recruits that they offer a more 
positive vision of  the future. It is easier to draw this 
contrast when people face distressing situations 
such as poverty, discrimination, and a repressive 
and/or corrupt state. Radical organizations that 
provide simple answers to their problems become 
more appealing when state restrictions on media 
and religious expression discourage legitimate 
channels for citizens to communicate and express 
their dissent. Overly repressive state policies also 
build up resentment and sympathy for oppressed 
groups, making the radicalization of  moderate Is-
lamists more likely. 
Implications of the terrorism/drug traf-
ficking Nexus for Policies aimed at Re-
ducing Violent Extremism and terrorism
The analysis of  patterns of  terrorism and drug traf-
ficking in Central Asia suggests that criminal and 
violent extremist activities can and do coincide, 
not least because they are driven by similar under-
lying conditions. It is important to note, however, 
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that the convergence of  terrorism and organized 
crime is not replacing the individual insurgency 
campaigns driven by political motivations and 
activities of  drug trafficking organizations driven 
by the considerations of  profit.   The existence of  
the terrorism/crime nexus calls for domestic and 
international policies that do not focus exclusively 
on insurgent/terrorist groups. However, the cur-
rent counterterrorist and counter-extremist strate-
gies employed by the Central Asian governments 
and approaches of  foreign governments and inter-
national organizations do not integrate anti-drug 
measures into one comprehensive framework of  
policies aimed at preventing organized violence 
and responding to violent attacks. 
The importance of  integration of  counterterror-
ist and anti-drug policies and interagency coop-
eration has been recognized at the international, 
regional, and national levels. On 19 December 
2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 2195 (2014) urging international action to 
break links between terrorists and transnational 
organized crime. The United States and its part-
ners have engaged in interagency cooperation 
to address the crime-terrorism nexus but until 
recently their primary focus has been on Latin 
America, Europe, and Afghanistan (not Central 
Asia). The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 
and Southern Command have joint interagency 
units, which support the U.S. country team efforts 
and collaborate with a variety of  international 
organizations and local governments on counter-
ing drug trafficking and other threats related to 
transnational organized crime. In Afghanistan, 
the Washington’s counterterrorism efforts have 
concentrated on the support and training of  the 
Afghan army and police and strengthening border 
controls. The US has also worked to prevent the 
reemergence of  ungoverned territories that pro-
vide fruitful ground for mobilization and training 
of  Islamists. Concurrently, the US has pursued an 
anti-drug policy by aiding Afghanistan’s political 
and economic development with the goal of  as-
sisting poppy farmers to transition out of  cultiva-
tion of  illicit crops to “alternative development” 
programs. 
Ignoring the complex relationship of  Islamist in-
surgency with drug trafficking and other forms of  
illicit trade in Central Asia is bound to severely 
undermine counterterrorist and counter-extrem-
ist efforts there. Criminal motives spread deep 
and wide throughout radical Islamist organiza-
tions, not least because drug trafficking and trade 
in illicit goods “feed” the militants and support 
their operations. Islamist groups without ideologi-
cal leadership and with futile cause might turn to 
organized criminal activities under the bogus po-
litical banner. Organized criminal groups can also 
“teach” terrorist organizations new operational 
and organizational techniques and “share” knowl-
edge of  corrupt networks. Therefore, the danger 
posed by radical Islamist organizations is linked to 
not only their extremist motivations, but also their 
capabilities. If  the connections with drug traffick-
ing groups or involvement in criminal activities 
form the foundation of  Islamist groups’ capabili-
ties, then the prevention and interdiction of  these 
exchanges offer a unique, non-military opportu-
nity to degrade the capacity of  both terrorist and 
drug-trafficking organizations. 
The scrutiny of  violent attacks committed across 
Central Asia also suggests that domestic drug traf-
ficking groups have developed in-house capabili-
ties for armed engagements against government 
forces to secure their criminal operations. If, in-
deed, some of  the violence attributed to Islamists 
is tied to local issues and drug trafficking prob-
lems and have few if  any strong connections to 
international network of  radical Islamists, than 
claims of  the regional dimension of  global jihad 
are exaggerated. Resources spent on the military 
operations aimed at combating violent interna-
tional jihad are misplaced, and would have been 
better spent on intelligent socio-economic meas-
ures to improve peoples’ lives, which constitutes 
necessary conditions for the achievement of  social 
harmony throughout the region.
Educational efforts, in general, and religious ed-
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ucation in particular, serve both ends: they can 
prevent Islamic radicalization and discourage 
youth from engaging with drugs. Instead of  sti-
fling religious freedoms and limiting discussion of  
the issues of  faith, the Central Asian governments 
need to promote extensive religious and spiritual 
education, encourage dialogue within Islam, and 
support the expansion of  critical coverage of  re-
ligious issues by broadcasting organizations. The 
governments could partner with religious groups 
for developing and implementing measures aimed 
at the reduction of  demand for and supply of  
drugs, thus undermining the economic basis of  
drug-related activities.
Equating all forms of  organized violence with 
the rise of  militant Islam militarizes anti-drug 
policies undermining their effectiveness. The il-
licit drug economy is a criminal-justice issue 
that should be addressed by an agency equipped 
to uncover and prosecute criminals. The use of  
military force stunts the advancement of  effective 
democratic rule, as it presents military solutions 
as viable options for solving governance problems. 
The problems of  poor governance, in turn, are an 
important factor in the rise of  violent extremism. 
Therefore, the militarization of  anti-drug efforts 
also contributes to Islamist militarization. 
Furthermore, by treating all forms of  organized 
violence as product of  religious radicalization, 
Central Asian governments increase opportuni-
ties for the excessive use of  force that has proved 
to be ineffective in curbing the spread of  radical 
ideas or reducing the threat of  terrorism. This 
limited approach has also legitimized government 
oppression of  secular and religious opposition, 
thus ironically sowing the seeds for radicalization 
rather than destroying them.
To thwart the radical groups’ attempts at gaining 
large-scale support among the moderate Muslims 
and criminal groups’ allure of  fast enrichment, 
the Central Asian governments have to turn to 
addressing the root causes of  extremism, drug 
trafficking, and terrorism that can be found in 
the commonplace failings caused by corruption, 
low standards of  living, lack of  opportunities, and 
authoritarianism. The counterterrorism, counter-
extremism, and anti-drug policies should be based 
on a more systematic approach including political, 
informational, socio-economic, legal, and other 
responses to these security threats. Preventive and 
prophylactic measures of  counteraction to these 
problems should be given a priority in the com-
prehensive program against organized violence.
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Right-Wing Extremism in Canada
James o. Ellis III
Canadian Network for Terrorism, Security and Society
Project Lead, Canadian Incident Database
CHAPTER 7
There has been a steady level of  right-wing extremist activity within Canada over the last 50 years, and 
anti-immigrant sentiment continues to crop up across the country.  Canada has been home to a collec-
tion of  right-wing extremists that have been surprisingly influential in global movements associated with 
white supremacy, Neo-Nazism, Identity Christianity, Creativity, and skinheads. Based on strong historical 
connections between Canadian extremists and those abroad, it is imprudent to presume Canada will not 
import right-wing violence from the U.S. and Europe.
Framing Right-wing Extremism
Canada’s new Counter-Terrorism Strategy notes 
that violence from domestic terrorist groups in-
cluding white supremacists, remains a reality in 
Canada, but relatively little contemporary re-
search exists on Canadian right-wing extremism. 
Unclassified US Homeland Security and FBI re-
ports have noted a national resurgence in right-
wing extremism over the last decade, and its ad-
herents have adopted concerns over immigration 
as a call to action following the economic down-
turn. Similar European groups have also emerged 
based on anti-Islamic sentiment. Given the rapid 
rate of  immigration into Canada, it is plausible 
that right-wing extremist violence could flare up 
along the lines of  similarly motivated attacks in 
the United States and Europe.   
For the purposes of  this essay, a working defini-
tion of  extremism would be holding political, social, 
economic, or religious views that propose far-
reaching changes in society that conflict with, or 
pose a threat to, the democratic order, while sup-
porting criminal and non-criminal acts to achieve 
these aims. Violent extremism can be defined as seri-
ous threats, harm, murder, mayhem, and damage 
to property which are motivated and justified by 
extremist beliefs. The Canadian Criminal Code 
identifies a terrorist act to be committed “in whole 
or in part for a political, religious or ideological 
purpose, objective or cause” with the intention of  
intimidating the public “…with regard to its se-
curity, including its economic security, or compel-
ling a person, a government or a domestic or an 
international organization to do or to refrain from 
doing any act.”  Terrorist activities can produce 
death and bodily harm, risks to the health and 
safety of  the public, significant property damage, 
and interference or disruption of  essential ser-
vices, facilities or systems. Terrorism represents a 
specific form of  violent extremism that is criminal 
and political.    
Right-wing extremism, in particular, stems from a 
complex set of  interrelated, and occasionally, con-
flicting beliefs systems, making it a difficult subject 
to frame. Right-wing extremism encompasses a 
large, loose, heterogeneous collection of  groups 
and individuals espousing a wide range of  griev-
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ances and positions, including: anti-government/
individual sovereignty; racism; fascism; white 
supremacy/white nationalism; anti-Semitism; 
nativism/anti-immigration; anti-globalization/
anti-free trade; anti-abortion; homophobia; anti-
taxation; and pro-militia/pro-gun rights stances 
(Simi, P. et al., 2013; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; 
Ross 1992; Gruenewald et al., 2013; DHS, 2009). 
Right-wing extremists may reach these stances 
from either religious interpretation or secular rea-
soning, and there is often conflict amongst various 
groups within this sphere. The similarities in tar-
gets and modus operandi suggest that these actors 
are best evaluated as a highly complex, yet inter-
connected community (Bowman-Grieve, 2009).
There are several somewhat distinct types of  right-
wing extremists. One typology defines right-wing 
extremists thusly:
1. General White Supremacists (e.g., Aryan 
Brotherhood, Ku Klux Klan);
2. Single Issue terrorists fixated with one particu-
lar ideological issue, such as taxes or abortion;
3. Neo-Nazis who maintain an anti-Semitic, rac-
ist, nationalist, and homophobic ideology;
4. Militia and Patriot Movement members skep-
tical of  the centralized government;
5. Christian Identity adherents that believe 
Whites are the true “chosen people;” and
6. Sovereign Citizens that hold the Federal gov-
ernment is currently illegitimate (Gruenewald 
et al, 2013).
Some right-wing extremists overlap these types. 
For example, skinheads come in many varieties, 
and the violent, racist skinheads float amongst sev-
eral of  the above categories. 
Any description of  the constellation of  right-wing 
extremist groups is merely a snapshot, as there is 
a constant churn in the membership and fortunes 
of  any given group. It can be difficult to appreciate 
the scale and complexity of  right-wing extremism 
in any given country.  A right-wing extremist may 
be a member of  several different groups at once 
or in rapid succession and may opt to act in ac-
cordance with a group’s agenda or independently 
(Ross, 1992).  As Jeffrey Kaplan notes, “Indeed, 
a researcher would be hard pressed to point to a 
single individual in the constellation of  right wing 
movements who has not already passed through 
several ideological way stations, and who no doubt 
has stops yet to make during his or her life” (Ka-
plan, 1995, p. 46).
Right-wing extremists usually argue for the innate 
superiority of  the own race or national group, 
while simultaneously expressing intolerance 
towards contact or mixing with other cultures, 
nationalities, or ethnicities, to maintain their 
“purity” or distinctiveness (Simi et al., 2013; Cot-
ter, 1999).  Some take this to represent an existen-
tial question, presuming the future extinction of  
the (loosely-defined) White race, unless action is 
taken. This is the touchstone for the “14 words” 
mantra of  David Lane – a founding member of  
The Order – which reads “We must secure the 
existence of  our people and a future for White 
children” (Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 995).  In-
deed, some right-wing ideologues have embraced 
a political theory of  race that extends beyond 
traditional national boundaries. Advocates of  
the Third Position propose a homogenous na-
tion based on supremacist racial or religious 
nationalism, which is intended to be a nonpartisan 
alternative to capitalism and communism (Wright, 
2009).  The theme that individual liberty (and the 
White race) is under attack from various quarters 
is pervasive throughout most right-wing extremist 
circles. Some believe sovereignty, or their way of  
life, is endangered or has already been lost, which 
connects to larger conspiracy theories and a need 
for survivalism, paramilitary readiness, and vio-
lent action (Gruenwald et al., 2013).  
The US Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS) noted that various right-wing extremists 
have adopted immigration as a call to action and a 
recruiting tool, and DHS assessed that “right-wing 
extremist groups” frustration over a perceived lack 
of  government action on illegal immigration has 
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the potential to incite individuals or small groups 
toward violence” (DHS, 2009, p. 5).  Nativism is 
not a new, but it is being combined with a broader 
set of  economic and social concerns to motivate 
violence. Right-wing ideologues point to globali-
zation, unemployment, growth in non-European 
populations, and new waves of  immigration as 
a perfect storm against their racial constituency 
(Wright, 2009). These issues were thrown into 
sharp relief  following 9/11, which these leaders 
cast as a result of  pro-Israel US foreign policy and 
non-white immigration (Wright). Mark Cotterill, 
a founder of  the American Friends of  the British 
National Party (AFBNP), stated as much in a Fall 
2001 speech, stating ‘‘Although we are all nation-
alists, here today we are only one nationality—
white.  It (immigration) is not an American fight 
or a British fight or a German fight.  It is a white 
fight, and we have got to win it’’ (Wright, p. 200).
The use of  violence is a common feature of  right-
wing extremists, which is seen as a legitimate 
and natural means to fight against conspiracies, 
maintaining their “purity,” and racially cleans-
ing their homelands through intimidation of  im-
migrants and visible minorities (Bowman-Grieve, 
2009; Cotter, 1999).  For right-wing extremists, 
violence attracts recruits and perpetuates their be-
liefs through action. For those unable or not yet 
prepared to carry out attacks, there are a variety 
of  other extremist support activities, such as: lis-
tening to White Power music; running extremist 
websites; producing and sharing extremist mate-
rials and videos; hosting extremist radio and TV 
shows; giving speeches and interviews; attending 
rallies, conferences, and protests; sending letters 
and flyers; vandalism; wearing extremist apparel; 
getting extremists tattoos; and other recruitment 
activities (Gruenewald et al., 2013). 
Right-wing and Religious Extremism 
Factors in Canada
Troubled race relations and associated violence 
have long been a part of  the Canadian story.  As 
Jeffrey Ian Ross noted, “Right-wing violence in 
Canada can be traced back as far as 1784 when 
Canada’s first race riot took place in the Nova Sco-
tian towns of  Shelburne and Birchtown” (Ross, 
1992, p. 77).  Racial segregation was legalized in 
schools in Ontario in 1849 (Barret, 1989), and 
there was substantial right-wing violence against 
Chinese and Japanese migrants in British Colum-
bia, as well as general right-wing extremism con-
nected to labor throughout the history of  Canada 
(Ross, 1992). As late as 1953, the Canadian Im-
migration Act included “climatic suitability” as a 
factor in determinations, leading some prominent 
immigration scholars to conclude that Canada’s 
pre-WWII immigration policy was “formally and 
explicitly racist” (Barret, 1989, p. 238).  So why 
are few aware right-wing extremism in Canada? 
There has been little research on the issue, in part 
due to a lack of  data. Again, Ross stated “[O]nly a 
fraction of  all right-wing activity is reported to the 
media or translated into criminal charges which 
make their way into the courts or produce written 
sources available in archives” (Ross, 1992, p. 95).
  
Aside from common racism, nativism, and anti-
Semitism, Canada has also played host to a num-
ber of  fringe religious communities that have 
produced violent individuals and terrorist cam-
paigns.   One example is the Canadian role in the 
development of  the Christian Identity movement. 
Christian Identity beliefs grew out of  Anglo-Is-
raelism (also called British-Israelism), which was 
developed by Richard Brothers in Britain in 1794. 
Brothers claimed that Anglo-Saxons were direct 
descendants of  the Lost Tribes of  Israel deported 
by the Assyrians in the 8th century BC (Bowman-
Grieve, 2009; Kaplan, 1995; Anderson & Sloan, 
2003b), but was not strongly anti-Semitic.  How-
ever, when Canadian W.H. Poole brought Anglo-
Israelism to North America, and Canada, the 
ideology was transformed into the fiercely anti-Se-
mitic Christian Identity theology (Kaplan, 1995). 
Another Canadian, William J. Cameron used his 
position as chief  spokesman for Henry Ford and 
editor of  the Dearborn Independent to spread anti-
Semitism south of  the border, particularly through 
the 1920s series “The International Jew.”  In the 
1930s, prominent figures like Cameron, Howard 
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Rand, C. F. Parker, and Clem Davies carried out 
meetings in Vancouver, which were later attended 
by American right-wing leaders such as Gerald L. 
K. Smith, Wesley Swift, Bertrand Comperet, Wil-
liam Potter Gale, and Reuben Sawyer, who first 
brought Christian Identity beliefs to the Ku Klux 
Klan (Kaplan, 1995).  Since that time, Christian 
Identity teachings have become a major driver 
inspiring right-wing extremists in North America 
and beyond, blending together White supremacy 
and populism (Anderson & Sloan, 2003b). Chris-
tian Identity teachings easily meld with other 
conspiratorial beliefs, and this doctrine helps to 
unify various right-wing extremists, including 
groups like the Aryan Nations, Ku Klux Klan, 
neo-Nazis, skinheads, and general survivalists 
(Anderson & Sloan, 2003b).  This belief  system 
has inspired much of  the right-wing terrorism and 
extremism over the last forty years.  Canada’s role in 
ascribing a strongly anti-Semitic bent to the Chris-
tian Identity movement should not be overlooked. 
 
Extremist Activity and Groups in Canada
Stanley Barrett observed four historical periods 
of  right-wing extremism in Canada: 1) the Ku 
Klux Klan in the 1920s; 2) Pre-WWII fascism; 
3) Neo-Nazism in the 1960s; and 4) Neo-fascism 
in the 1970s and 1980s, during which some 45 
right-wing extremist organizations formed (Bar-
ret, 1989).  Building on this, Ross described four 
waves of  extremist activity following WWII: 1) 
Edmund Burke Society attacks against Leftists of  
the mid-1960s; 2) Western Guard attacks against 
Communists in the late 1960s; 3) Ku Klux Klan 
attacks during the mid-1970s and early 1980s; 
and 4) Skinheads attacks against visible minorities, 
Jews, and gays (Ross, 1992).  His research showed 
the vast majority of  attacks occurred in Ontario, 
Quebec, and British Columbia, where large vis-
ible minority and immigrant populations lived, 
and still do. (Ross). Barrett too found that for the 
majority of  right-wing extremist groups’ member-
ship was concentrated in these provinces, though 
these groups wanted to mount nationwide cam-
paigns in favor of  White supremacy, immigration 
reform, and anti-Semitism (Barret, 1989).  
Starting in the 1960s, the fascist Canadian Nazi 
Party, led by John Beattie and David Stanley, gar-
nered significant attention (and protestors) with its 
outdoor rallies at Allan Gardens in Toronto that 
drew crowds of  close to 5,000 people, and it gen-
erated reciprocal opponents like the N3 Fighters 
Against Racial Hatred.  In the 1970s, the West-
ern Guard carried out a series of  public attacks in 
concert with its drive to manipulate public opin-
ion via its propaganda and recorded telephone 
hate messages.  In the 1980s, the Aryan Nations, 
which was founded on Christian Identity theolo-
gy, came to Canada, and its national leader, Terry 
Long, sought to build a training camp in Caro-
line, Alberta.  The Aryan Nations compound in 
the United States at Hayden Lake, ldaho brought 
together many different extremists and survival-
ists, and its prison ministry was seminal in the 
development of  the Aryan Brotherhood.  Cana-
dian extremists again reached beyond these shores 
when the Heritage Front’s Wolfgang Droege and 
Don Andrews represented Canada at Muammar 
Qaddafi’s April 1987 Third Position conference, 
attended by some 2,000 delegates.  Several Ca-
nadian groups have had a significant influence on 
the global right-wing extremist stage, notably the 
Ku Klux Klan, the Church of  the Creator, and 
Skinheads.
Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
The Ku Klux Klan is the oldest right-wing extrem-
ist group active in Canada. The KKK crossed 
into Canada from the United States in the 1920s, 
with Klan groups appearing in Ontario, British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Quebec 
under various names, such as the Kanadian Ku 
Klux Klan, the Ku Klux Klan of  Canada, and 
the Ku Klux Klan of  the British Empire (Barret, 
1989). The Ku Klux Klan has thrived on racist, 
nativist, and anti-Semitic sentiments that have 
appeared both explicitly and implicitly within 
the fabric of  Canadian history, society, and insti-
tutions over time (Barret). A fiercely Protestant 
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organization, the Ku Klux Klan seeks to defend 
Western Christian civilization by repatriating or 
eliminating Jews, visible minorities, homosexuals, 
Communists, and Catholics (Barret). 
A Klan klavern (i.e. klan chapter) appeared in 
Montreal in 1921, followed by one in Vancouver 
in 1924.  The British Columbia Klan claimed five 
provincial assemblymen amongst its members, 
and it built onto extant anti-Asian sentiments and 
calls for deportation of  Chinese, Japanese, and 
Indian immigrant workers (Barret, 1989).  In Al-
berta, the KKK focused more on European im-
migrants and Catholics, and the Klan made ma-
jor inroads in Saskatchewan, boasting between 
15,000-40,000 members (Barret). The Canadian 
Klan was violent from the beginning, starting with 
a rash of  anti-Catholic arsons in 1922 in Quebec, 
followed by a 1924 arson at St Boniface College 
in Manitoba that killed 10 Catholic students, an-
other at Juvenaut College, and a church robbery 
in Samia, Ontario (Ross, 1992).  
After WWII, the Klan settled into its familiar pat-
tern of  attacks against visible minorities, Leftists, 
Jewish and immigrant communities. Anti-black 
violence in August 1965 at Amherstburg, Ontario 
brought additional notoriety (Ross, 1992).  In the 
1980s, the Canadian KKK was further influenced 
by David Duke, and in the early 1990s, Dennis 
Mahon of  Oklahoma also crossed the border to 
better encourage and network with Canadian 
klaverns (Kaplan, 1995).  
Church of the Creator (CotC)
Ben Klassen, the founder of  the Church of  the 
Creator (an anti-Christian, racist organization), 
developed his ideas during his formative years in 
Canada from 1925-1945, which included time at 
the University of  Saskatchewan.  He later stud-
ied at the University of  Manitoba, enlisted in the 
Canadian Officers Training Corps, and hoped to 
join the Axis forces in Germany.  
Klassen established his “church” in the United 
States in 1973, and expanded his ideology, “the 
Creativity” through several books, including 
Nature’s Eternal Religion (1973), The White Man’s 
Bible (1981), and Salubrious Living (1982) and the 
newspaper Racial Loyalty.  Klassen felt Christian-
ity was fundamentally flawed by recognizing Jews 
as the chosen people, and he believed that it was 
a conspiracy to subvert the White race, part of  a 
millennia-long struggle between Jews and whites 
(Michael, 2006).  He felt an original, ethnically-
based religion could advance the white race, but 
felt that the Christian Identity and Odinist move-
ments were misguided and would lead white su-
premacists astray.  Klassen ultimately committed 
suicide in 1993, but the COTC continued under a 
series of  successors, most notably Matthew Hale.  
The Church of  the Creator (COTC) is fervently 
anti-Semitic and racist, and its adherents natu-
rally became involved in random and planned 
acts of  violence, though this conduct was usually 
disavowed (Kaplan, 1995).  The COTC claims to 
be “a Professional, Non-Violent, Progressive, Pro-
White Religion,” promoting “White Civil Rights, 
White Self-Determination, and White Liberation 
via 100% legal activism,” but it is also known for 
developing the concept of  “RAHOWA,” an una-
voidable “Racial Holy War” (Bowman-Grieve, 
2009).  
The term “RAHOWA” is now used as shorthand 
by right-wing extremists across the world, spread-
ing far beyond the COTC. For example, the 
concept of  RAHOWA and Creativity were later 
spread by the Canadian band RAHOWA!, a 1989 
Toronto band led by George Burdi, who studied 
political science at the University of  Guelph be-
fore spreading Creativity’s teaching to skinheads 
(Michael, 2006). In 1993, Burdi sought to advance 
white power music by launching Resistance Re-
cords (which was later acquired by William Pierce 
- chairman of  the National Alliance and author 
of  The Turner Diaries – the book that motivated 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) (Michael, 
2006). Burdi also organized COTC paramilitary 
training with a former member of  the Canadian 
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Forces Airborne Regiment, and he had strong ties 
to Wolfgang Droege of  the Heritage Front (Mi-
chael, 2006).  RAHOWA! earned the ire of  reac-
tionary groups, such as Anti-Racist Action.  Burdi 
was later arrested and imprisoned for attempting 
to circumvent Canadian hate speech laws with his 
Detroit-based company and dissociated himself  
after prison.
By some estimates, the World Church of  the Cre-
ator grew to encompass thousands of  members 
with chapters in half  of  the US states and several 
foreign countries (Michael, 2006).  Matthew Hale 
continued to grow the movement, reaching out to 
women as well as prisoners.  Indeed, two members 
connected to the female prison ministry – Erica 
Chase and Leo Felton – were arrested for planning 
to ignite a race war in Boston via a bombing cam-
paign (Michael, 2006).  Following 9/11 and Ben-
jamin Smith’s shooting spree that killed 9, Hale 
rose on the US Federal Bureau of  Investigation’s 
radar, and he was later imprisoned for 40 years for 
soliciting the murder of  a judge (Bowman-Grieve, 
2009).  Canadians played a major role in the dif-
fusion of  Creativity, its associated music, and its 
concepts like RAHOWA. Creativity has had a dis-
proportionate influence on right-wing extremism 
across the world, and it has also helped to spread 
ZOG conspiracies and to further radicalize Odi-
nists and Skinheads (Michael, 2006).
Skinheads
Adopted from Nazism, the skinhead movement be-
gan in East London in the 1960s, then in the 1970s 
it coalesced with the British punk scene, and by the 
1980s it became associated with right-wing groups, 
like the UK’s National Front, which identified im-
migrants and Jewish elites as the banes of  the British 
working class (Bowman-Grieve, 2009). The white 
power skinhead band Skrewdriver also sprang from 
this movement, along with its front-man Ian Stuart, 
who went on to found Blood & Honour/Combat 
18 and spread neo-Nazi skinhead culture (Bowman-
Grieve, 2009; Cotter, 1999), and would later give 
inflammatory speeches during his concerts. Many 
skinheads are motivated by unemployment, and 
they attack immigrants out of  the belief  they are 
stealing jobs or housing from the white working-
class (Cotter, 1999).  Many skins feel a global ra-
cial kinship to whites in North America, Europe, 
South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia (Cotter, 
1999).      
Skinheads number in the tens of  thousands with 
members in over 30 different countries, compris-
ing vast transnational networks (Cotter, 1999), 
and they first came to Canada in the 1980s (Ross, 
1992). According to a previous survey of  world-
wide Neo-Nazi Skinheads by the Anti-Defama-
tion League, Canada was ranked 11th in terms 
of  skinhead activity, which is quite high given the 
relatively small population of  the country (Cotter, 
1999).  Canadian skins have been labeled anti-
American, anti-immigrant, anti-free trade, and 
anti-homosexual, and many have belonged to 
the cadet corps or military reserve (Ross, 1992). 
Canadian skinhead organizations have included 
Longitude 74, the White Federation, the Aryan 
Resistance Movement (ARM), and the United 
Skinheads of  Montreal (Ross, 1992), however most 
skins have no formal organizations, forming loose 
gangs or free-floating individuals (Cotter, 1999). 
Skinheads may be Neo-Nazi, Odinist, COTC, 
or white supremacist in orientation, but there are 
also non-racist and even anti-racist skins, such as 
the Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice (SHARPs) 
who wear green jackets (Kaplan, 1995).  Despite 
these variations, the fundamental constants in the 
skinhead subculture are white power music and 
violence (Bowman-Grieve, 2009).  
The Canadian KKK, Church of  the Crea-
tor, Skinheads, and many other groups have 
kept right-wing extremism and violence an ev-
er-present threat within the Canadian context. 
There has also been violence associated with 
the anti-abortion movement, including cross-
border cases like James Charles Kopp. There is 
growing concern that violence will also erupt 
from the Freeman on the Land movement and 
sovereign citizens, who declare themselves to 
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Assessment and Policy Recommendations
Canada has been home to a collection of  right-wing extremists that have been surprisingly influential 
in the global movements associated with white supremacy, Neo-Nazism, Identity Christianity, Creativity, 
skinheads, anti-abortionists, tax protesters, sovereign citizens, and others. Based on historically strong con-
nections and exchanges between Canadian extremists and those abroad, it would be imprudent to presume 
that Canada is immune to the importation of  the rising right-wing extremism in the United States, Europe, 
and beyond. Where radical beliefs belonging to the KKK were once imported into Canada, ardent anti-
Semitic beliefs were exported out of  Canada in the form of  Identity Christianity and Creativity. Racist 
table 3: Right-Wing Extremist Groups in Canada since 2010
be beyond the government’s jurisdiction. More 
than 35 right-wing extremist groups have been 
active in Canada since 2010, but few have success-
fully carried out violent attacks. 
62RIGHT WING ExTREMISM IN CANADA
skinhead rock flowed into Canada from Europe, and white power music from RAHOWA! flowed back out. 
Extremist enterprises have been set up to transfer funds, propaganda, and hate music across borders, and 
individuals have crossed the same borders to plan or conduct attacks, such Thomas Lavy and James Kopp. 
Indeed, national borders are becoming less salient within these circles. Though smaller in size than the US 
and European counterparts, it would be short-sighted to assume that the Canadian right-wing movement 
is in a permanent state of  disarray or impotence (Barret, 1989). Canadian security officials should remain 
vigilant in monitoring the wide variety of  financial and non-traditional exchanges (music, conspiracy theo-
ries, pamphlets, etc.) involved in right-wing circles. 
Anti-immigrant sentiment continues to crop up across Canada. A recent example is the anti-immigration 
flyers from Immigration Watch Canada in Brampton in April 2014 contrasting European and South Asian 
immigrants, and this particular provocation appears to be a continuation of  racist vandalism targeting 
a Sikh elementary school there in 2012 (Aylward, 2014). There are historical precedents for reciprocal 
radicalization between right-wing extremists and other groups.  For example, there was a clear pattern of  
KKK rallies in Toronto that would, like clockwork, invite confrontations with visible minorities, Jews, and 
left-wing groups (Barrett, 1989). Groups like Anti-Racist Action emerged to challenge right-wing extrem-
ists head on, and prominent figures like Ernst Zündel often received death threats or were attacked them-
selves. Similar patterns emerged with white power music concerts and skinhead gatherings, and there were 
anti-racist skins (SHARPs and others) that formed to fight their racist brethren. Within British Columbia, 
there were also small-scale, tit-for-tat exchanges between white supremacists and First Nations communi-
ties. This exchange included the June 9, 1999 pipe bomb planted in a rest stop by Peter Anthony Houston, 
who pleaded guilty to intent to cause an explosion and possession of  an explosive substance (CBC News, 
2009). There was a subsequent conviction for additional, unplanted pipe bombs. As part of  this campaign, 
a skinhead associate of  Houston attacked a group of  First Nations youth in East Vancouver, and he was, in 
turn, beaten later by members of  the Native Youth Movement. Given the viciousness of  right-wing attacks 
and the propensity of  some immigrant communities to feel unprotected by or distrustful of  policing and se-
curity services, the possibility of  reciprocal radicalization seems quite plausible, given historical precedents 
with other communities targeted by right-wing organizations and individual extremists.  
Much of  right-wing extremist violence is perpetrated by individuals that are outside of  big organizations 
and only loosely connected to the larger movement, if  at all. The radicalization processes of  lone opera-
tors and small cells are not well-studied, and militating factors are varied and possibly unique for some 
individuals, making causal analysis difficult (Spaaij, 2010). Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy suggests 
growing recognition of  this issue:
As seen in Oklahoma City in 1995 and in Norway in 2011, continued vigilance is essential since it remains possible that 
certain groups—or even a lone individual—could choose to adopt a more violent, terrorist strategy to achieve their desired 
results (Public Safety Canada, 2011).
More can be done to articulate the threat, as well as the history of  political violence and extremism in 
Canada. It is crucial that the public, including marginalized and affected communities, support counter 
violent extremism measures. Ultimately, the success of  any security policy rests upon its legitimacy in the 
eyes of  the public. Providing clear-eyed assessments, accessible information, and evidence-based policy are 
the keys to ensuring a safe and secure Canada. 
63RIGHT WING ExTREMISM IN CANADA
References
Anderson, S. & Sloan, S. (2003b). Doukhobors. Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots. Scarecrow Press: Lantham, 
 Mass,114-115.
Anderson, S. & Sloan, S. (2003b). Identity Christianity. Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots. Scarecrow Press: 
 Lantham, Mass.,171-172.
Aylward, C. (2014). Police investigating anti-immigration flyers distributed in Brampton. The Globe 
 and Mail. April 24. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/police- 
 investigating-anti-immigration-flyers-distributed-in-brampton/article18199010/. 
Barrett, S. (1989). The Far Right in Canada. In Franks, C.E.S. (ed.), Dissent and the State. Oxford 
 University Press: USA, 224-246.
Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009). Exploring ‘Stormfront’: A Virtual Community of  the Radical Right. Studies in 
 Conflict & Terrorism, 32(11), 989-1007.
CBC  News (2009). “B.C. man convicted of  building bomb planted in highway restroom.”  June 9.  Retrieved 
 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/b-c-man-convicted-of-building-bomb- 
 planted-in-highway-restroom-1.861498. 
Cotter, J.M. (1999). Sounds of  hate: White power rock and roll and the neo‐nazi skinhead subculture. 
 Terrorism and Political Violence, 11(2). 111-140.
Department of  Homeland Security, Office of  Intelligence and Analysis, Extremism and Radicalization 
 Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division. (2009, April 7). Rightwing Extremism: 
 Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment. 
Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S. & J.D. Freilich. (2013). Far-Right Lone Wolf  Homicides in the United 
 States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 36(12), 1005-1024.
Kaplan, J. (1995). Right Wing Violence in North America. In Bjørgo, T. (ed.) Terror from the Right. Frank 
 Cass: London, England. 44-95.
Michael, G. (2006). RAHOWA! A History of  the World Church of  the Creator. Terrorism and 
 Political Violence. 18(4), 561-583.
Michael G. & Minkenberg M. (2007). A Continuum for Responding to the Extreme Right: A Comparison 
 between the United States and Germany. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(12), 1109-1123.
Mullins, S. (2013) “Global Jihad”: The Canadian Experience. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(5), 734- 
 776.
Norton, S. and Leuprecht, C. (2013). Canadian Extremist Crime Database: Methodological Primer. 
 Defence Research and Development Canada - Centre for Security Science. Technical 
64RIGHT WING ExTREMISM IN CANADA
 Memorandum DRDC CSS TM 2013-004.    
Public Safety Canada (2011). Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Ross,  J.I. (1992). Contemporary radical right‐wing violence in Canada: A quantitative analysis. Terrorism 
 and Political Violence. 4:3, pp. 72-101.
Simi, P., Bubolz, B. F., & Hardman, A. (2013). Military Experience, Identity Discrepancies, and Far Right 
 Terrorism: An Exploratory Analysis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(8), 654-671.
Spaaij, R. (2010). The Enigma of  Lone Wolf  Terrorism: An Assessment. Studies in Conflict & 
 Terrorism, 33(9), 854-870.
Wright, S.A. (2009).  Strategic Framing of  Racial-Nationalism in North America and Europe: An Analysis 
 of  a Burgeoning Transnational Network. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(2),189-210.
PaRT II 
Countering the Narrative of Violent Extremists
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CHAPTER 8
The Islamic State of  Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has been a product, in part, of  state failure, civil war and 
the repression of  Sunnis by the Shi’ite government of  Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq and by the atrocities of  the 
regime of  Bashar al-Assad against is own people in Syria3(Cordall, 2014). Almost as much, however, it is 
the product of  the will to power of  a branch of  a broader Islamist movement that has been active in Iraq 
for more than a decade, following the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. 
Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since May 2010, ISIS is a jihadi takfiri24 terrorist organization that now con-
trols, to varying degrees, about one third of  northern Syria and one third of  north-western Iraq, an area 
inhabited originally by 5-6 million people of  which 500,000 or more have fled. While estimates about the 
size of  ISIS range from as low as 20,000 to as high as 100,000 and beyond (Beauchamp, 2015), this is not 
seemingly enough to hold and govern such a vast territory with millions of  people, except by a regime of  
terror  under which a so far unknown (but high) number of  people have been demonstratively killed in 
order to intimidate the rest. (UNHCR, 2014).
While controlling substantial areas of  land - something unusual for terrorist organizations - ISIS is also 
very much present in cyberspace, where its claims too often go unchallenged. With its propaganda in 
social media, and with some of  its video footage also broadcast in mainstream media, ISIS has caught 
the imagination of  a considerable number of  young Muslims all over the world with its violent messages 
and catchy slogans. Its apparent success has also led to a modest number of  conversions to Islam among 
mainly marginalized non-Muslim youths in Western countries, as well as attracted Muslims from Western 
and non-Western countries to travel to Iraq and Syria. At the same time, it has also filled with terror those 
who have to endure its harsh rule and those who are facing ISIS fighters at the front lines in Syria and Iraq. 
The media campaign of  ISIS is very professional by any standards, with high-quality visual footage and 
well-crafted ideological statements attracting young Muslims and some recent converts to Islam to join its 
ranks. Per day, ISIS produces up to 90,000 Tweets and other social media responses – a volume of  activity 
unmatched by government counter-messaging (Schmitt, 2015). According to the American FBI director, 
James Comey, ISIS has been issuing statements in almost two dozen languages (Sullivan, 2014).
In order to break the present momentum of  ISIS, the use of  military force in Iraq and Syria is not enough. 
What is needed is a counter-narrative that can seriously challenge and undermine the narrative of  ISIS. 
1   The author wish to thank Prof. Rüdiger Lohlker, Dr. Philipp Holtmann, Dr. Milena Uhlmann and Dr. Ugur Ümit Üngör for commenting 
     on an earlier version of  this text. Responsibility for any shortcomings rests with the author alone.  A full version of  the content of  this text 
     can be found at www.icct.nl.
 
2   Takfir refers to the practice of  excommunicating Muslims judged to be insufficiently dedicated to their faith and to sharia rule. Pronouncing 
     against someone takfir turns those targeted into unbelievers (kufar) who can be killed (Esposito, 2003). 
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twelve Claims by ISIS and Arguments 
to Counter these
Claims by ISIS about Islam and Muslims
Claim	No.	1:	
ISIS claims that it stands for pure and unadulter-
ated Islam. 
Ad	1:	Argumentative elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
The historical record (as opposed to faith-based 
accounts) offers only dim glimpses of  the origins 
of  Islam in its first decades of  existence. There-
fore, any effort to return to the golden age of  
the first three generations of  successors of  the 
Crafting such a counter-narrative is also necessary to slow down if  not stop the flow of  misled foreign fight-
ers to ISIS. So far more some 25,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries have gone to Syria and 
Iraq to join ISIS and other jihadist organizations in this cross-border theatre of  war (Zelin, 2015). Some 
5,000 of  the foreign fighters are said to originate from Western democracies, with most of  them having an 
immigration background.
In the following, an attempt will be made to provide arguments to counter a dozen claims of  ISIS which 
form key parts of  its narrative. The counter-messaging arguments suggested below might, after further 
refinement, be utilized in counter-speech acts by those attempting to prevent individuals from joining the 
ranks of  foreign fighters.  While some experts claim the appeal of  ISIS has little or nothing to do with 
religion but is more a reflection of  a youth revolt among Muslims, the position taken here is that ideology 
and religion are crucial and central for legitimizing jihadist violence  caused by a variety of  mainly political 
factors (Wood, 2015). This is not to deny that individual, social and generational conflicts that play a role 
in radicalisation, both for those foreign fighters who come from Western diasporas as well as those who 
originate in Muslim-majority countries (e.g. Turkey), where young people are often well-integrated in their 
societies. While the fanatical extremists of  ISIS might no longer be open to rational, persuasive arguments, 
many of  those not yet fully radicalized might still have open minds. They can be confronted with facts and 
rational reasoning and might then be able to see ISIS for what it is: a millenarian “death cult” that discred-
its rather than defends Islam (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). 
In the following, a dozen claims and statements found in ISIS propaganda are identified3 and an attempt 
is made to counter these on a number of  grounds – historical, theological and otherwise.4  It is held that 
ISIS’ ‘selling points” play a major role in attracting foreign fighters to its ranks. While most people are 
appalled by the brutality of  ISIS, a minority of  born Muslims and converts to Islam are attracted to it, 
because or despite the violence (Uhlmann, 2015). The pronouncements and slogans of  ISIS therefore need 
to be taken seriously and need to be dissected and discussed; they cannot be simply dismissed as ideology 
and propaganda.
Let us look at some of  the main claims, slogans and statements of  ISIS.
3   4 
3   These claims have been identified by TRI  Research Associate Dr.  Philipp Holtmann, based on his ongoing analysis of  ISIS’ Internet 
      output. 
4   A more comprehensive critique would draw from at least ten different sources and frameworks: (1) history of  Islam; (2) four main Islamic  
     jurisprudential schools and their fatwas;(3) international humanitarian law;(4) moral standards as they exist in human rights documents,  
     including Islamic and Arabian human rights texts; (5) the (political) self-interest of  the constituency for which IS claims to speak;(6)  
     the special interests of  women and religious minorities; (7) the juxtaposition of  ISIS’ own practices with its declaratory policies;(8) witness 
     accounts of  people who have broken ranks with the Islamic State;(9) victim and survivor accounts  of  those who have experienced IS   
     practices first-hand;(10) internal documents from IS found on computers and in safe houses. 
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Prophet involves, to some degree, the (re-) inven-
tion of  a lost tradition. 
According to Muslims, Allah revealed himself  
over a period of  23 years to Muhammad, whose 
words were written down by others only after his 
death in 632 CE. A multiplicity of  Muslim inter-
pretations exists on the Quran, on Muhammad’s 
exemplary way of  life and on Islamic law (sharia). 
These can be used to challenge ISIS and its claim 
to a monopoly of  interpretation. This fact could 
be emphasized to encourage a more skeptical 
view among susceptible target audiences towards 
ISIS’ argument that it represents the “pure and 
unadulterated Islam” (Küng, 2006; Vanya, 2014).
Some critical scientific studies, which have at-
tempted to get closer to the oldest versions of  the 
Quran, have come up with findings that tend to 
challenge Salafist interpretations. Some of  the 
Quran researchers who deal with the etymology 
of  the sacred text claim that this also concerns 
crucial topics, such as the rewards of  a “martyr” 
in paradise: when being retranslated and redact-
ed, they suggest that the heavenly offering might 
consist of  sweet white raisins rather than virgins 
(Luxenburg, 2000; Küng, 2006; Al-Azmeh, 2014). 
This could be a vantage point for degrading cer-
tain doctrines and key-discourses of  ISIS. The 
claim of  ISIS to stand for “pure and unadulter-
ated Islam” therefore is just that – a claim among 
other claims with no better proof  of  correctness. 
However, by their close (but superficial) imitation 
of  alleged and partly real historical practices from 
the early days of  Islam following what it claims 
“the Prophetic methodology” (Wood, 2015), ISIS 
hope to gain legitimacy, denouncing those who di-
verge from its version of  Islam as takfir.
Claim	No.	2:	
ISIS claims that Muslims are persecuted and their 
rights violated all over the world and that the only 
solution to stop this is to fight back.
Ad	2:	Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
In order to claim the moral high ground, ISIS of-
ten portrays its war as defensive rather than as of-
fensive. In its black-and-white ideology it depicts 
itself  as heroic defenders of  the Muslim world 
– the ummah (community of  Muslims) - against 
Western colonization and the domination of  Arab 
and other Muslim lands through pro-Western 
Muslim rulers who are portrayed as puppets of  
the West. 
Yet, the facts suggest that Muslims are indeed 
not persecuted “all over the world.”  The largest 
persecutions often take place in Muslim majority 
countries themselves (Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Su-
dan) and often both perpetrators and victims are 
Muslims. A comparison of  religious persecutions 
in Christian and Muslim countries has shown that 
large-scale persecutions are ten times more often 
taking place in Muslim-majority countries (Grim 
& Finke, 2007).  For example, the slow-motion 
genocide in Darfur (costing more than 250,000 
victims since 2003) is perpetrated by Arab Mus-
lims against African Muslims and neither ISIS nor 
other jihadist organisations have raised a finger in 
the defense of  African Muslims in Darfur. ISIS it-
self  is now a prime example of  engaging in active 
religious persecution on a large scale. 
Claim	No.	3:		
According to its online magazine Dabiq, ISIS 
claims that true Islam can only be established by 
the sword. This means that members of  other re-
ligions and sects, including the monotheist ones 
(Jews, Christians), can be subjugated, forced to 
convert or be killed (Dabiq, Issues 1-4). 
Ad	3:	Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message:
An appropriate counter-narrative to this claim 
would be to emphasize the historical cases in which 
many people have converted to Islam by persua-
sion, rather than by force.  In the case of  Islam’s 
expansion in the 7th century, the Historical Atlas of  
the Islamic World notes that “This expansion was 
primarily a cultural phenomenon but it was also 
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a significant chapter in military history” (Nicolle, 
2003, p. 48).  While we only have very limited 
evidence about conversions in the early days of  
Islam, people were usually encouraged and not 
coerced to become Muslims. After conversion 
they would no longer have to pay a special poll tax 
(jizya) levied on non-Muslims who wanted to enjoy 
the protection of  Muslim rulers. Other “People 
of  the Book,” such as Christians and Jews, could 
gain the status “protected” (dhimmi), but were not 
allowed to ride horses or carry weapons - so there 
was also a material incentive for them to accept 
Islam.
However, having said that, there are numerous 
hadiths (9th and 10th century accounts of  what 
the Prophet and other early Muslims allegedly 
said or did, as reported by his closest companions 
(Esposito, 2003)), which stress the importance of  
expanding Islam “by the sword,” i.e. by war 
(Sookhdeo, 2008). On the other hand, the 
Prophet Muhammad is also quoted as saying 
“let there be no compulsion in religion” (Quran, 
2:256).  ISIS narratives exploit the problem of  
contradictory messages by claiming that the later 
(more intolerant) statements of  the Quran from 
the Medina period invalidate the (more concilia-
tory) earlier statements of  the Prophet from his 
period in Mecca (Gabriel, 2004). 
The ISIS narrative also regards “People of  the 
Book” (Christians and Jews) as second-class 
citizens in their societies, a view that stems from 
some forms of  Salafi Islam. For ISIS and other 
jihadi extremists, the “People of  the Book” and 
unbelievers who do not submit to rules set by 
them, can be subjugated, enslaved, expelled or 
even killed. However, this view is widely contested 
by mainstream Islam. One of  the challenges of  
religious texts– not just the Quran  - is that passag-
es that are time- and context-specific are applied 
in new and modern situations. Muslim scholars 
have interpreted passages of  the Quran and the 
hadiths in many different ways; for almost every 
example one can find a counter-examples and, in 
some cases, even a counter-counter-example. This 
is also true for those passages in the Quran that 
advocate killing of  opponents (e.g. Surah 9:5). Yet 
the Quran contains also passages that oppose the 
killing of  innocent people, for example, the often-
quoted Surah 5:32 (Hermann, 2015).  
Claims by ISIS about Violence
Claim	No.	4:	
According to some ISIS clerics, civil strife (fitna) 
is a positive thing because in its course the true 
believers come to the surface, distinguishing them 
from the heretics and hypocrites. 
Ad	4:	Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
Fitna literally means “to burn,” but is also refer-
ring to temptation, probation, to put to the test, 
distress, discord, riot, civil strife, rebellion against 
the divine order. Fitna is seen as a situation to be 
avoided at almost all costs by mainstream Islam. 
The term has multiple uses, referring inter alia to 
“sedition” and trial (testing by temptation), which 
can lead to deserting one’s faith.  The Prophet 
himself  called fitna “worse than killing” (Quran 
2:217). The first major civil war of  the Islamic Ca-
liphate, lasting from 656-661, is generally referred 
to as the “First Fitna.” Some of  the supporters of  
ISIS apparently see fitna as not that destructive, 
because in their view the ummah is in such a cata-
strophic shape that civil strife can only lead to a 
better situation. In addition, they might use the 
word in the sense of  “to put to test” which is but 
one of  the many meanings. 
Even if  we accept that interpretation, the question 
remains by what test “heretics” and “ hypocrites” 
can be distinguished from “true believers.”  In the 
history of  Islam, there is not a historical record 
of  a test during  the various fitan (pl. of  fitna) since 
the 7th century were of  any help in distinguishing 
“true believers” from “hypocrites” and “heretics,” 
as ISIS claims.
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As to the “true” in “true believers”: ISIS followers 
and sympathizers should be confronted with al-
ternative Islamic narratives, which stand for open 
and rational interpretations of  Islam as these ex-
isted for centuries, not just in the rich medieval 
history of  Islamic civilizations, but well into the 
19th century. Looking at this half-forgotten tra-
dition, Muslims might be able to challenge the 
“truth vs. untruth” discourse of  IS-followers and 
help to highlight nuanced Muslim interpretations 
that differ from those of  ISIS scholars. 
Claim	No.	5:	
ISIS claims that a Muslim has to pass through the 
stage of  violent jihad in order to enter paradise. 
Jihad is even a precondition for the establishment 
of  the ummah, since otherwise no separation can 
take place between mu’minin (believers), munafiqin 
(hypocrites) and kuffar (unbelievers). The process 
of  ruthless separation must be continued until the 
two camps are completely separated: the camp of  
iman (belief) vs. the camps of  nifaq and kufr (disbe-
lief) (Al-Awlaki, 2014).
Ad	5: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message:
Jihad has been interpreted by Muslims in several 
ways. One distinction is between the “greater I,” 
which means restraining oneself  from commit-
ting immoral acts considered to be transgressions 
against divine law and striving to become a bet-
ter person, and the “minor jihad,” which refers 
to the fight for righteousness and to helping the 
subjects of  injustice but also to the defense and 
the active propagation of  faith by armed force. 
This particular meaning of  a violent “holy war” 
is the prevalent one in the Quran. The first part 
of  this ISIS claim appears to be inspired by a 
hadith attributed to Mohammed, which says: 
“Know that Paradise is under the shades of  
swords.” Jihad in the sense of  “greater jihad,” as 
an attempt of  each and every one to overcome 
base instincts in an effort to better one’s character 
by dedication and self-discipline is a valid concept 
that should, in counter-narratives, be stressed over 
the violent “lesser jihad.”
One possibility in countering the narrative of  
this hadith, as is the case with many others, is to 
question the authenticity (Esposito, 2006).  The 
Prophet has said different things under different 
circumstances, for example, that “Paradise is at 
the feet of  mothers (Der Spiegel, 2014, p. 60)” – a 
statement hard to combine with the one about the 
“shades of  swords.” A possible counter-message 
could be: if  the ummah, the community of  Mus-
lims, can only be established by the sword, which 
involves violence, it will lead to resentment and 
resistance among those coerced into the correct 
belief  – something that cannot be conductive to 
establishing a harmonious community which the 
ummah is supposed to be.  
Terming the ongoing armed conflict between 
Sunni and Alawite Muslims in Syria and the one 
between Sunni and Shia in Iraq as a jihad, as ISIS 
does, should also be countered with opposing evi-
dence.  One possible counter message is to discuss 
the meaning of  jihad contrary to the terms of  sec-
tarianism. Various religious authorities in Islam, 
among them more moderate clerics involved in 
the Syrian revolution/civil war, such as the Is-
lamic Body of  Greater Syria (Hay’at al-Sham al-
Islamiyya), have expressed themselves in this sense 
(Religious Rehabilitation Group, 2014). Moreo-
ver, non-sectarian violence can be highlighted as 
a possible counter-message. For example, part of  
the casualties in Syria (some 250,000 fatalities and 
nearly one million injured) were not the result of  
clashes between the troops of  the Alawite Assad 
dictatorship and Syrian Sunni resistance fighters 
but resulted from clashes between jihadist Sunni 
Muslims, especially those of  the Islamic State and 
the Al-Nusra Front (BBC, 2014).
Claim	No.	6:
ISIS claims, citing the words of  al-Zarqawi,  that 
“the honorable resistance“ has noble and great 
Sharia aims. All jihad exerted by the resistance is 
for the benefit of  the Muslim people. The jihad 
of  the resistance is not a limited jihad to redraw 
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the borders of  the Sykes-Picot agreement, but is a 
worldwide jihad.5 
Ad	6: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
One way to counter this narrative is to discredit 
the narrator, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who set up 
“the Organization of  Monotheism and Jihad” 
(JTJ - Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) in 1999 and, by 
2004, pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden as 
he established al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, a.k.a. Tanzim 
Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn). Upon his death 
in October 2006 by American forces, his followers 
created the umbrella organization Islamic State in 
Iraq (ISI) with precursors to ISIS.  
However, al-Zarqawi’s resistance against the 
American intervention was not very “honorable” 
as claimed by ISIS in terms of  his treatment of  
Muslim people. His cruelty distanced himself  
from Al-Qaeda’s leadership, so much so that Al-
Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahi-
ri, had to warn him in July 2005 that by killing in-
nocent Muslim Shia civilians he alienated people 
from Al-Qaeda (“ISIS: Portrait,” 2014).  A citizen 
of  Jordan, Zarqawi had started his career as a 
criminal. His Islamic theological credentials were 
minor if  not totally absent (in that he differs from 
the new caliph, sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
who is said to hold a doctorate in Islamic studies). 
As to his jihad being for the “benefit of  the Mus-
lim people”: most of  Zarqawi’s victims were Shia 
Muslims. He referred to them as “human scum” 
and “poisonous snakes” (“ISIS: Portrait,” 2014, p. 
24). 
Moreover, ISIS has to expand its territory by ne-
cessity as its economic model is based on continu-
ous plunder rather than the creation of  wealth on 
the territory it holds.  Thus, another example of  
how ISIS’ aims are not favorable to all Muslims is 
in its systematic murder of  tribal leaders in Iraq’s 
al-Anbar province indicates that it seeks to terror-
ize and subdue Sunni Muslims there rather than 
work for them and with them (Soufan Group, 
2014). 
Claims by ISIS about Leadership
Claim	No.	7:	
ISIS claims that, under present circumstances, 
Muslim unity becomes mandatory and that there-
fore it becomes a religious obligation to unify un-
der a single leader.6  
Ad	7: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message:
 
Religious movements have a tendency to split 
rather than to unify and Islam is no exception to 
this rule. Its most prominent split is the one be-
tween Sunni and Shia, which is more than 1300 
years old. Within Sunni Islam itself  there are, as 
within Shia Islam, sects and sub-groups. There is 
no indication at all that they will unite in the near 
future. Rather, they are likely, if  attacked by ISIS, 
to put up a fight and offer resistance. While more 
than half  a dozen of  AQ’s affiliates have, in recent 
months, declared allegiance to ISIS, recent splits 
among some of  these affiliates also indicate that 
not everybody is willing to throw in his lot with 
ISIS. 
Moreover, the majority of  Muslims do not ascribe 
to ISIS’ ideology or call to action.  In fact, a pub-
lic opinion poll among Arab Muslims, conducted 
by the Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and 
Policy, surveying public opinion in seven coun-
tries, found that 85 percent of  respondents had 
a negative opinion about ISIS (Ghanmi, 2014). 
Chances that more Muslims rally behind ISIS are 
small as the extreme violence (crucifixions, ston-
ing, beheadings, amputations, rapes, mass killings 
3 
5   See lecture 5, “Series of  the Life From the Words of  the ‘Ulamā’ on the Project of  the Islamic State“. As to the context: In February 2014, 
      the organisation used a 2006 lecture by Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi, former leader of  Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad and founder of  the original 
     cell of  IS (Islamic State of  Iraq, f. 2006) to demonstrate strategic continuity and build support for its imminent declaration of  the caliphate.
6  This is another argument of  al-Muhajir in the context of  the establishment of  IS, probably in 2006. Republished by IS in 2014, in lecture 
    No. 7.
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of  prisoners) disgust large majorities of  Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. When ISIS advanced 
in Iraq, over half  a million civilians fled in one 
week  - hardly a sign of  welcoming unity under 
ISIS. The Jordanian-Palestinian writer Abu Mu-
hammad al-Maqdisi, a respected voice among 
Salafists, has accused ISIS of  driving a wedge 
between Muslims – the very opposite of  the unity 
sought by ISIS (al-Maqdisi, 2014).
Claim	No.	8:	
ISIS claims to be the bearer of  legitimate religious 
authority over all Muslims, which gives it the right 
to re-establish the caliphate (Holtmann, “The Dif-
ferent Functions,” 2014).7  
Ad	8: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
ISIS has adopted a popular variation of  the ji-
hadi standard banner used since the 1980s, a 
black flag with a white circle in the middle that 
encloses the seal of  the Prophet with the words 
“God Messenger Muhammad.” Its leader has 
declared himself  caliph (meaning  a “successor” 
who was meant to be the vice-regent of  Muham-
mad). The title “Caliph” has been used for Islamic 
rulers overseeing religious and political affairs of  
an Islamic community, while “caliphate” refers to 
the territory or state ruled by the caliph (Religious 
Rehabilitation Group “The Fallacies,” 2014). The 
caliph was originally a politico-religious leader 
who headed the Muslim nation (imam) and also 
acted as supreme military commander (amir al-
mu’minin). This dual function has, however, disap-
peared after the reigns of  the first four caliphs. The 
last (Ottoman) Islamic caliphate came to an end in 
1924 when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in his secular-
ization and modernization campaign for Turkey, 
abolished the institution headed by the last caliph 
Abdulmecid II. After a hiatus of  90 years, Abu 
Bakr Al-Baghdadi had himself  declared “Caliph” 
of  a worldwide caliphate on 29 June 2014.  
However, according to one Islamic scholar, Rusydi 
‘Alyan (in his book Al-Islam wa al-Khilafah, 1996), 
a caliph” has to have a “profound knowledge of  
Sharia law” (which the new caliph probably has) 
and “being fair, virtuous, dignified, mature and 
sane.” (Holtmann, “The Different Functions,” 
2014, p. 6). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has already 
shown not to be the latter.   For example, the in-
stant sharia-based punishments of  their courts 
do not meet any fair trial standards, the manner 
women are sold in slave markets is neither  vir-
tuous nor dignified.  He might be “mature” and 
“sane” but that alone would hardly qualify him to 
be “Caliph Ibrahim.”
Claims by ISIS about the Caliphate
In Islamic history the caliphate was a contested 
institution – three out of  the first four so-called 
Rightly Guided Caliphs (Umar, Uthman and Ali) 
died by assassination. Discord after the death of  
the Prophet at the time of  the Rightly Guided 
(Rashidun) Caliphs (632 – 661 CE) even reached 
a point where some of  the Prophet’s companions 
called for “jihad against the Caliph” (Madelung, 
2014, pp. 11-12). What ISIS presents is a “roman-
ticized history of  the Caliphate,” as R. B. Furlow 
and his colleagues have noted. They added that 
ISIS portrays “….the Caliphate  as a glorious, 
shining kingdom on a hill, while editing out in-
convenient historical details that plagued the Ca-
liphates from the time of  Muhammed’s death” 
(Furlow et al., p. 1). Many claims of  ISIS refer to 
the Caliphate. The desire to re-establish a cali-
phate has been popular in broader Muslim circles 
for almost a century.  It was a bold move of  ISIS to 
address this widespread wish for a new Caliphate. 
It has certainly helped to increase the stream of  
young Muslim recruits to Syria and Iraq since 
mid-2014.
Several ISIS claims refer to the caliphate, includ-
ing the following.
3 
7  This is one of  the major claims of  ISIS, since legitimacy means support and fosters leadership aspirations. The IS power claim is based on 
adaptations of  classical Islamic stipulations regarding the investment of  a caliph and the special and general mechanisms that lend legitimacy 
to the investiture and proclamation of  the caliph, such as “pledges of  investiture” and “popular pledges of  obedience”. 
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Claim	No.	9:
ISIS claims that the IS-caliphate is the true land 
of  Islam and emigration (hjirah) to the land of  Is-
lam is obligatory. Whoever joins IS will find great 
rewards in this world and in the hereafter (Dabiq, 
2014, Issues 1-4).
Ad	9: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
The claim that those who join ISIS will get heav-
enly rewards goes back to numerous verses in the 
Quran that call for fighting and claim that it is 
binding upon believers to fulfill God’s commands 
and obey His leadership (hidaya). In exchange, be-
lievers will gain heavenly rewards in the Hereafter 
(Quran, 9).  However, the ISIS-discourse is based 
on an uncompromising, literal and non-contextual 
interpretation of  such verses and can be seriously 
challenged. For example, indiscriminate violence 
and brutal terrorist practices do not deserve any 
rewards. Credible Muslim opinion makers who 
interpret these verses in their respective historical 
and political contexts should continue to be in-
volved in any project that challenges the narrative 
of  the Islamic State. Their voices need to be heard 
more loudly in the Islamic world.
In parallel, one should also stress that the history 
of  failed Western policies in Muslim countries 
must not be countered by attacks against civilians 
who are in most cases themselves Muslims and 
who cannot be held responsible for the misdeeds 
of  some members of  political elites. By being self-
critical one gains trust and can facilitate the task 
to inspire Muslim audiences to become more self-
critical as well, especially towards brutal discours-
es and deeds from members from their own ranks.
If  the IS-caliphate is indeed the “true land of  Is-
lam,” moderate Muslims will find it difficult to 
square such a “truth” with some of  the actual 
practices of  ISIS, such as:
•	 War	crimes:	 the mass killings of  Shia pris-
oners of  war and the ethnic cleansing of  As-
syrian Christians, Turkmen and Shabak Shia; 
beheading of  foreign journalists; killing of  
non-believers and heretics based on ISIS’ 
takfir ideology; destruction of  places of  reli-
gious worship; burning of  people in cages and 
throwing homosexuals from high buildings.
•	 Crimes	 against	 humanity: the selling of  
5,000 -7,000  Yazidi women and children into 
slavery; attempted genocide of  Yazidis;
•	 Human	rights	abuses: e.g. the ill-treatment 
of  civilians, including women and children; 
abduction and torture of  boys from Kobane; 
the brainwashing of  children and the recruit-
ment of  child soldiers as young as nine years 
old; use of  people with mental or physical ill-
nesses as suicide bombers; subjecting women 
to sexual violence and systematic rape. 
Large majorities of  Muslims reject tactics used by 
ISIS. A Pew public opinion survey held in 2013 
found that:
In most countries where the questions [regarding legitimacy 
of  suicide bombings in defense of  Islam] was asked, rough-
ly three-quarters or more Muslims rejected suicide bombing 
and other forms of  violence against civilians. And in most 
countries, according to this survey, the prevailing view is that 
such acts are never justified as a means of  defending Islam 
from its enemies (Pew Research, 2013)8.
The record of  ISIS so far covers the full spec-
trum of  crimes, from individual murder of  chil-
dren to attempted genocide. The gap between the 
declaratory policy of  ISIS – its claim to be the 
“true land of  Islam” - and its actual record of  war 
crimes, gross human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity on the ground is probably the 
most powerful argument in efforts to counter the 
3 
8  There are some countries in which substantive minorities think violence against civilians is at least sometimes justified. This view is 
      particularly widespread among Muslims in the Palestinians territories (40%), Afghanistan (39%), Egypt (29%) and Bangladesh (26%). The 
      readiness to accept violence against civilians seems to be context-dependent. It rises in places suffering from brutal state suppression, poverty 
     and long civil-war histories
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ideological narrative of  ISIS. Muslim witnesses to 
such crimes by ISIS should be given ample voice 
in counter-narratives.
Claim	No.	10:
ISIS claims that there is a wonderful brotherhood 
among IS-followers. Every capable person should 
rush forward to join this brotherhood and per-
form emigration (hijrah) to the land of  jihad, or at 
least spiritual emigration away from the values of  
the infidel societies in which many Muslims live. 
Ad	10: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
The claim of  a brotherhood among the ISIS fight-
ers has elements of  truth as it is well known that 
men tend to bond in battle. However, there are 
also tales coming from the ranks of  ISIS of  bitter 
disputes that can be highlighted as effective coun-
ter-narratives. For example, given the fact that 
Muslims fight Muslims in Syria and Iraq and jihad 
refers to the defense of  the faith against unbeliev-
ers, it is difficult to view the conflict in Syria (and 
its spill-over into Iraq) as jihad. As the Singapore-
based Religious Rehabilitation Group, in a bro-
chure over “The Syrian Conflict” writes:
The conflict in Syria has led to confusion about the obliga-
tion of  jihad among many Muslims. Many Muslims are 
being misled into thinking that fighting in Syria is an act of  
jihad. This is not true. The Syrian conflict is a sectarian 
war among Muslims in Syria. It is about political power 
and influence and determining who has control of  land and 
resources.(…) It is not about defending the faith of  the 
ummah (Religious Rehabilitation Group “The Syrian 
Conflict,” 2014, p. 2). 
Some of  the foreign fighters who flocked to Syria 
and Iraq have begun to realize this and disillu-
sionment has set in. The tales of  those who re-
turn home disillusioned are feared by ISIS. More 
than 100 foreign fighters who tried to make it 
back home have been executed by ISIS, appar-
ently in an effort to prevent some uncomfortable 
truths from gaining publicity (“IS has Executed,” 
2014).  Among those who stay, whether or not 
the “wonderful brotherhood” remains “wonder-
ful” can also be doubted. What many of  these 
foreign fighters tend to forget are the long-term 
consequences of  wartime traumas on their mental 
health. Veterans often become depressed and not 
infrequently suicidal without appropriate psycho-
logical counseling. For example, the experience of  
many Taliban fighters who became drug addicts, 
paranoid and depressed should be a warning to 
foreign fighters joining ISIS. 
Claim	No.	11:	
The IS-caliphate is the true new nucleus of  the 
land of  Islam and emigration (hijra) to it is pre-
scribed and obligatory.  ISIS claims that it is an 
individual obligation (wajib ‘ayni) for all Muslims 
skilled in Islamic legal, administrative, health and 
military affairs to join IS in order to assist in the 
construction of  a viable state (Dabiq, 2014, Issues 
1-4).
Ad	11:	Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
The call to perform hijrah - which means both emi-
gration and withdrawal from an un-Islamic soci-
ety to a Muslim one is one of  the most powerful 
instruments in the Islamic tradition as it implies 
following in the footsteps of  the Prophet. ISIS 
makes clever use of  it to lure vulnerable young 
Muslim to its state-building project. 
It is a standard tenet of  militant Salafism that jihad 
is the personal duty of  every Muslim (Meir Amit 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 
2014). Yet mainstream Islam only knows five du-
ties; the alleged sixth personal duty to perform 
jihad is based on later interpretations of  jihad by 
medieval Islamic jurists like Ibn Taymiyya and by 
modern Islamists like Sayyid Qutb. It is not con-
tained in texts from early “authentic” Islam.
Claim	No.	12:	
IS claims that it is capable of  hitting Western in-
terests all over the world by means of  its affiliates, 
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with the number of  highly motivated, dedicated 
followers growing by the day.
Ad	12: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation 
into a Counter-Message: 
This is part of  ISIS self-glorifying propaganda and 
psychological warfare. ISIS’ motto is “Remaining 
and expanding.” So far ISIS’ direct attacks have 
been largely limited to Syria and Iraq (and, to a 
lesser extent, Libya, Tunisia and Lebanon). How-
ever, since mid-2014 a number of  lone actors ap-
pear to have been inspired by ISIS strategic com-
mands. They have perpetrated terrorist attacks in 
places as far away as Canada, in addition to those 
conducted in Europe. This behaviour is in line 
with ISIS’ “virtual leadership” paradigm, a long-
range command and control pattern, in which 
ideology and strategic guidance via the media are 
supposed to inspire, if  not guide supporters’ at-
tacks in the West (Holtmann, “Online and Offline 
Pledges,” 2014; Franco, 2014).
However, this strategy backfires against ISIS goal 
to create a viable state. Attacks in the West will 
only strengthen the resolve of  the coalition of  
more than sixty states that has been brought to-
gether by the United States to fight ISIS. This 
coalition includes Western, neutral and Muslim 
countries. The escalation potential of  these states 
is infinitely greater than the one of  ISIS. By tak-
ing on the whole world, ISIS -  which might have 
had a chance of  survival as a Sunni state next to a 
Kurdish and a Shi’ite state in a fragmenting Iraq 
- is digging its own grave. It might take months 
or even years but ISIS as a state (not as an under-
ground terrorist movement) looks doomed. Loos-
ing ground in Syria and in Iraq, it is likely that 
ISIS might seek to regroup in other places. On 
the other hand, its internal divisions might break 
it up before it can break out. While each of  its acts 
of  terrorism has produced terror, even more so, it 
also produces resistance to terror. Nonetheless, in 
the short and medium term the group is a major 
destabilizer in the region. Its apocalyptic belief  
that the End of  Times are near and that the final 
battle will be fought and won in Dabiq (Syria), ac-
counts for its fanaticism.
ISIS’ military strength and the degree of  support 
it receives from former Baathist officers and Sunni 
tribes in Anbar is subject to speculation and dis-
pute; one account mentions some 25,000 fighters 
of  which about half  are foreigners and the re-
mainder come from Syria and Iraq while others 
arrive at higher estimates (Meir Amit Intelligence 
and Terrorism Information Center, 2014). Of  
the 5,000 or so foreign fighters who came from 
Western countries, many have already died, some 
have decided to remain in the Islamic Caliphate 
and some have returned while others who wanted 
to return have reportedly been killed by ISIS to 
avoid that they could reveal some ugly truths upon 
return. How high the threat emanating from those 
who have returned for the West is, is difficult to 
assess beforehand but it is a gross exaggeration to 
say that they are “capable of  hitting Western in-
terest all over the world,” as ISIS claims. 
Conclusion
This exercise of  taking a number of  ISIS claims and attempting to counter them has shown the potential 
of  this approach – not more. What is needed is a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic 
inter-disciplinary team-work, aimed at developing counter-messages, counter-speech, counter-arguments 
and counter-narratives. Subsequently, these have to be tested with audiences that have a cultural affinity 
to the main target groups. As far as Western democracies are concerned, the target group consists of  vul-
nerable young Muslims who might become foreign fighters or domestic terrorists if  they are not stopped 
on their trajectory of  radicalization. After such testing and appropriate re-calibration of  texts, counter-
arguments and messages like the ones tentatively sketched here might be ready for use by credible Muslim 
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voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational or faith-based 
arguments. It is vital that Muslim scholars are involved in all phases of  developing such counter-narratives, 
not just at the delivery end. While the jihadist ideologues themselves might well be beyond their reach due 
to the fanatically closed minds (“Salafists only listen to Salafists,” as one of  them put it), rebellious young 
men tempted by Salafist jihadi messages might still be susceptible to the voice of  reason, appealing to their 
own self-interest and to the their inner voice of  humanity, the voice of  their better self  which is also the 
one of  the “greater jihad.’’
Terrorism is a combination of  violence and propaganda. Counter-terrorism has so far mainly targeted 
the former and neglected the latter. The use of  kinetic force against terrorists in the “war on terror” has, 
in more than a decade of  counter-terrorism, in many cases been unproductive and downright counter-
productive in other cases. It has been very costly in terms of  lives and money lost. On the other hand, 
efforts to counter the ideology that drives terrorism have not made much progress in all these years, for 
lack of  funding as well as for lack of  development of  effective and tested soft power instruments that target 
the hearts and minds of  would-be jihadists. It is high time to invest more in developing better counter-
messages and more persuasive counter-narratives which appeal to Muslims on both the emotional and the 
intellectual level. 
Since counter-narratives are only defensive, it is even more necessary to develop credible alternative nar-
ratives – narratives that can give a new sense of  purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they 
have no future in their and our societies. Those in positions of  authority have to show them that we do not 
live in blocked societies where positive change can come only by means of  violence. Policy-makers have 
to listen not only to the grievances of  young people but also address their hopes and their expectations 
for the future and they have to enable young people to actively shape their own future in pluralistic, open 
societies. The destructiveness of  terrorism has to be shown to be futile and has to be opposed by a new 
constructiveness. 
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Countering Online Violent Extremism in australia: 
Research and preliminary findings
Anne Aly and Kosta Lucas
Curtin University
CHAPTER 9
The nexus between online content and radicalisation towards violent extremism is a priority area of  con-
cern in Australia. The Australian government recently announced its intention to focus on combatting 
online radicalisation. The presence of  violent extremist content online has grown exponentially in the past 
decade or so as the internet and social media platforms have become integral tools in the violent extremist 
repertoire used to inform, influence and recruit support for their cause. While research into the forms and 
structure of  violent extremist content online is fairly well developed, there is little empirical evidence to 
support the development of  counter strategies including online counter narratives. 
This paper reports on a continuing research program to counter violent extremism online. The program 
focuses primarily on understanding the role of  the internet in radicalisation and on developing online 
counter narratives to interrupt radicalisation.  It comprises several discrete research projects exploring 
how users interact with online content in order to develop understanding of  how such content influences 
radicalisation. Despite growing interest into the role of  the internet and social media in the process of  radi-
calisation, we are still no closer to understanding why some individuals engage with online violent extrem-
ist content in ways that influence their offline behaviour. Nor are we any closer to understanding why the 
messages of  global jihadi movement groups such as the Islamic State of  Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS) appeal 
to some individuals but not to others. A vast body of  research into the content and constructs of  violent 
extremist online messaging has been produced. This research has illuminated the ways in which violent ex-
tremists construct their messages, the master narratives they employ and how they utilise the internet and 
social media to disseminate their messages. However to make assumptions about the appeal and influence 
of  such online content ignores the fact that those who receive and engage with violent extremist messages 
do so in conditions which influence how they interpret and act on those messages. The assumption that 
online narratives and messages have a direct impact on the attitudes and behaviours of  their target audi-
ence is questionable and deserves further exploration. By examining how internet users receive, engage 
with and interpret online messages, we can develop a more comprehensive understanding of  the role of  
the internet in radicalisation and how to effectively counter the phenomenon of  online radicalisation. 
The research framework for the Countering Online Violent Extremism Research (CoVER) Program at 
Curtin University is based on a media theory approach that recognises audiences as active agents in the 
communication process. Accordingly, it is not sufficient to study only the messages that are disseminated 
via online mediums. Rather the focus of  inquiry is on the ways in which the receivers of  messages (the 
audience) interact with the message, the medium and the conditions under which these interactions occur 
(Aly, 2012). The framework involves three levels of  analysis- each yielding different insights that collectively 
inform an understanding of  how and why terroristic online narratives are constructed and deconstructed 
in different ways by different people.
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The first level of  analysis involves examinations of  online violent extremist content in order to develop un-
derstanding of  what terrorists are saying and who they are speaking to. It also involves quantitative meas-
ures of  who is actually receiving these messages. Such measures may not produce anything more insightful 
than broad demographics but potentially could yield empirical observations about the characteristics and 
habits of  users who are participating in interactive relationships around terroristic online content.
The second level of  analysis applies Media Uses and Gratifications Theory (Katz et al., 1973; McQuail, 
1983) to develop a better understanding of  why individuals and groups of  individuals use the internet and 
how online content serves certain social and psychological functions. Uses and Gratifications Theory of-
fers a framework for examining how users’ needs that are shaped by their social roles and psychological 
predispositions are gratified by the attributes, the content and the context of  different media platforms. 
Contemporary approaches to Uses and Gratifications Theory recognise four needs: information, personal 
identity, social integration/ interaction and entertainment.
Media Uses and Gratifications describes how needs motivate media use and how media content can sat-
isfy social and psychological needs, but it does not give comprehensive consideration to the psychological 
dispositions, sociological factors or context in which media use occurs. Nor does it consider that needs and 
uses are not static, but instead are influenced by external factors such as life events or global trends. As 
such, this level of  analysis offers insights into why people engage with violent extremist content online but 
not the social realities that drive their engagement. 
The third and final level of  analysis involves a deeper exploration of  how individuals view, engage with and 
interpret online violent extremist content. Recognising that different individuals in different conditions will 
interpret messages in accordance with their own social backgrounds, conceptual frameworks and world-
views, this level of  analysis involves qualitative audience ethnographic research.
Finally, the research framework adopts Weimann and von Knop’s (2008) model in which they identify 
several stages of  engagement with terroristic narratives online: each motivated by a different set of  needs 
that are in turn gratified by online functions and content. The “Searching Phase” involves users looking for 
answers out of  a particular interest or curiosity that leads them to visit extremist websites. The “Seduction 
Phase” sees users being introduced to extremist narratives as they continue to visit specific websites. In the 
“Captivation Phase” the users start to visit blogs, forums or chat rooms though they do not participate in 
their interactive features. In the “Persuasion Phase” users begin to participate in communicative exchanges 
as members of  online communities.  The final, “Operative Phase,” occurs when users are introduced to 
the operational activities of  the group and this may translate to real world activities.
Counter narratives to interrupt online 
radicalisation project
As part of  the CoVER program, researchers at 
Curtin University are exploring ways in which 
individuals engage with violent extremist content 
in order to develop understanding of  how effec-
tive counter narratives can be constructed. Part of  
this research involves a discrete project in partner-
ship with Exit White Power- an Australian based 
NGO dedicated to tackling white supremacist 
and racist based ideologies. The project involves 
the collection of  user responses to a set of  discus-
sion starters posted on a public discussion page on 
Facebook. The ‘White Power? Discussion Page’ is 
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moderated by Exit White Power and is primar-
ily designed to encourage debate and discussion 
about racism. Over a period of  three months 
(July- October 2014) 24 discussion starters were 
posted on the Discussion Page. Over the life of  
the project the page was advertised on Facebook, 
targeted at Australian men aged 14-25 and in par-
ticular to those engaging in discussions on race 
hate pages.
The aim of  the project was to test the effective-
ness of  using both group identification (GI) and 
ideological beliefs (IB) messages in online counter 
narratives to white supremacy. Group identifica-
tion factors include a variety of  social and per-
sonal reasons that attract particular individuals to 
joining a white extremist group - for example a 
sense of  belonging, as an outlet of  rage or as a 
source of  personal support. Ideological belief  fac-
tors include adopting a theory that presents a sim-
plified explanation of  a complex world, that casts 
white people as superior and which turn hate and 
violence into virtues.
To research the responses elicited by GI and IB 
focussed counter narratives, the discussion start-
ers alternated between addressing each of  these 
factors. IB focussed messages questioned white 
supremacist theories on the basis of  fact, debunk-
ing misinformation and suggesting alternative 
interpretations of  current affairs issues, for exam-
ple ““Asia for the Asians, Africa for the Africans, 
White countries for everybody”... Is it actually 
true that only white countries accept refugees and 
immigration?” GI focussed messages questioned 
whether involvement in white supremacy is desir-
able in personal terms, for example “What do you 
think it takes to become active in the White Na-
tionalist movement? Would you have to make big 
changes to your life?”  
All responses and comments during the life of  the 
project were collated and formed a database that 
could then be analysed to answer the following re-
search questions:
1. How do users engage with online discussion 
posts targeting ideological and lifestyle factors?
2. How can online forums/ discussion pages be 
used to develop counter narratives?
The findings of  the analysis, along with findings 
from other research projects will be used to inform 
the understanding of  effective online counter nar-
ratives along three dimensions:
• Discursive elements of  a counter narrative 
that encourage response and participation 
in online counter narrative engagements - 
Terminology
• Narrative elements of  a counter narrative that 
encourage response and participation in on-
line counter narrative engagements -	Theme
 
• Persuasive elements that enable counter nar-
ratives to effectively disrupt violent extremist 
messaging online - Credibility
Preliminary Findings
While a comprehensive analysis of  the White 
Power? Discussion Page data is yet to be 
completed, a preliminary analysis has already 
yielded some significant insights into the ways in 
which individuals engage with online violent ex-
tremist content in a discussion forum. Analytical 
data provided by Facebook Analytics shows that, 
during the life of  the project, the page had an or-
ganic reach of  19529 and engaged 10266 users. 
There were 24323 visits to the page and a total 
of  3086 comments to the 24 Discussion Starters. 
The most commented upon discussion starter was 
“Describe the moment in your life when White 
Pride became important to you...” (IB). This 
starter was designed to encourage users to reflect 
on the ideological assumptions of  race and their 
personal identification with ‘white power.’  The 
least commented on discussion starter asked users 
“How do you think being a vocal white nation-
alist affects your future prospects?” (GI). Overall 
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the IB focussed discussion starters attracted more 
comments than the GI starters, though this slight 
discrepancy could be attributed to a number of  
variables not necessarily relevant to the type of  
message. The discussion starters and number of  
likes and comments are summarised in Table 3 
(see next page). Please note that these figures were 
tallied after moderation of  comments that violate 
The Page’s Terms and Conditions of  Use. 
A qualitative content analysis of  the comments 
was constructed around a grounded theory 
model, based on the one first developed by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967). This model involved an initial 
reading of  the data to code for as many categories 
as possible. The initial open coding of  the data 
highlighted themes for further analysis. The sali-
ent themes from the analysis were then collated 
and integrated. The final stage of  the coding pro-
cess produced four thematic categories embedded 
in the user comments: survival/ preservation (of  
the white race); victimhood (of  a white genocide 
conspiracy); blaming the other and justification of  
beliefs. 
A word frequency search generated through 
NVivo computer software revealed that the most 
commonly used words in the comments were 
“white” and “people.” Throughout the commen-
tary ‘white people’ was the most salient identity 
marker for user in- group identification.  Along 
with the results from the content analysis, this sug-
gests that the functional needs served by the dis-
cussion page were related to personal identity and 
social integration, not information seeking. This 
is an important point as it underscores that the 
attraction of  online use (both the consumption 
and production of  content) is related to the per-
sonal and intergroup relations and not to informa-
tion seeking. Further analysis of  how the themes 
were narrated in page comments highlighted that 
the themes correlated to personal identity and 
tAbLE 3: Preliminary Findings
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intergroup relations functions. Survival and vic-
timhood narratives served to reinforce in group 
favouritism, blaming the other functioned to sup-
port moral superiority.  
A final analysis applying Frank, Matsumoto, & 
Hwang (2014) ANCODI hypothesis will add to 
the findings. The ANCODI hypothesis posits that 
anger, contempt and disgust are an emotional 
mix indicative of  intergroup political aggression. 
By coding the emotive language expressed in 
the comments and correlating this to intergroup 
relations and the themes, a more comprehensive 
understanding of  how users engage online with 
violent extremist narratives and how they can also 
be engaged in counter violent extremist narratives. 
Conclusions
The project reported here is part of  an ongoing research program into online violent extremism with a 
focus on exploring the structural relations between violent extremist online content and user engagement 
with violent extremist narratives. The project tested how users who already demonstrated some propensity 
to engage in white power online narratives would interact with discussion starters that questioned group 
identity and ideological belief  factors associated with right wing nationalist movements. 
The analysis of  the page comments highlights several points for developing understanding of  online 
engagement with violent extremism. Firstly, the profiles of  those who regularly engaged with discussions 
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FIGuRE 2: Online Indicators of Engagement with Violent Extremist Narratives
confirm that they were already engaging with white power narratives.  According to Weimann and von 
Knop’s (2008) model of  the stages of  engagement with online terroristic narratives, the seduction phase 
occurs when users are introduced to extremist narratives and continue to be exposed to these narratives 
by visiting specific websites that reinforce the particular extremist beliefs. The captivation phase sees us-
ers start to visit interactive websites such as forums, blogs or chat rooms though they do not participate by 
posting comments or taking part in discussions (they may however respond to comments through benign 
actions such as ‘liking’). The persuasion phase marks participation in communicative exchanges as the 
user identifies as a member of  an online community of  like-minded individuals.  While it is not possible to 
make any conclusions about the overall visitors to the page, the content analysis of  the comments confirms 
that the page attracted participation from users who self-identified as “white nationalists,” “patriots,” and 
“right wing.” This suggests that the discussion page attracted users in the persuasion phase and possibly 
also the seduction and captivation phases though considering the overall number of  page visits. 
There was no discernible difference in the tone or language of  responses to either group identification 
focussed or ideological belief  focussed discussion starters. Those who commented tended to use the dis-
cussion page as a forum for reinforcing their world views as revealed by the salient themes of  the page 
commentary: survival, victimhood, blaming the other and justification of  beliefs. This indicates that the 
primary functions of  the discussion page, in terms of  Media Uses and Gratifications Theory, were personal 
identity and social integration. Users participated in the discussion page as a way of  reinforcing intergroup 
relations: in group favouritism, out group derogation and moral superiority. They did not use the discus-
sion page for other forms of  communication and interaction such as sharing information, interests or for 
entertainment.  
88CVE ONLINE IN AUSTRALIA
While a comprehensive analysis of  the project is yet to be undertaken, the preliminary findings point to 
some valuable lessons that can be directed towards developing more effective online counter narratives. 
Importantly, the personal identity and social integration function of  media should be the foundation for 
the development of  counter narratives that seek to re-engage individuals and interrupt online radicalisa-
tion. Providing facts or information that challenges the assumptions of  an extremist ideology did not prove 
effective in engaging users who already self-identify with these ideologies. Rather, consideration should be 
given to inter group relations and how these relations are expressed through violent extremist narratives. 
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Countering the Terrorist Narrative: Issues and 
challenges in contesting such spaces
thomas K. Samuel
Director, Research and Publications, 
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT)
CHAPTER 10
President Obama in his address to the United Nations in September 2014, spoke on the need for “contest-
ing the space that terrorists occupy.” He went on to further elaborate that the narrative and ideology of  
groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda and Boko Haram would “wilt and die” if  it was “consistently exposed and 
confronted and refuted…” (Obama, 2014).
How then do we in practical terms, confront and subsequently contest the “space” that terrorists occupy? 
Perhaps, we can start by acknowledging that we are in fact facing a grave and challenging threat. In May 
2015, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that the flow of  Foreign Terrorist Fight-
ers (FTFs) to Islamic State and other extremist groups had increased alarmingly: 15,000 fighters from 80 
countries in November 2014 to 25,000 fighters from 100 countries in mid-2015 (UN News Centre, 2015). 
This translates to a staggering increase of  approximately 70%. Let us be clear: dethroning an existing idea 
and in many ways challenging the status-quo (for in such radical circles, fighting in Syria and Iraq is seen 
as the accepted norm), while addressing the issues they raise by providing an alternative that is workable, sus-
tainable and practical will be extremely daunting. It nevertheless has to be done, if  we want to see credible 
progress made in defeating the terrorist in general and countering their narrative in particular.   
KEYwoRdS: terrorist narrative, counter-narrative, message, secondary trauma
the message
What are they saying?
Schmid and de Graaf  (1982) argue convincing-
ly that while terrorism in the past was only seen 
through the lenses of  political violence, there is 
now a need for it to be understood in the context 
of  “communication and propaganda”. Schmid 
posits that terrorism is a “combination of  both 
violence and propaganda” to “advertise” and 
convince others on the groups potential to cause 
“harm and to destroy” (Schmid, 2005, p. 127-
136). This propaganda that is then communicated 
forms the basis of  the terrorist narrative. 
What then is a narrative?  
George Dimitriu notes that a narrative can be 
defined as a “resource for political actors to con-
struct a shared meaning to shape perceptions, be-
liefs and behavior of  the public” (Dimitriu, 2013, 
p. 13). This is the framework through which “[a] 
shared sense is achieved, representing a past, pre-
sent and future, an obstacle and a desired end-
point” (Dimitriu, 2013).  Corman (2011) points 
out that “narratives are powerful resources for in-
fluencing target audiences; they offer an alterna-
tive form of  rationality deeply rooted in culture, 
which can be used to interpret and frame local 
events and to strategically encourage particular 
kinds of  personal action” (Corman, p. 36).
Given this, there is an urgent need on the part of  
the practitioners to understand the message of  the 
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terrorists. What is the story-line that they are tell-
ing to attract, engage, radicalize and subsequently 
recruit people? Based on my previous research 
(Samuel, 2012), I would like to postulate that the 
main rhetoric of  the terrorist comprises a simple 
three-step progression, which  is as follows:
1. There are injustices occurring in many parts 
of  the world;
2. There is a need to act; and
3. Violence is the only possible response.
These straightforward assumptions appeal to 
those looking for simple answers to complex ques-
tions and has the added advantage of  being par-
tially true. It is firstly reiterated and reinforced 
that there are tremendous acts of  injustice, cruelty 
and discrimination, causing incredible misery, suf-
fering and anguish to numerous innocent people 
all around the world, simply because of  the race, 
religion, belief  or creed they profess. According 
to Roy Rodgers from University Malaya, terror-
ists are most adept at exploiting and manipulating 
such grievances, legitimate or otherwise. Reports, 
images and life-witness accounts are all skillfully 
manipulated to showcase worldwide suffering, 
and it is subsequently conveyed by the terrorists 
to any interested individual through any available 
means.
It is in this context that two questions are formed:
1. After seeing and witnessing all that is happen-
ing (suffering, humiliation and cruelty against 
targeted groups), can you choose to do noth-
ing? 
2. What then will your response be to this trag-
edy? 
How do they present their message?
The strength of  the message to convince and 
make an impact also lies in the manner in which it 
is related and conveyed. It is therefore important 
for us to identify the tools and/or the methodol-
ogy that the terrorists use to convey their message. 
Is it a gradual one-to-one friendship/mentorship 
tailor-made process that is crafted to suit the per-
sonality and the environment of  the individual 
that they seek to radicalize? Is it a generic on-line 
media programme that is designed to attract the 
general attention of  individuals, by showcasing 
the injustice and persecution followed by the suf-
fering and humiliation faced by the victims? Or is 
it a combination of  methods, whereby the on-line 
media is used to attract those who are curious or 
interested, and their progress is later monitored 
and facilitated  by vis-à-vis interaction?
As mentioned, closely connected to the process 
in which the message is presented, are the tools 
and channels through which the message is show-
cased.  Is the social media the main conduit and 
how exactly does it reach and influence?  Or is 
the narrative carried out via religious messages in 
religious institutions, or even traditional means of  
communications such as books or radio/televi-
sion broadcasts? Does what happen on-line reflect 
what is actually taking place off-line?  The above 
issues need to be carefully considered to better un-
derstand the ability of  the terrorists to be effective 
in their messaging.  
Secondary Trauma
Related to the process on how they present their 
material, is the skillful use of  the terrorist narra-
tive to exploit secondary trauma.  The phenom-
enon of  ‘secondary trauma’ is defined as a set of  
symptoms that parallel those of  post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), which include hyperarous-
al symptoms such as feeling tense and/or having 
angry outbursts (Bober & Regehr, 2005; “What 
are the symptoms?,” n.d.). These sets of  emo-
tions could happen when an individual associates 
himself  with victims of  violence, through direct 
or indirect means, and as a result, over a period 
of  time, identifies and feels the suffering and pain 
of  the victim as his own. The Fort Hood incident, 
in which a US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal 
Malik Hasan killed 12 people, was said to have 
possibly been caused by a secondary trauma (Mc-
Girk, 2009).  What is of  significance is the man-
ner in which secondary trauma has been the cause 
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of  violent conduct. No longer does an individual 
have to be in direct contact or close association 
with a victim before he or she feels their pain. With 
this approach, individuals who are otherwise in 
stable and peaceful environments might neverthe-
less be severely affected through an “ideological 
inducement” (Rommel Banlaoi, personal commu-
nication, 23 February 2010). Marhmudi Hariano 
alias Yusuf, a former terrorist now based in Sema-
rang, relates how he was introduced to videos and 
reading materials about the suffering of  Muslims at 
the age of  17 by his teachers (Marhmudi Hariano 
alias Yusuf, personal communication, 5 April 
2011). 
It is in this regard that we see how the terror-
ist recruiter has focused the narrative, and has 
been able to connect the individual to the per-
ceived injustice of  the aggrieved party. By cleverly 
manipulating the Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) revolution, in tandem with the 
globalisation phenomenon, terrorists have been 
very successful in ensuring that pain, anguish and 
misery happening in distant lands and even in 
different times, have been brought into the lives of  
the people, vividly and graphically, by the media in 
general and the internet in particular (Samuel, 
2012). Through blogs, chat rooms and the YouTube, 
perceived or real injustices happening all around 
the world have been condensed, edited, packaged 
and delivered to arouse a variety of  feelings and 
emotions with the express purpose of  eliciting 
sympathy, “igniting the flame” (Rommel Banlaoi, 
personal communication, 23 February 2010) or 
even encouraging active participation in violent 
action. This was seen in the case of  a 22-year old 
British undergraduate who was shown videos of  
Muslims allegedly ‘suffering because of  the West’, 
which led her to be radicalised, wanting to be the 
first female British suicide bomber in order to 
make “the Western world listen” (Talwar, 2010). 
In a study of  young Guantanamo Bay detainees, 
many indicated the extensive use by their recruit-
ers of  visual displays and films of  suffering wom-
en and children in refugee camps in Chechnya, 
Palestine and Afghanistan (Curcio, 2005). Nasir 
Abas, a former key member of  the Jemaah Islami-
yah (JI), notes how his teachers used to distribute 
reading materials and show videos of  Muslims suf-
fering in Afghanistan and Palestine (Nasir Abas, 
personal communication, 7 April 2011). Harry 
Setyo R., a former Indonesian terrorist, recounted 
from his experience how instructors used videos, 
reading material and lectures on issues in Pales-
tine and Ambon to indoctrinate young recruits 
(Harry Setyo R., personal communication, 5 April 
2011). Noor Umug from the Philippines, high-
lights how teachers in certain religious schools in 
the Southern Philippines actively include reading 
materials and videos of  suffering Muslims in 
Palestine, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern 
countries. These visual stimuli were used by terror-
ists to generate anger as the seed for future violent 
conduct.
  
Why does it strike a chord?
Why does the message brought about by the ter-
rorists gain acceptance? What is in their message 
that has the tremendous ability to bypass moral 
and ethical considerations, and subsequently chal-
lenge the notion that all life is sacred and wanton 
murder of  the innocent is abhorrent? What and 
how does any part of  their story compel an in-
dividual to not only risk punitive action from the 
state, but also the possibility of  losing their lives to 
engage in acts deemed as terrorism? 
It might be worthwhile to listen to what former 
terrorists have to say with regards to what trig-
gered and drove their actions.  Harry Setyo R., 
the former terrorist in Indonesia, relates from his 
own experience how the terrorist recruiters would 
draw the potential recruit’s attention to the plight 
of  suffering Muslims, and subsequently question 
them on their response to such tragedies (Harry 
Setyo R., personal communication, 5 April 2011). 
Marhmudi Hariano alias Yusuf  highlights how as 
a young man he felt compelled to defend his fellow 
Muslims, whom he perceived as suffering, wher-
ever they were, after being exposed to the rhetoric 
of  the terrorists. Sydney Jones reiterates that in the 
Indonesian case, the premise that “this is the way 
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that you can actively help your fellow  Muslims,” 
functions as a strong and effective recruiting strat-
egy for the terrorists. 
The importance of  the narrative is perhaps what 
led Frank Ciluffo to declare, “We’ve been fighting 
the wrong battle. The real centre of  gravity of  the 
enemy is their narrative” (Ripley, 2008).
the Counter-Narrative
Counter-narratives, according to a study conduct-
ed by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) 
“attempts to challenge extremist and violent ex-
tremist messages, whether directly or indirectly 
through a range of  online and offline means,” and 
are aimed at “individuals, groups and networks 
further along the path to radicalisation, whether 
they be sympathizers, passive supporters or those 
more active within extremist movements” (Briggs 
& Feve, 2013, p. 6).
Only when we understand the message, do we 
have the chance to effectively develop and craft a 
counter-message that has the potential to engage 
the story of  the terrorist. This counter-narrative 
has to be able to firstly, debunk and negate the 
claims of  the terrorists and secondly, to provide al-
ternative mechanisms to address the issues raised 
by the terrorists. Professor Bilveer Singh from the 
National University of  Singapore (NUS) is of  the 
opinion that if  an effective counter-narrative pro-
gramme is not in place, there will be problems at 
a later stage (Bilveer Singh, personal correspond-
ence, 10 March 2011). This point was further reit-
erated by Noor Huda Ismail, who has interviewed 
hundreds of  former terrorists both as a scholar 
and a journalist and based on his experience in 
running various innovative counter-radicalisation 
programmes in Indonesia (Noor Huda Ismail, 
personal correspondence, 5 April 2011). Further-
more, Sir David Omand, the former director of  
the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) noted in 2005 that “[we] badly need a 
counter-narrative that will help groups exposed to 
the terrorist message make sense of  what they are 
seeing around them” (Furedi, 2007, p. 87). Given 
this development, what then are the issues that 
we need to consider when formulating a counter-
narrative?
Debunk and Negate
Debunking and negating really go to the core of  
contesting the arguments, rhetoric and propagan-
da of  the terrorist narrative. In order to do so, one 
should highlight the questionable achievements of  
the terrorists in terms of  analyzing what are their 
objectives, what have they done and what have 
they achieved. This can be done in three (3) steps.
First, the terrorists groups have a political or ide-
ological agenda such as liberation of  a certain 
people-group from foreign invaders, the end of  
discrimination, the need for justice and equality 
etc. Second, we compare these objectives with 
the actions that have been taken by the terror-
ists (i.e. indiscriminate bombings, beheadings of  
prisoners, killing of  civilians through suicide at-
tacks) and third, we analyse if  any of  their actions 
have indeed helped them achieve their objectives. 
While this method seems simplistic, it has, in the 
author’s experience, when presenting this as a 
counter-narrative, opened up the space to ques-
tion the effectiveness of  the terrorist method. Alex 
Schmid notes that the “actual record of  behavior” 
in the case of  al Qaeda, “is very much vulnerable 
when their lofty professions are measured against 
their actual performances” (Schmid, 2014, p. 15.). 
Indeed, there is hard evidence that suggests that 
more than 80% of  the victims of  al Qaeda have 
been Muslims (Wright, 2012). And, in many 
cases, the narratives of  the terrorists themselves are 
rejected by the very Muslims they claim to be 
fighting for (Zelin, 2013). 
The purpose here is to show that at best, the vio-
lence perpetrated by terrorists are tactically infe-
rior strategy and at worst, terrorists are actually 
aware of  this but have their own vested interests. 
All of  which has had very little to do with their 
stated objectives and instead caused tremendous 
harm and misery to the very people they claim to 
be fighting for. At this particular juncture, it might 
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be significant to note that many of  those who are 
mouthing the narrative of  the terrorists are basi-
cally repeating what others are saying without giv-
ing much thought to the reliability and accuracy 
of  their words. This ‘echo chamber’ effect might 
give the perception, that what is being said must 
be true given the number of  people saying the 
same thing. Hence, there is a need to break this ef-
fect by challenging the ideas and perceptions often 
times readily accepted without question.
It is of  utmost importance that efforts are under-
taken to obtain the right people to debunk and 
negate the terrorist narrative. Essentially, we need 
messengers who are credible and have the ability 
to connect to the audience. Former terrorists who 
have been rehabilitated and victims of  terrorism 
offer a powerful story that could be harnessed in 
countering the terrorist narrative. In the case of  
former terrorists, they are said to have the cred-
ibility or the “street credentials” and “carry a cer-
tain weight in terms of  the respect that potential 
recruits might have towards them” (Zeiger, 2014). 
Victims, by virtue over what has happened to 
them, provide a “powerful emotional narrative” 
that has the potential to “reinforce dissatisfaction” 
over the method and the approach taken by the 
terrorist (Zeiger). Their story also has the poten-
tial to counter the often times evocative premise 
that the terrorists are representing and fighting for 
a victimized group of  people. As highlighted by 
Schmid, “victim and survivor voices need not only 
be heard, but ought to be amplified” (Schmid, 
2014).
Retell the Story
While it is essential to challenge and debunk the 
arguments put forth by the terrorists, there is per-
haps also the need to take proactive measures 
in “retelling the story” (Kumar Ramakrishna, 
personal correspondence, 23 July 2015). For far 
too long terrorists have been able to manipulate 
religion and twist it to suite their own agenda and 
objectives. We need to “retell the story” and take 
back the stage in presenting religion to the masses. 
The compassionate, merciful and just sides of  reli-
gion has often been deliberately and methodically 
pushed aside by the terrorists and all that is left is 
a skewed and incorrect interpretation. For exam-
ple, crafting stories that depict the golden age of  
Islam, the scientific and social advances that Is-
lam gave the world would show at least two things. 
Firstly, that there was such a period in Islam and 
secondly how far and remote that era is when 
compared to the current one we see propagated 
by IS and other such groups. Retelling the story 
would also include highlighting religious modern-
day heroes who have defied the terrorist call of  
violence and yet been able to address grievances 
and resolve problems and conflicts through crea-
tive non-violent means. 
Problems and Challenges
It must however be noted that the strategy of  
bringing awareness to those susceptible to terror-
ist radicalization, is based on the assumption that 
having once known the actual facts regarding the 
damage caused by the terrorists and the futility in 
terms of  achieving strategic objectives, there will 
be a dawning of  realization that joining or sympa-
thizing with terrorists is not a logical or a rational 
thing to do. The second assumption is that these 
potential terrorist recruits will then make calcu-
lated, rational choices. 
Can awareness in the form of  a counter-narrative 
lead those who have already decided who the 
enemy is and the rewards of  destroying such an 
enemy make a difference?  Here, there is a need, 
as mentioned earlier, for reliable messengers. Un-
fortunately, often times, the counter narrative is 
formulated and disseminated by what is perceived 
to be the ‘enemy.’ This at times could mean that 
the message is not given sufficient reflection, 
regardless of  how well it is crafted, due to per-
ceived source of  the narrative. Given this, greater 
effort must go into developing home-grown, indig-
enous efforts in formulating counter-narratives. 
Similarly, counter-narratives that focus on youth 
that are top-down and paternalistic can be seen 
as condescending and will not have the desired 
effects. Therefore, training credible, home-grown 
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Conclusion
Hillary R. Clinton, the former American Foreign Secretary, candidly noted in 2011 during a Senate 
Testimony, that “we are in an information war, and we are losing” (Pizutto, 2013). Until and unless we 
rethink our strategy on countering the narrative of  the terrorists, we may not only lose the information 
war, but the war itself. 
messengers is of  utmost importance.  
Finally, there might be a need to actually reas-
sess our actions to see if  inadvertently we are the 
reason for the narrative of  the terrorist to begin 
with. We need to entertain the possibility that at 
times our actions could be legitimate grievances, 
capitalized by terrorists for their evil, ulterior mo-
tives, to carry out indiscriminate violence. The 
Qatar International Academy for Security Studies 
(QIASS) in its report entitled Countering Violent Ex-
tremism: The Counter Narrative Study pointed out the 
need for “dealing with local and regional issues” 
as “the starting point for countering the narra-
tives of  violence” (Qatar International Academy 
for Security Studies, 2013, p. 192). Often times, 
these local and regional issues stem from double 
standards between what we say and what we actu-
ally do. Hence, the need to close the “say-do” gap 
(Fink & Barclay, 2013). As Ralph Waldo Emerson 
put it so succinctly, “What you do speaks so loudly, 
that I cannot hear what you say” (Emerson, 1876). 
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PaRT III
Disengagement, Deradicalization and
 Reintegration of Former Violent Extremists

Testing the Notion that Prisons are Schools for Terrorism: 
Examining radicalization and disengagement in the 
Philippine corrective system
Clarke R. Jones
Australian National University
CHAPTER 11
This paper gives a brief  overview of  my research in the Philippines, which seeks to address the best ways 
to incarcerate terrorist offenders. There is still much conjecture about how governments should incarcerate 
terrorist offenders. Should terrorist offenders be segregated together, or even isolated away from other in-
mates to prevent prison radicalisation, or should they be dispersed into the general prison population with 
minimal risk? So far, strategies for housing terrorist inmates remain inconsistent in many countries and 
there have been very few empirical studies undertaken to determine the most effective way to house them.
 
In Australia, the fear that mainstream prisoners will be radicalised by terrorist inmates has been a key rea-
son for national security and corrections policies to segregate and isolate ‘high-risk’ terrorist inmates from 
other prisoners (Jones, 2014). In New South Wales, for example, terrorist inmates are housed in expensive 
purpose-built ‘supermax’ facilities, which segregate high-risk offenders (Carlton, 2008). The UK takes a 
different approach and is reluctant to separate terrorist inmates from other prisoners following their expe-
rience with Irish Republican Army (IRA) inmates in the 1970s. The UK’s early segregation policy proved 
counter-productive as the confinement of  IRA inmates together in large numbers “engendered powerful 
social pressures” to conform and remain committed to the group (Silke, 2011, p. 125).
The assumptions about prison radicalisation appear to be based on a limited number of  high-profile 
cases like Richard Reid, Kevin James, Levar Washington and Jose Padilla, all of  whom are alleged to have 
become Islamic radicals in prison. Not only are these cases offered as evidence of  the dangers of  prison 
radicalisation (that is when terrorist inmates are mixed with other prisoners), they also seem to provide jus-
tification for countries, such as the USA and Australia, to develop special segregation policies (Jones, 2014). 
The common rationale behind these policies is that incarcerating terrorists leads to the entrenchment of  
their beliefs, new recruits, and more sophisticated terrorist acts upon release (Rappaport et. al., 2012). Just 
as prisons are frequently referred to as “schools for crime”, several commentators (Cilluffo et. al., 2007; 
Hannah et al., 2008) maintain similar perspectives about prisons being schools for terrorists. Cuthbertson 
(2004) also raises the concern that prisons bring together terrorists with hardened criminals, producing an 
even greater threat. Such fears mimic conventional penological concerns about mixing younger with older 
prisoners and career criminals with first offenders.  
My research draws on penology to compare the beliefs and behaviour of  terrorist offenders incarcer-
ated in two contrasting prisons in the Philippines: one that integrates terrorist inmates into the general 
prison population, and the other segregates them from the mainstream prisoners. With this contrast 
in mind, I address the following questions. Do the ‘pains of  imprisonment’ (Sykes, 1958) and cer-
tain prison environments act to inhibit or encourage the radicalisation of  mainstream prisoners by 
KEYwoRdS: de-radicalization, incarceration, prison radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism
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background & Justification
Along with Indonesia, the southern Philippines 
has been one of  the main sites of  terrorist activity 
in the Southeast Asian region. Almost 300 civil-
ians have been killed in terrorist attacks in Indo-
nesia since 2000 and an even greater number of  
fatalities have occurred in the Philippines, where 
there have been more than 400 deaths from bomb 
attacks since 2001. Traditionally there have been 
strong linkages between terrorists in both coun-
tries. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most sig-
nificant terrorist organisation, had its main train-
ing base in Mindanao from 1994 until 2000 and 
several hundred Indonesian jihadists have trained 
and sometimes fought alongside their Filipino 
counterparts. Relations between JI and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu 
Sayyaf  Group (ASG) have been especially strong 
and endure to the present. These groups are well 
represented in the Philippine corrective system. 
The U.S. State Department continues to assess 
the southern Philippines (the Sulu archipelago 
and the island of  Mindanao) as a “safe haven for 
terrorists,” particularly because the Philippine 
government still has little control in this region 
(U.S. State Department, 2013). There are several 
active jihadist groups that pose a threat to Austral-
ian civilians and interests in the region. One of  
the ASG’s more recent kidnapping victims was an 
Australian citizen, Warren Rodwell, who was tak-
en from his home in Mindanao in December 2011 
and released safely after 15 months in captivity. 
The ASG, which has the highest representation 
in Philippine prisons, poses a significant security 
threat. The group has been linked to hundreds of  
kidnappings and murders. 
As counter-terrorism operations continue to pre-
vail against these jihadist groups, the number of  
individuals held in custody for terrorism is grow-
ing and have been bolstered by transfers of  ter-
rorists from jails overseas. The Philippines govern-
ment is also concerned that terrorist prisoners will 
use their prison time to radicalise others, recruit, 
and on release commit further acts of  terrorism. 
The lack of  properly designed and resourced pro-
grams to manage terrorist offenders is likely to re-
sult in high recidivism and a continuing terrorist 
threat, although very few terrorist inmates are due 
for release in the near future.
My research is being undertaken in New Bili-
bid Prison (NBP) and Metro Manila District Jail 
(MMDJ), which are the main correctional facili-
ties in the Philippines where the majority of  ter-
rorist inmates are held. NBP is the largest cor-
rectional facility with a maximum security prison 
population of  about 14,200. As a means of  man-
aging such a large number, new inmates are as-
signed among twelve ‘gangs’ that have self-formed 
over time as a result of  the weak prison regime. 
These gangs vary in size, the largest coming from 
the criminal milieu of  metro-Manila. Terrorist of-
fenders are not obliged to join a gang; however, 
terrorist inmates?1 Do different prison regimes and their methods of  incarceration, such as integration or 
segregation, contribute to changes in beliefs and behaviour in terrorist inmates? Does a terrorist offender’s 
offence history (or absence of  prior offences) have a bearing on how they adapt to prison culture and envi-
ronment? In answering these questions, I also consider the Philippine’s unique cultural and religious char-
acteristics (e.g. a Catholic majority in Philippine prisons) as these have a bearing on the nature of  prison 
regime, environment, and inmate culture. They may also impact on the risk of  prison radicalisation and/ 
or the potential for success in intervention efforts (Jones & Morales, 2012). 
1 
1  For the purpose of  this study, the term ‘terrorist inmate’ denotes those individuals incarcerated, whether on remand or convicted, for a range 
   of  offences associated with terrorism. This research focuses on Muslim terrorists as they constitute almost all the terrorist detainees in the 
   Philippines. The study recognises that the term terrorist is problematic and that many ‘terrorist’ inmates may be better described as jihadists, 
   in that they believe Islam allows the use of  violence under certain circumstances but not the indiscriminate killing of  civilians through actions 
   such as bombings in public places. In the Philippines, many Abu Sayyaf  Group members, for example, are incarcerated for criminal offences 
   but may not have been involved with political violence.
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gang pressure usually results in terrorist offenders 
joining a gang. Gang membership provides in-
mates with a sense of  order and discipline, protec-
tion, kinship and a means of  income. The gang 
leadership also provides a system of  supervision 
and reporting troublesome inmates, and also pro-
vides a monitoring system where they can report 
clandestine meetings or suspicious activities. 
The prison currently holds 44 terrorists who are 
dispersed amongst the gangs. MMDJ is a much 
smaller facility but currently holds 496 alleged ter-
rorist offenders. These are concentrated and seg-
regated away from other prisoners in two separate 
sections called the Special Intensive Care Areas 
(SICA 1 and SICA 2). At present SICA 1 holds 
224 terrorist offenders and SICA holds 272.2 
There are no gangs in either area.
Key Research objectives
In order to test the assumption that prisons are 
breeding grounds for terrorists, my research has 
two key objectives.
1. To examine if  terrorist inmates who are integrated 
into the prison population exhibit a greater degree of  
‘prisonisation’ (i.e. adjustment to imprisonment) than 
when incarcerated with fellow terrorists and segregated 
from other inmates.
Based on Clemmer’s (1958) theory of  “prisoni-
sation,” I am testing two different methods of  
incarceration for high risk groups - integration and 
segregation - to determine their impact on ter-
rorist inmates’ beliefs and behaviours. Clemmer 
describes the changes inmates undergo during 
their imprisonment as functional or pragmatic 
adaptations to the dangers of  prison. Over time 
inmates assimilate the customs of  the prison and 
adopt the behaviour and norms of  the inmates’ 
(oppositional) culture, particularly the gang sub-
cultures, associated with that institution. This 
adjustment or functional process he termed pris-
onisation, which was attributed to long periods of  
incarceration and a loss of  contact with the out-
side world. At worst, prisonisation leads to learned 
helplessness and an inability to return to normal 
life. The degree of  prisonisation is influenced by 
several factors such as the inmate’s personality, 
criminal background, social relationships and ac-
ceptance or rejection of  the prison code. 
With Clemmer’s work in mind, I am examining 
the following hypothesises: (a) when terrorist in-
mates are dispersed and integrated into the gen-
eral prison population, they are likely to adopt 
the norms and beliefs of  the various gang sub-
cultures, which inhibits them radicalising other 
inmates and encourages them to disengage from 
their militant pasts; and (b) when terrorist inmates 
are segregated from the general prison population 
and are incarcerated together they are unlikely 
to adopt other patterns of  behaviour or beliefs, 
thereby retaining, and possibly even exacerbating 
their militant values.
2. To examine whether a terrorist inmate’s offence history 
(or absence of  prior offending) has a bearing on how 
they adapt to inmate culture and the prison environ-
ment.  
Thus, I am testing whether terrorist inmates who 
have a history of  criminal offending adapt more 
readily to gang sub-cultures than those with no 
criminal record, or only a history of  violent jihad 
(cf. Wolfgang, 1961). Stander, Farrington, Hill & 
Altham (1989, p. 325) (Note that prisoners tend 
to specialise in certain types of  offences, so a 
terrorists’ past offences may be indicative of  
future offending patterns). As there are a variety 
of  offences committed by individuals labelled as 
“terrorist inmates,” I hypothesise that adjustment 
to imprisonment will also vary among these in-
mates when integrated into prison. I eventually 
aim to develop an adaptation index for terrorist 
inmates that can be used to better guide interven-
tions efforts. 
1 
2 Figures are taken from personal communication with Philippine correctional officials on 21 November 2014. 
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Research Significance and Innovation
Relatively few counter-terrorism policies apply pe-
nological theory and research to improve the way 
terrorist inmates are managed.  Because of  the 
lack of  evidence-led policies, the default practice 
has been to assign all terrorist inmates to the high-
est levels of  prison security (i.e. above probable 
risk), resulting in expensive, counter-productive 
and harsh incarceration conditions. My research 
is unique because it provides relevant evidence-
based research for pressing decisions about how 
best to house incarcerated terrorists. Currently, 
there are few studies informed by penological the-
ory that examine radicalisation, disengagement 
and de-radicalisation,3 particularly how the prison 
experience influences terrorist beliefs and behav-
iour. 
My approach is informed by the need to tailor in-
tervention programs to be sensitive to place and 
circumstances. There is no single “off the shelf ” 
intervention model and it remains unclear which 
aspects of  current programs successfully lead a 
militant to disengage from terrorism, de-radical-
ise, and remain so after release. Informed opinion 
suggests that interventions should be uniquely tai-
lored to the specific conditions of  a country where 
the program is being conducted (International 
Crisis Group, 2007). My research will eventually 
contribute to the development of  evidence-based 
correctional policies in the Philippines relevant to 
terrorist offenders by taking into account the role 
of  individual adaptation to the prison environ-
ment and its different regimes and settings.
I also contribute to both penological and counter-
terrorism literature by including findings about 
whether the prison environment, and more specif-
ically inmate culture, impacts on terrorist inmates 
and their jihadist ideologies when integrated into 
a general prison population. In addition to Clem-
mer, 1958; Wolfgang, 1961; and Stander et. al., 
1989), several other scholars have examined the 
effects on inmates arising from the limits and dep-
rivation of  imprisonment (Sykes, 1956; Sykes, 
1958; Goffman, 1961). Sykes (1958) suggests that 
inmate behaviour stems from the pains of  impris-
onment and upon entering prisons inmates are 
stripped (ritual degradation) of  their outside iden-
tity and influences while confined to small congest-
ed spaces with limited resources to support them. 
Therefore, prisons produce their own unique and 
extreme responses that force changes in attitudes 
and behaviours. Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest 
that individuals also bring patterns of  behaviour 
with them when they enter prison. More recent 
studies note several environmental influences 
on inmates from both the informal structure of  
the prison, such as an inmate’s criminal orienta-
tion (e.g. the importation of  outside gang culture) 
(Camp & Gaes, 2005), and the formal organisa-
tion of  the prison, such as the effects of  the prison 
regime and guards (Sparks et al., 1996).
I have started with a functionalist approach to the 
impact of  imprisonment but recognise that both 
the duration and forms of  incarceration will influ-
ence the way terrorist inmates adapt to the prison 
subcultures encountered (Alpert, 1979). I note 
Hawkins’s (1976) criticism of  prisonisation theo-
ry’s failure to explain individual/group variations 
in the expression of  inmate culture and for as-
suming that the oppositional character of  inmate 
society explains the rigid uniformity of  behaviour 
(both guard and inmate). I assume, however, that 
different methods of  incarceration affect individu-
als in varying (good or bad) ways and these effects 
may persist, at least for a short time on release 
(Walker, 1983). Thus, it is possible for inmates 
not previously radicalised to be radicalised, or for 
radicalised inmates to remain or intensify radi-
calisation or for radicalised inmates to disengage 
or qualify their outlook while in prison. However, 
there is limited empirical research about what oc-
curs when radical inmates are incarcerated under 
different prison regimes that vary their exposure 
to the mainstream inmate population and/or to 
1 
3 Radicalisation is defined as a change in beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand 
sacrifice in defence of  the in-group (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). Disengagement is defined as a behavioural change, such as refraining 
from violence and leaving a group or changing one’s role within it (Rabasa et al 2010). De-radicalisation is defined as an ideological or cogni-
tive shift, such as a fundamental change in understanding that moderates one’s beliefs (Ashour 2009).
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the other radical prisoners. 
By applying penological studies to the field of  
prison radicalisation, I have begun to provide the 
foundation for cross-disciplinary research that is 
needed to understand the impact of  prison (or not) 
on ideologically motivated prisoners. In contrast 
to the common view - that prisons are “schools for 
crime” - my study hypothesises that some prisons 
(not all) may play a positive role in the rehabilita-
tion of  a terrorist by serving as a passive (or gener-
al) intervention by reducing adherence to militan-
cy. Importantly, I draw on Horgan’s work  (2009) 
which proposes that prisons disrupt an individu-
al’s crimogenic/terrorist milieu by providing res-
pite that can lead to significant personal change. 
Hunt et al. (1993, p. 398) suggests that in prison 
“prior loyalties, allegiances and friendships” are 
disrupted. Inmates cope by creating new relation-
ships and bond or group with like-minded prison-
ers, establishing new patterns of  social interaction 
(Caldwell, 1956). So in this alternative view, the 
imprisonment of  a terrorist may mark the begin-
ning of  physical disengagement and even the psy-
chological de-radicalisation of  some. 
The current focus of  research in this field ad-
dresses two main concerns: the causes of  radicali-
sation, and the effectiveness of  intervention pro-
grams (e.g., Noricks, 2009; Rabasa, et al., 2010; 
Morris, et. al., 2010). Understanding the causes of  
radicalisation (e.g. factors including inter-personal 
relationships and networks, and a sense of  com-
munity or belonging, victimisation of  self  or loved 
ones; see Morris, et al., 2010) is important for this 
study because, as Noricks (2009) observes, some 
of  these factors also play a role in an inmate’s dis-
engagement and eventual de-radicalisation. Cren-
shaw (1981, p. 381) was one early writer to exam-
ine the causes or ‘preconditions’ of  terrorism. She 
separates these into ‘permissive’ and ‘precipitant’ 
factors. Permissive factors are the more long-term 
macro causes, including economic and social dis-
advantage, that help create the group identifica-
tion/solidarity process that assists radicalisation. 
Precipitant factors are an event that may trigger a 
change in behaviour towards the use of  violence. 
The permissive factors may be particularly rele-
vant because the prison environment and its asso-
ciated inmate culture will eventually result in ter-
rorist inmates developing new social groups and 
networks over the life of  their sentence. It is this 
aspect, prison social dynamics, which has often 
been overlooked or under-estimated in studies of  
de-radicalisation that we seek to explore.
methodology 
There is very limited published descriptive infor-
mation about the correctional system in Philip-
pines. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding 
of  the settings in which my research is undertaken 
has been critical to understand how terrorist of-
fenders are incarcerated there. In addition to 
earlier site visits, a review of  the laws, operation, 
customs and problems of  the prison system aug-
mented by further field visits to prisons and jails 
has been undertaken. The sensitivity and com-
plexity of  the qualitative research required for my 
study, combined with the relatively small numbers 
of  voluntary participants to date, has restricted 
the collection of  data for explicitly quantitative 
research aims, such as getting large enough sam-
ples for post-hoc statistical measures of  differences 
across prisons and other co-variates such as prior 
offending. Nevertheless, the scale of  data collec-
tion allowed supplementary statistical methods 
to be used for analysis as well as data from semi-
structured conversational interviews across the 
two correctional facilities. 
I am also using a conventional subject-case meth-
od informed by data collected about the inmate’s 
personal and historical background from the 
available prison and related case/offence records 
for all eligible inmates. Where present, prison 
administrative records have also been used to code, 
amongst others, prison infraction/disciplinary 
charges, medical/mental health status, gang affilia-
tion and role, gang tattoos, age, religious observance, 
marital status and length of  sentence. Case data 
was/is augmented by face-to-face interviews of  a 
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representative sample of  ‘terrorist’ offenders in 
each facility. Interviews also sought to address 
missing data from recorded case data and explore 
with inmates questions of  adjustment to prison 
and attitudes and beliefs toward extremism.
Interviews have been conversational to help assess 
the self-reported impact of  prison on inmates and 
their beliefs. I have focused on the possible role 
of  ‘prisonisation’ or adaptation and so have far 
repeated the interviews 12-18 months after the ini-
tial interviews in order to assess changes in adap-
tation style and beliefs should that occurred. Thus, 
I attempt a simple panel study as a means of  ob-
serving change over time. The panel study examines 
the extent to which terrorist inmates may disen-
gage from radical extremism during the course of  
their sentence. I have also attempted to observe 
the changes experienced by inmates as a result of  
the impact of  the prison environment. I am also 
measuring both the changes in attitudes towards 
militancy and the changes in attachment to their 
social group/gang relative to their length of  expo-
sure to prison. 
As terrorist offenders are incarcerated differently 
in the Philippines - inmates in NBP are integrated or 
incarcerated with prison gangs, but in MMDJ they 
are segregated or incarcerated together away from 
the direct influence of  other prison sub-cultures - 
these different situations allow me to observe any 
disparities in attachment to militancy and changes 
over time in adaptation to imprisonment among 
the two groups. Inmates in MMDJ (SICA 1& 2) 
have been expected to show less change over the 
period of  incarceration as segregation may reinforce 
rather than dissipate attachment to group values. 
So far there has been a general reluctance to par-
ticipate in repeat interviews. Therefore, non-cash 
incentives (as approved by the prison authorities 
and in accord with ethical research guidelines) 
such as food hampers have been used. As the shar-
ing food is an integral part of  Filipino culture, this 
has been a critical part of  gaining acceptance with 
all inmates.
A general semi-structured interview format (in-
cluding “warm-up” non-controversial or neutral 
questions: such as questions about education, fam-
ily connections, self-reported issues/problems etc.) 
have been used to explore two sets of  specific ques-
tions designed to address militancy and solidarity. 
Assessment	A – (beliefs in militancy; radicali-
sation) measures changes in terrorist inmates’ 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour towards the 
Indonesian and Philippine governments; their 
perceptions and intentions towards the use of  
violence to assist fellow Muslims or to protect 
their faith; their perceptions about whether 
Muslims are repressed and besieged by ‘infidel’ 
forces; their perception about whether they are 
at war or peace with the Philippine govern-
ment; and their feelings about their treatment 
by the government. 
Assessment	 B – (inmate solidarity/adapta-
tion) measures changes in group loyalty by ex-
ploring the terrorist inmates’ commitment to 
their immediate social group; their willingness 
to befriend outsiders of  Islam; their willingness 
to take risks to support their social group; the 
extent to which they would take risks to sup-
port their social group; the impact of  the pains 
of  imprisonment and the degree to which they 
view their social life as solely prison oriented. 
I have supplemented both interview and re-
corded data by drawing on a broader inform-
ant network consisting of  prison staff and gang 
leaders who will also be consulted about their 
perception of  religious observance and gang 
participation/affiliation for participants (e.g. 
adherence to gang rules and activities, dress 
standards and language will be relevant). The 
repeated interview design combined with the 
observations of  informants should help in 
triangulating the reliability and validity of  the 
data collected from inmates.
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Preliminary Findings
It is too early in the study to provide any conclusive evidence about the best ways to house terrorist offend-
ers in the Philippines and there is still much research to be done. Certainly from an observational perspec-
tive and from interviews conducted over the past three years, there have been no visible signs of  radicalisa-
tion in NBP, and the dispersion model seems to be effective in bringing about change. In one case study, an 
Indonesian inmate with affiliations to JI, has appeared to have disengaged for extremism over his 11 year 
sentence. His leadership position within a gang, his active participation in prison sport (badminton), cou-
pled with new qualifications in massage and reflexology has provided him new interests and direction in 
life. He has also remarried and had three children. Even though he still remained vocal about Indonesian 
politics, his new career and family has brought about significant change in his life. Whether this can be 
classed as de-radicalisation is yet to be determined but certainly he appears to have disengaged. There are 
other stories like him. In fact, most terrorist offenders up until last year have appeared to be model prison-
ers with very few of  them having violated prison rules. Some have taken on gang leadership roles and there 
is one working productively in the prison hospital. 
But, much gets unnoticed in the chaotic overcrowded conditions, particularly when there is serious gang 
trouble and guard attention focuses on weaponry and drugs rather than potential signs of  prison radicali-
sation. Without close observation there is much that gets unnoticed by the guards. For example, in 2013, 
NBP administration only became aware of  an Arabic and Islamic school that was being run out of  the 
Mosque within the prison. The school was founded by Muslim inmates in 2010 and is now headed by an 
Indonesian terrorist inmate with former associations to JI. He received an indefinite sentence (without the 
possibility of  parole) in 2005 for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.  
On face value, his leadership position in the Mosque immediately raises concerns. One would expect that a 
well-known terrorist running Islamic studies has the potential to radicalise and recruit other inmates. So far 
this has not been case although further scrutiny is still required. On a positive note, however, in early 2014 
he applied to have his Islamic studies course formally recognised by the prison’s education department. 
There was no apparent violent radical discourse in the curriculum, although his teaching would need to 
be monitored more closely to be certain.
Nonetheless, prison dynamics are very fluid and, just as in the outside world, international events can dis-
rupt the peace very quickly. Over the past twelve months, particular since the rise of  the so-called Islamic 
State, there have been early indications of  a change in temperament within the leadership in an area where 
Muslim inmates congregate in NBP – the Muslim camp. There was also an incident in early January 2014 
where a hand grenade detonated in the Muslim camp. The incident was investigated and deemed not to 
be terrorist related, but instead was a dispute between two dominant groups, the Tausug (ASG associated) 
and the Maranao (businessmen).
Over the past six months, some terrorist offenders in NBP have become less cooperative and secretive of  
the activities of  their colleagues. This may have been brought about by the transfer of  five new JI inmates 
from MMDJ to NBP in December 2014. Some of  these inmates were allegedly behind a video that ap-
peared on an internet site in July 2014 showing Muslim detainees in the Philippines performing the Bay-
ah to Baghdadi. The detention area appeared to be one of  the SICA facilities. Though Philippine law 
108PRISONS: SCHOOLS FOR TERRORISM?
References
Alpert, G. P. (1979). Patterns of  Change in Prisonization: A Longnitudinal Analysis. Criminal Justice and 
 Behaviour, 6(2), 159-173.
Ashour, O. (2009). The De-Radicalization of  Jihadists. New York: Routledge.
Caldwell, M.G. (1956). Group Dynamics in the Prison Community. The Journal of  Criminal Law, 
 Criminology, and Police Science, 46(5), 648-657.
Camp, S. D. & Gaes, G.G. (2005). Criminogenic Effects of  the Prison Environment on Inmate Behaviour: 
 Some Experimental Evidence, Crime & Delinquency, 51(3), 425-442.
Carlton, B. (2008). Isolation as Counter-Insurgency: Supermax Prisons and the War on Terror. 
 Proceedings of  the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference, The Crime 
 and Justice Research Network, University of  New South Wales.
Clemmer, D. (1958). The Prison Community. New York: Rinehart.
Cilluffo, F. J., S. L. Cardash and A. J. Whitehead. (2007). Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders. 
 The Brown Journal of  World Affairs XIII(2).
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of  Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379-399.
Cuthbertson, I.M. (2004). Prisons and the Education of  Terrorists. World Policy Journal, 21(3), 15-22.
Gendreau, P., Goggin, C. & Cullen, F.T. (1999). The effects of  prison sentences on recidivism. Solicitor 
 General, Canada.
Goffman, E. (1961). On the Charcateristics of  Total Insitutions. In D.R. Cressey (ed.), The Prison Studies 
 in Institutional Organisations and Change (pp. 22-47), New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hannah, G., Clutterbuck, L. & Rubin, J. (2008). Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the 
 Challenge of  Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.
Hawkins, G. (1976). The Prison: Policy and Practice. Chicago: The University of  Chicago Press.
Horgan, J. (2009). Walking Away from Terrorism. New York: Routledge.
Hunt, G., Riegel, S., Morales, T. and Waldorf, D. (1993). Changes in Prison Culture: Prison gangs and the 
 case of  the ‘Pepsi generation.’ Social Problems, 40(3), 398-409.
International Crisis Group. (2007). De-radicalisation and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report, No. 142.
Irwin, J. & Cressey, D.R. Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture. Social Problems, 10(2), 142-155.
109PRISONS: SCHOOLS FOR TERRORISM?
Jones, C. (2014). Are prisons really schools for terrorism? Challenging the rhetoric on prison radicalisation. 
 Punishment & Society, 16(1), 74–103.
Jones, C. & Morales, R.S. (2012). Integration versus Segregation: a Preliminary Assessment of  
 De-Radicalisationin two Philippine Correctional Facilities. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Journal, 
 35(3), 211-228. 
McCauley, C. & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanics of  Political Radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. 
 Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415-433. 
Morris, M., Eberhard, F., Rivera, J. & Watsula, M. (2010). Deradicalization: A review of  the Literature 
 with Comparison to Findings in the Literature on Deganging and Deprogramming, Research 
 Brief, North Carolina: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions.
Noricks, D.M.E. (2009). The Root Causes of  Terrorism. In P.K. Davis and K. Cragin (eds.), Social Science 
 for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together (pp. 11-70). Santa Monica: National Defense 
 Research Institute, The RAND Corporation.
Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S.L., Ghez, J.J. & Boucek, C. (2010). Deradicalizing Islamic Extremists. Santa 
 Monica: The RAND Corporation.
Rappaport, A., Veldhuis, T. & Guiora, A. (2013). Homeland Security and Inmate Population: The Risk 
 and Reality of  Islamic Radicalisation in Prison. In L. Gideon (ed.), Special Needs Offenders in 
 Correctional Institutions (pp. 431-458). New York: Sage Publications. 
Silke, A. (2011). The Psychology of  Counter-Terrorism. London: Routledge.
Sparks, R. and Bottoms, A.E. (1996). Legitimacy and Order in Prisons. The British Journal of  Sociology.
Stander, J., Farrington, D.P., Hill, G. & Altham, P.M.E. (1989). Markov Chain Analysis and Specialization 
 in Criminal Careers. The British Journal of  Criminology, 29(4), 317-335.
Stander, J., Farrington, D.P., Hill, G. & Altham, P.M.E. (1956). Men, Mechants, and Toughs: A Study of  
 Reaction to Imprisonment. Social Problems, 4(2), 130-138.
Sykes, G.M. (1958). The Society of  Captives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Useem, B. & Clayton, O. (2009). Radicalization of  U.S. Prisons. Criminology and Public Policy, 561-592.
U. S. State Department. (2013). Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, Terrorist Safe Havens. Retrieved 21 
 May 2014 from http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209987.htm. 
Walker, N. (1983). Side-Effects of  Incarceration. British Journal of  Criminology, 23(1), 61-71.
Wolfgang, M.E. (1961). Quantitative Analysis of  Adjustment to the Prison Community. The Journal of  
 Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 51(6), 607-618.

Desistance and Deradicalisation - 
The case of Northern Ireland
orla Lynch 
Director, MA Criminology and Lecturer in Criminology, University College Cork, Ireland
Hedayah Fellow
CHAPTER 12
Northern Ireland has a long history of  terrorism and political violence, the most recent period of  conflict 
lasting from 1969 to (arguably) the signing of  the Belfast or Good Friday agreement (GFA) in 1998. As a 
part of  the peace process that led to and emerged out of  this agreement, almost five hundred politically moti-
vated prisoners were released from prison (McEvoy, Shirlow & McElrath, 2004). These individuals returned 
to their homes and communities, some committed to non-violence, others choosing to return to involve-
ment in violence via existing loyalist groups, and what is commonly called “dissident republicanism.”
Understanding the choice of  ex-political prisoners to further engage in violence or alternatively seek other 
avenues to contribute to a continued resistance to what they deem injustices is poorly understood. While 
the recidivism rate of  politically motivated offenders is significantly lower than the mainstream criminal 
population (Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008), there is evidence to suggest that not all of  those released under 
the GFA lived up to the assumption that they would no longer represent a danger to the general public. 
However, a significant community of  ex-prisoners exists in Northern Ireland (NI), individuals who are 
active peaceful contributors to their local communities. For example, some have chosen to support lobby-
ing initiatives for fellow prisoners and their families, participate in peace work through cross community 
events, involve themselves in youth work related to community divisions, work with youth on behalf  of  
the probation services, conduct research and work in schools around issues emerging from their troubles 
(Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008). 
While these ex-prisoners can conceivably be considered to be actively contributing to NI society, albeit it in 
spite of  societal restrictions on full participation (Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008), their desistance from violence 
is only one element of  their transition from violence to peace. 
The complexity inherent in encouraging individuals to end their participation in terrorism and political 
violence has been well researched particularly using the frame of  de-radicalisation. Various researchers 
(Horgan, 2006) have documented the necessary factors that both push and pull individuals to end their 
participation in violence, as well as the social and legal measure that can encourage individuals towards 
non-offending. However research that focuses specifically on the cognitive process of  de-radicalisation has 
been less comprehensive. In effect, de-radicalisation is a loosely used term that blurs distinctions between 
desistance and disengagement as explanatory frameworks thus concealing the conceptual peculiarities of  
both processes. In the case of  Northern Ireland, the majority of  the ex-prisoners are known to have de-
sisted from political violence, however they have by no means de-radicalised from the views that led them 
to, or guided them through their choices in the first place. 
KEYwoRdS: terrorism, de-radicalisation, desistance, ex-prisoners 
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Radicalisation as an explanatory concept has 
gained significant currency in the academic litera-
ture on terrorism and even though it lacks con-
ceptual clarity it is also considered to have a caus-
al relationship to terrorism (Mandeville, 2009; 
Hopkins 2004, 2011; McDonald 2011). As a 
result, outlining individual vulnerabilities that may 
predict radicalisation has become a central feature 
of  terrorism research (Lynch, 2013). The assump-
tion here is of  course that radicalisation leads 
to terrorism and political violence and inversely 
deradicalisation is the pathway out of  violence. This 
circular logic has not furthered our understand-
ing of  terrorism and ultimately as an independent 
variable, radicalisation is poorly conceptualized 
and of  questionable value. 
Furthermore, despite the investment in radicalisa-
tion research along with the  programmes claim-
ing to do deradicalisation, there is little evidence 
as to the utility of  the radicalisation framework 
in these processes nor evidence of  the success or 
failure of  these initiatives (Horgan & Braddock, 
2009). Holding radical beliefs about the utility 
of  violence is one potential element of  participa-
tion in terrorism and political violence, however 
whether it is causal or a necessary antecedent is 
a very different debate. Existing literature has 
demonstrated that the emergence of  radical ideas 
that support political violence often develop after 
an initial commitment to a movement (Shirlow & 
McEvoy, 2008) or during imprisonment. As Hor-
gan (2006) points out, people join violent move-
ments for many reasons, not all of  them related to 
an ideology, a propensity for violence or a desire to 
counter act some notion of  injustice. 
What we can measure and thus potentially under-
stand is the decision of  individuals to terminate or 
reduce their involvement in identifiable acts of  ter-
rorism, including identifying recidivism through 
incidents of  repeat prosecution. In effect, this is 
measuring desistance from terrorist behaviours. 
As a criminal act, incidences of  terrorism and po-
litical violence (TPV) are complex due to the leg-
islative system in place specifically to address such 
ideologically motived actions, but also due to the 
inherent complexity in defining and understand-
ing what constitutes a terrorist act, including the 
support for terrorism as a criminal venture. As an 
explanatory framework, the notion of  desistance 
is well developed in criminology and a number of  
iterations and developments in the approach have 
occurred over the past thirty years. However, as 
a framework for understanding an individual’s 
choice to withdraw from violent political offend-
ing the application of  the approach is somewhat 
more complex. 
Using the notion of  desistance to understand the 
movement away from terrorism and political vio-
lence in the case of  NI is a difficult criminologi-
cal concept to apply. In attempting to understand 
desistance, an obvious place to begin is the main 
paramilitary groups’ decisions to agree to the 
1998 GFA, and subsequent ceasefires terminat-
ing ultimately in disarmament. In NI, from this 
point on, there was a significant reduction in ter-
rorist acts as the main groups agreed to forgo vio-
lence as a tactic to achieve their aims. However, 
this marker, (the GFA) is in behavioural terms, an 
arbitrary point as it is impossible to link the on-
set of  desistance, to the point at which the choice 
to stop violent offending changed (Bushway et 
al., 2003). Similarly, such a static criteria ensures 
that all relevant offenders are treated equally, and 
those longstanding members of  the organization 
may well proceed through a very different indi-
vidual process in comparison to younger more in-
experienced individuals. In effect, understanding 
the process by which regular and serious offend-
ers choose to desist and understand the process of  
desistance for new, or more casual offenders may 
well be poorly understood by attempting to see the 
progression as a static process. In the case of  NI, 
conceptualizing desistance is further complicated 
given Bushway et al’s (2003) criteria for measure-
ment –an actual measure of  non-violence in com-
parison to a stated commitment to non-violence; 
there is a significant disparity between these posi-
tions. In such a case desistance could conceivably 
be categorized as temporary. 
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Furthermore given that terrorist violence is a rel-
atively rare behaviour for each individual group 
member (although support activities may be more 
prevalent), static measures of  participation versus 
non-participation are not best placed to account 
for the behavior of  individual terrorist offenders. 
More appropriate would be to view desistance as 
a developmental process (Bushway et al., 2003), 
a method that allows a lifespan approach to un-
derstanding the choice not to engage in violent 
political protest. For a number of  reasons, this ap-
proach is more useful and ensures the notion of  
desistance has greater utility in terrorist research. 
For one, there is no way to determine whether the 
current phase of  desistance is permanent. Given 
this, frameworks from developmental criminology 
advocate the study of  within individual changes 
over the lifespan (Bushway et al.). However, in 
instances of  group offending, or offending with a 
supportive narrative or ideology, the issue of  indi-
vidual change is but one element of  the process. 
Again, approaches from developmental criminol-
ogy recognize this complexity through the notion 
of  equifinality – the idea that causality is multi-
faceted and multiple casual processes can result 
in a similar outcome (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996 
in Bushway et al.) and in the case of  the terrorist 
group societal factors need to be considered.
Along with the complex issues of  causality for 
desistance, there are complex issues that relate to 
offending in the specific case of  terrorism. Not 
all terrorist activity is violent, much of  the sup-
port activity may not even be illegal, however, 
all participants are assumed, by virtue of  their 
group membership, to be offenders. Analyzing all 
members of  the organisation as a unified whole 
will hide the more radical process undertaken by 
those intransigent members who have committed 
serious violent attacks. Similarly, seeking uniform-
ity in the process will prevent an understanding 
of  the fringe offenders. Importantly in the case 
of  terrorist offending in NI, there is a complexity 
around the type of  and classification of  offend-
ing. By virtue of  their illegal group membership, 
all activity by such individuals may well be classed 
as terrorism, however there is a significant but 
unquantifiable category of  activity, that of  non-
political crime – that plays a significant part in the 
overall offending pattern by these individuals. De-
sistance from the very rare violent terrorist activ-
ity is one aspect of  understanding desistance from 
terrorism, but offending more generally is also a 
part of  the story. This approach directs the discus-
sion away from notions of  offending towards our 
poor conceptualizations of  what terrorism actu-
ally is. Terrorism is in small part, the spectacular 
incidents of  public violence, however, terrorism is 
in large part, normal day to day criminality and 
supportive legal and illegal behavior. Whether 
these can be separated, or more importantly, for 
the individual, whether these are seen as separate 
processes needs to be considered. 
Taking the traditional approach to desistance, 
there are offenders and after a set point, there 
are non-offenders. In the case of  the post peace 
process environment in NI, this clearly fits the 
narrative that emerged from the negotiations in 
1998. However, superimposing this narrative of  
static non-offending onto the dynamic ex-offender 
population reveals little about the process leading 
to the current and arguably tentative state of  non-
violence. In the case of  group splits, ongoing sup-
port activities, dissident violence and mainstream 
criminality, attempting to understand desistance 
as a trajectory rather than a static measurement 
may be more revealing. 
In a study by Bushway et al. (2003), there were 
some interesting findings using the dynamic ap-
proach to desistance. Using a theoretical analysis, 
the authors were able to infer from existing data 
that individuals who could be seen as desisters, 
were more likely to be low-level offenders in the 
first place. Rates of  desistance overall were also 
closely linked with rates of  offending. Importantly, 
issues related to age at commencement of  illegal 
activity and duration of  offending were also cen-
tral to understanding desistance. These findings 
have particular implications for a multi-role or-
ganization like, for example, the PIRA.
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Again relying on the dynamic process approach to 
desistance (Laub and Sampson, 2001) identified 
two separate elements of  particular relevance: a 
gradual social transition involving individual be-
havioral and perceptual change, and a termina-
tion of  the offending behavior. Elements in this 
process include aging, peer exposure, social learn-
ing, social control etc. However, in the case of  NI 
and terrorist offending, the role of  the group must 
also be a key variable. Without being able to link 
an individual desistance process to a group’s ulti-
mate termination of  offending, it is difficult to link 
causal factors to terrorist desistance. 
Interestingly and a particular issue in the case of  
NI’s political violence is the notion of  false desist-
ance. Given the very low prosecution and even ar-
rest rate for terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, 
the probability that someone is assumed to have 
desisted from terrorist offending, even if  offending 
continues in one form or another leads to what 
is referred to as false desistance (Bushway et al., 
2001). This notion of  false desistance is particu-
larly relevant in the case of  terrorism given the 
inherent grey areas of  the phenomenon. Support 
activities - ideological, strategic and operational 
-can persist undetected even in cases of  apparent 
desistance. In the case of  terrorist violence and 
particularly in terms of  counter terrorism polic-
ing, the utility of  the notion of  desistance becomes 
then related not to a process of  termination of  of-
fending, but a qualitative issue related to the nature 
of  the offending, ultimately linked to a reduction 
in the severity of  the crime. Measuring desistance 
for political offenders then becomes less about 
criminality and more about the reduction of  vio-
lence whereby certain group activities are tolerated 
although illegal, for the purpose of  restraining the 
outbreak of  violent conflict; in reality that means 
that traditional static notions of  desistance are in-
appropriate for understanding the process of  re-
duction in terrorist offending. 
Also important in considering the utility of  de-
sistance as a useful concept in understanding the 
move away from terrorist offending in Northern 
Ireland is the impact of  group processes on the in-
dividual trajectory. Criminological theory refers to 
peer influence and proximity to delinquent peers 
as key causal factors in understanding the pro-
pensity to offend, but also the possibility to desist. 
However, little is known about the role of  a coher-
ent physical and ideological group in encouraging 
or dissuading desistance. The role of  the group 
may assist in the alteration of  the rate of  offending 
given opportunity, ideology and target selection, 
resources etc., but it may also assist in the termi-
nation of  offending for ideological reasons, and as 
a result of  political negotiations. However, both 
of  these processes may be reached for individual 
members by fundamentally different routes (Hor-
gan, 2005). 
In considering desistance in terms of  its applica-
bility to terrorist offending, there needs to be a 
consideration of  two key factors, the traditional 
criminological focus on life course and life events 
as well as the notion of  group desistance; terrorist 
offending can terminate or evolve based on trajec-
tories emerging from both perspectives. In the case 
of  group desistance, the relatively limited crimino-
logical literature is predominantly concerned with 
gang criminality. Naturally, there are a number 
of  conceptual differences, however there are im-
portant lessons that can be drawn from what we 
already know about desistance research with 
gangs. In terms of  the group nature of  the gang 
and the terrorist organization, there are a num-
ber of  conceptual similarities that link both phe-
nomenon: the process of leaving the group/gang 
and the reduction versus termination of  offending 
(Carson, Peterson & Esbensen, 2013). In terms of  
leaving the group, research from the criminological 
literature demonstrates that status change is a cen-
tral element in gang desistance. During the process 
of  desistance, due to a termination of  the relation-
ship with the gang, there are identifiable changes 
in status for the former gang members. This is par-
ticularly applicable in the case of  criminal gangs as 
research has demonstrated, that for youths, gang 
membership is predominantly transitory and so 
status change is an inevitable occurance (Carson et 
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al., 2013). In the case of  terrorism research, due to 
the clandestine nature of  the organization and the 
layers of  membership that exist, understanding 
membership longevity is less clear-cut. However, 
in the case of  NI, leaving the terrorist group can-
not be conceived of  as a definitive action because 
there is a complexity related to an individual’s 
involvement initially in the paramilitary group 
and subsequently participation in related (albeit it 
non-violent) organisations. In many cases these 
non-violent organisations comprise of  the same 
members with a very similar if  not identical ideo-
logical underpinning. Many of  these non-violent 
groups emerged in Northern Ireland around the 
time of  the Good Friday Agreement, initially as 
support groups for prisoners and ex-prisoners, 
but later they evolved into groups that acted in a 
community support/social justice role (McEvoy, 
Shirlow & McElrath, 2004). While the aim or pur-
pose of  these organizations is not in question, in 
terms of  the support they offer members and the 
fact that in effect membership of  these non-vio-
lent groups can conceivably mediate the potential 
status change for members may have interesting 
implications for how we conceptualise desistance 
in the case of  terrorism and political violence.
According to McEvoy et al. (2004) in terms of  
the personal lives of  ex-prisoners, there was an 
acute period of  readjustment of  personal status 
that faced most former prisoners in NI. However, 
whether the involvement in a non-violent group 
and related community activities mediated some 
of  the individual level status interruption is an 
important question. The implication is of  course 
that in the case of  NI, desistance may well be un-
related to the termination of  membership of  an 
organization and more specifically quantified by 
ideological consistency, maintenance of  a similar 
historic narrative, non-offending and as a result a 
qualitative reduction in the nature of  offending. 
Another significant issue unique to desistance 
from (group) terrorist violence is the issue of  top 
down decisions affecting the option or opportu-
nity to offend. In the case of  NI and the PIRA, 
the ceasefires variously declared on numerous oc-
casions, but ultimately finalised in 2005 were a 
significant if  not the ultimate arbiter of  the choice 
to continue violent offending (although so called 
rogue actions occurred). This is problematic for 
some theorists who advocate for a definition of  
desistance that recognizes the voluntary nature of  
the process (Shover, 1996). However, it is essential 
to recognise that the peace process in NI was not 
merely an elite led process, it involved community 
change and significant transition on the ground 
(Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008). Therefore it can be 
reasonably assumed that in tandem with the high 
level political negotiations, a very local and at time 
personal journey to desistance was underway for 
paramilitary group members. Furthermore, given 
the existence and emergence of  dissident organi-
zations, for individual group members, the cease-
fires did not dictate the process, as the option to 
defect to groups who continued to use violence 
was open for some. Importantly, the trajectory of  
group level processes towards non-violence do not 
capture the idiosyncrasy of  individual decisions to 
desist, as many ex-prisoners had made this choice 
prior to any official announcement. Regardless, in 
the application of  theories of  desistance to TPV, it 
is important to separate the termination of  violent 
behaviour from the process of  desistance itself  
(Laub & Sampson, 2001).
Another significant issue of  concern in the appli-
cation of  desistance theory to terrorist behavior is 
the long advocated predictor of  desistance – the 
issue of  maturational reform. While there are 
many hypotheses as to the causal factors poten-
tially leading to desistance, there are a number of  
“sturdy correlates” (Laub & Sampson, 2001, p. 1) 
notably, marriage, employment, identity transfor-
mation, and aging. This fits with assumptions in 
criminological theory that relate delinquency to 
offending and subsequently links termination of  
offending with maturation. In the case of  terror-
ism research, whether this process is linked to the 
decline in the activity of  the group or some indi-
vidual process, it is difficult to comprehend due on 
the one hand to the interrelatedness of  the con-
structs but also the unavailability of  data. Even 
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trying to comprehend and collate gross statistics is 
difficult. Estimates of  the ex-prisoner population 
in NI range from 20-30,000 individuals, and cur-
rently estimates claim that between 14 and 31% 
of  the NI population aged 50-59 have been im-
prisoned for politically motivated crimes (Jamie-
son, Shirlow & Grounds, 2010). However, what is 
clear is the progressive importance of  prison avoid-
ance for the ex-prisoners. This is in line with re-
search by Shover (1996) that found that fear of  in-
carceration increased with age. Confounding the 
understanding of  desistance with maturation for 
terrorist behaviour is the issue of  group role and 
established expertise. For example, in the case of  
the PIRA, expert bomb makers were a necessary 
element in the organization, and the possibility for 
desistance may not have emerged given the value 
placed upon and the status of  that role.
In considering how we understand the end 
of  terrorist activity, desistance has significant 
conceptual utility. This short note highlights the 
potential contributions of  criminological theory to 
our understanding of  desistance and de-radicali-
sation. It is vital to recognize that there is a long 
history of  research into many types of  crime, both 
ideologically motivated and otherwise, and this 
body of  work should be recognized as a significant 
reference source. Reimaging our understanding of  
political violence due to the emergence of  domi-
nant narratives related to the existential threat of  
new terrorism, serves only to blind us to well tested 
frameworks for understanding violence, but also 
allows for the emergence of  politically led, empiri-
cally weak, conceptually confused efforts at expla-
nation. 
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The Evolving Identities of Former Child Soldiers 
in Colombia
Ines marchand, Agape for Colombia 
myriam denov, McGill University
CHAPTER 13
For the last fifty years, Colombia has suffered the effects of  violent guerrilla warfare, making it Latin 
America’s longest running armed conflict. Inequality and injustice in the appropriation of  land ownership 
and other economic resources are said to be important factors in the development and prolongation of  the 
conflict. Drug trafficking and the lack of  political and socio-economic opportunities are also key contribut-
ing factors (Basta ya, 2012).  
In its study of  Colombia’s armed conflict, the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (National Centre for His-
torical Memory) has identified four critical periods in the conflict’s evolution. The first period, from 1958 
to 1982, marked the transition from bipartisan violence to subversive violence, alongside the proliferation 
of  guerrilla groups. (Basta ya, 2012).   The second period, between 1982 and 1996, saw the political projec-
tion and military growth of  the guerrillas, the emergence of  paramilitary groups, as well the proliferation 
of  conflict-related drug trafficking. This period also marked the creation of  a new constitution in 1991, 
alongside several failed peace agreement attempts. The third period, from 1996 to 2005, was one of  the 
bloodiest due to the growth and strengthening of  the illegal armed groups and the radicalization of  politi-
cal views in favor of  a military solution to the armed conflict. The fourth period, from 2005 to the present, 
has been marked by a resurgence of  a strong military offensive on the part of  the Colombian government 
military, significantly debilitating illegal armed groups.  This period has also seen peace negotiations with 
FARC, which remain ongoing. 
At the early stages of  Colombia’s armed conflict, there was very little evidence to suggest that children 
were used in hostilities. However, as the armed conflict has progressed, paramilitary and guerrilla groups 
began to adopt new recruitment strategies that included the mobilization of  children. Due to the perceived 
benefits in using the young, vulnerable, and obedient, the recruitment of  children became endemic in the 
1990s. By 2003, Human Rights Watch (2003) estimated that there were at least 11,000 children recruited 
into armed groups in the country. Children are now said to compose 30% of  all members of  armed groups 
in Colombia, while over 60% of  those in urban militias are believed to be children (Burgess, 2009).
The challenges that children and youth face in the context of  armed groups and armed violence are signifi-
cant and undeniable, including multiple forms of  physical, psychological and sexual violence, exploitation, 
deprivation and other gross human rights violations.  These challenges do not abruptly end upon exiting 
an armed group, but instead change shape (Jones & Denov, 2015). The difficult and complex transition 
from a militarized life in an armed group to a civilian life has been well documented (Helmus & Glenn 
2004; Marlowe, 2001).  Given the extended periods of  time that children and youth are often associated 
with an armed group, upon exiting, they are faced with the need to be reintegrated into norms and institu-
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methodology
This study, funded by the Social Science and 
Humanities Research Council of  Canada 
(SSHRC), has examined the reintegration experi-
ences of  a group of  demobilized youth who had 
been associated with various armed groups during 
the course of  an armed conflict. A qualitative re-
search design was employed because it is particu-
larly conducive to garnering young people’s direct 
experiences of  and perspectives on reintegration. 
A key aim of  the fieldwork was to gain not only 
an understanding of  the youth’s experiences fol-
lowing demobilization, but as well their reflections 
and interpretations of  these experiences, as well as 
their psychosocial effects. 
To explore participants’ experiences of  reintegra-
tion, in 2010, the authors conducted semi-struc-
tured interviews in Spanish with 22 respondents 
who had been formerly associated with an armed 
group in Colombia — twelve male and ten female. 
At the time of  the interviews, all respondents were 
over 18 (ranging from 19-27 years) and living in 
an urban context in the province of  Quindio. The 
in-depth interviews were audio-recorded with per-
mission and subsequently transcribed and trans-
lated into English.  All our respondents had been 
recruited by an armed group when they were un-
der 18 (ranging between 8 and 16 years old) and 
had remained with the group for an extended pe-
riod of  time (ranging from 3 months to 8 years). 
All 22 participants had been displaced from their 
communities of  origin, had received support from 
ICBF and were living in an urban context.
As with all self-report data, the interviews with 
participants were invariably affected by their will-
ingness to divulge personal information and expe-
riences.  The potential fear of  stigmatization and 
recrimination may have prevented some partici-
pants from openly disclosing some of  their experi-
ences, while it may have led others to alter aspects 
of  their stories. The potential flaws of  self-disclo-
sure must therefore be taken into account when 
considering participants’ stories. Moreover, given 
the small sample size, the findings of  the study can 
in no way be generalized to the larger population 
of  former child soldiers in Colombia.  
tions from which they had been isolated, often for years.  To assist with child soldier reintegration, since 
1999, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) has provided assistance to former child soldiers 
(those under the age of  18) from all armed groups who have been captured by the Colombian army or 
have deserted and handed themselves in to the authorities. Known as the “Attention Program for Children 
and Adolescents”, a total of  4,811 children were assisted through this program between 1999 and 2011, of  
which 72% were boys and 28% were girls (Watchlist, 2012).  For a child who has been demobilized from an 
armed group, the care aspect of  ICBF programming involves support and protection. Family reunification 
is a priority.  However, for security reasons it is not always possible for the child to return to his or her fam-
ily of  origin.  Such children may be placed within an institutional or foster family setting.  In these cases, 
the Attention Program focuses on psychosocial care, education, job training, and support for productive 
initiatives. When the child becomes an adult s/he may join the reintegration program for former adult 
combatants where s/he can continue to receive support, as needed.  
Given the challenges of  reintegration post-demobilization, this paper traces the realities and experiences 
of  22 former Colombian child soldiers regarding their perspectives of  reintegration, particularly as it re-
lates to identity. Drawing on their own voices, this paper explores the process of  identity construction in 
child soldiers both during and following their involvement in an armed group, exploring issues of  identity 
transformation, gender, and reflections on reintegration and reconciliation. 
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Evolving Identities: the making and 
unmaking of a warrior
The notion of  identity is vital to understanding 
the conflict and post-conflict realities of  former 
child soldiers as they transition from civilian life 
to military life (as in the case of  military recruit-
ment), and then once again as they transition from 
military life to a civilian existence (during demo-
bilization and reintegration).  In this paper, we 
refer to the concept of  identity as it is presented 
in Colombia’s Attention Program.  Identity is un-
derstood as “the versions or theories that we build 
about ourselves in the conversations with others 
and in different cultural family or social contexts” 
(“Support Modules,” 2007, p. 25). Accordingly, 
the concept of  identity is multidimensional: “it is 
possible to be a victim of  the armed conflict, and 
at the same time be a student, and a demobilized 
person.” (Support modules 1, 2007, p. 25). Iden-
tity, therefore, changes and alters over time and 
through diverse experiences and social realities. 
In this sense, identity is not singular - most people 
learn to have multiple identities.  One can be a 
mother and a physician, or an athlete and a com-
munity leader. However, the identity that becomes 
prominent depends largely on the context (Wessels 
2006, p. 82).  In addition, the relational aspect of  
identity is significant: identity is not “an essence, 
an attribute or an intrinsic property of  the subject, 
but has a relational character and it emerges and 
is confirmed only in the confrontation with other 
identities (Gimenez, 2002, p. 4). 
Alongside the notion of  identity, the concept of  
social representations is also significant to under-
standing the reality of  former child soldiers. “Be-
longing to a group implies sharing to some degree 
the core of  the social representations that charac-
terizes and defines that group.” These represen-
tations “serve and frame the perceptions and in-
terpretations of  reality and provide guidelines for 
behaviors and social practices” (Gimenez, 2002, 
p. 7). 
To explore and understand the realities of  identity 
construction and transformation among Colom-
bian former child soldiers, in the following section 
we highlight the voices and perspectives of  our 
study participants. In particular, we explore iden-
tity as it relates to military recruitment or becom-
ing a warrior, identity, war and gender, as well as 
identity construction following demobilization or 
becoming a civilian. 
militarized Identities: becoming a warrior
The day they took me and kept me, was very difficult be-
cause … I began to cry, I was only twelve years old. … 
I missed my mother…but everything takes practice, and 
one gets used to it … I got used to it and I forgot every-
thing [about my past] (male child soldier, March 2010).
Many of  our participants were abducted by 
armed groups and coercively made to participate 
in armed conflict.  Others, however, made the de-
cision to join.  For participants who reported join-
ing an armed group, several factors were reported 
as paramount in their decision to join.  These in-
cluded: conflict in their family of  origin, lack of  
education and job opportunities, the presence 
of  armed groups in the area, poverty and prom-
ises of  financial rewards, a search for power, and 
self-worth.  The glamour associated with armed 
groups was also enticing.  As this participant ex-
plained: 
I was not forced to leave my family … We didn’t have 
much money and we would see that my friend’s brother 
had a great life, he went to the city, bought a car, had 
money and he made us dream about it … so we joined 
the group. But when we got there, it was all the opposite 
(male child soldier, 2010).
Importantly, whether joining the group by force 
or non-force, participants did not enter the armed 
groups with a militarized identity.  Rather, this de-
veloped over time and was linked to multiple fac-
tors.  As the quotes below illustrate, these factors 
included military and ideological indoctrination, 
radicalization, fear and threats, a search for pow-
er, and promises of  benefits - all of  which - came 
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early in the recruitment and training process:
The first combat that I had was very hard. A partner 
would yell at me: if  you don’t fight, if  you don’t calm 
down and start firing they will kill you… Do it for your 
daughter, remember that you have a daughter, then one 
loses fear and gets used to it but … they start killing 
partners beside you and they ask you for help and you 
cannot help them because if  you do, then they kill you 
(female child soldier, 2010).
With a uniform and after four months I was the second 
operator of  the machine gun… If  you show that you 
are courageous, that you are a warrior, you gain certain 
benefits (male child soldier, 2010). 
In one year one learns how to participate in combat … 
they tell you that the government is your enemy (male 
child soldier, 2010).
A guerrillera doctor examines you, she undresses you and 
looks at everything… to make sure you don’t have any ve-
nereal disease. Then comes the training, to learn how to 
move forward on the ground, learn how to walk without 
making noise, without breaking branches. After a year, 
they make you pass a life or death test, they set up barbed 
wire …with explosives and light them up.  They make 
you go under without touching that, I have the marks… 
then they give you a rifle, a gun, the uniform and they 
tell you that you are a normal guerrilla man (male child 
soldier, 2010).
There is a book in the guerrilla, a book that is called 
‘The Four Corners’ and that book lists all the things a 
guerrillero can do, … the rights and obligations, it is a 
book like the ones the government has about the rights and 
obligations (male child soldier, 2010).
I liked it, when I entered the FARC, I was in love with 
it …even if  they took me by force...by being there, being 
able to manipulate the weapons, to have the power… and 
it makes you feel good (male child soldier, 2010).
The training participants received, the uniform, 
the use of  arms, and the use of  indoctrination into 
a militarized world vision that identified violence 
as justified, all conveyed an identity - a feeling of  
belonging, power and pride that was – for many 
- attractive and enticing. Over time, through a 
complex and powerful mix of  coercion and indi-
vidual agency, many former child soldiers became 
immersed in and ultimately adopted a militarized 
identity and, in their words, “became a warrior.”
 
Gender, Femininity and Identity
Participation in an armed group often disrupted 
gender norms, roles and responsibilities for many 
young women coming from traditional Colom-
bian households. Within armed groups, many 
female participants reported being treated as 
‘equals’ with their male counterparts. Within the 
wartime context of  hyper-masculinity, this meant 
an abandonment of  traditionally feminine quali-
ties and roles:  
When one goes over there [to war], one does men things 
and does not have women’s intimacy. It gets lost. You do 
men things and you are with men. … The punishments 
are equal. We have to open trenches, go through the same 
training and wear the same camouflage. Everything, eve-
rything. … One acts the same and gets used to it, and 
loses the feeling of  being a woman (female child soldier, 
2010). 
This participant explained how her feminine 
identity was suppressed within the armed group:
 I did not value myself, I felt like I was not a woman 
but a man.  I would dress like a man. I would act as a 
man…and I did not feel the difference because they do 
not let you feel the difference (female child soldier, 2010).
Moreover, expressing one’s femininity after leav-
ing the armed group was described as both chal-
lenging and satisfying: 
[After demobilization] Now...I can wear a skirt, I can 
fix my hair, I can dye it, I can wear makeup…I can be 
more like myself...I had no idea what would look nice 
on me, what I could wear and slowly I got used to it. 
The adaptation was very difficult (female child soldier, 
2010). 
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For some female participants, entering mother-
hood following demobilization jolted them back 
in touch with their femininity, restoring a sense of  
purpose:
When I got pregnant, I was very happy from the first 
time that I found out until the end...my baby. When I 
found out, it brought me such happiness, such an internal 
satisfaction just to know that I was going to take care of  
a little person for whom I would live. That made me feel 
many things and in a way I feel that my son is the final 
touch in feeling like a woman and a good one. I felt that 
(female child soldier, 2010).
For this participant, becoming a mother report-
edly gave her more confidence and certainty over 
who she was: 
It gave more security, I would walk on the streets and 
feel safer, safer about what I could say or affirm as a 
woman(female child soldier, 2010).
Becoming a mother also represented hope for a 
new start during a difficult period in their lives. 
For many, the journey from war to civil society was 
bitter and lonely. Many participants did not return 
to their families and their communities, but were 
forced to relocate, due to fear of  retaliation by 
armed groups. Becoming a mother offered some 
female participants the chance to redefine them-
selves with renewed hope and purpose: 
It was a unique experience, an experience that emanates 
a lot of  tenderness. A lot of  hope, one feels that one has 
someone to fight for, someone who will accompany you, 
part of  you that will start living, a hope (female child 
soldier, 2010).
Given the hyper-masculinity associated with the 
armed groups, some females reported that notions 
of  identity, femininity and accepted gender roles 
had to be relearned in the post-demobilization 
context. Pregnancy for some was the ultimate con-
firmation of  femininity. 
Reflections on Recruitment and demo-
bilization: the unmaking of a warrior
Within the logic and context of  war, extreme vio-
lence and killing often became normalized and 
even - at the extreme - acts deserving of  recog-
nition and praise. However, in the aftermath of  
violence and in the context of  social reintegration, 
young people’s awareness of  the ethical implica-
tions and the consequences of  their violent actions 
as warriors become evident.  Participants’ narra-
tives not only demonstrate their capacity to reflect 
on the consequences of  their violent past, but also 
their profound implications: 
I did forgive myself, but there are many things about my 
past, knowing that one has killed another person is…sad 
even though one knows …that it was that person [killed] 
or oneself. It does hurt… (female child soldier, 2010).
On one hand, to have that experience is good...I am ca-
pable to know what is good and bad… when I am going 
to do something, I think about it a lot…. But on the 
bad side of  it, I lost my family because of  it and I can’t 
forgive myself  for that. To lose your family for something 
that is not worth three pesos (male child soldier, 2010).
Consequences in the sense that I cannot live safely in 
any community or village or city …One remains very 
reactive, very alert, on the defensive (female child soldier, 
2013). 
You cannot forget so easily so there are nightmares. If  I 
am sleeping while it rains and there is lightening, it is 
horrible for me because I wake up disturbed, I think of  
things that are not related. I feel paranoid (female child 
soldier, 2010).
The experiences of  recruitment, of  life in the 
armed groups, and of  demobilization, left a pow-
erful imprint on the minds of  our participants. 
Moreover, during the process of  reintegration 
and through the Attention Program they had the 
opportunity to reflect on their wartime actions 
and to confront their former and current view of  
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themselves, their worldview and the consequences 
of  their actions.  Participants asserted that despite 
the horrors they experienced and participated in, 
their participation in war provided important life 
lessons that will remain with them:  
One has sequels … you learn something...if  you do some-
thing and if  you like it you keep doing it … like killing 
someone, I liked it, I used to like it … when I left (the 
group) some people made me change… (Now) I would 
not do it, not even for money (male child soldier, 2010).
I think everything in life teaches you, in a more personal 
way, in a profound way, a lesson. Everything that I have 
learned there I will not repeat. I can choose because now 
I know... it was personal growth, a learning process. I 
think that it has been a unique experience (female child 
soldier, 2010).
Reconciliation & Former Child Soldiers
There are an array of  societal reactions to child 
participation in armed conflict, as well as their 
reintegration into civil society.  Societal and com-
munity reactions in Colombia have tended to vary 
on a continuum from outright social stigma and 
rejection to full support for their plight.  These 
participants discussed the stigma that they experi-
enced and its implications:
People in the community knew who we were [that we 
were former child soldiers].  So one would ask to talk to 
someone and they would reject you.  One would go to the 
store to buy something and people would look at you as 
if  you were the worst thing… So we were getting tired 
of  that because we would be rejected everywhere.  Where 
they didn’t reject us, they would give us the things while 
staring at us … it was hard for the identity of  the per-
son…When we arrived, after a month [of  experiencing 
rejection], everyone wanted to leave [and return to the 
armed groups] (male child soldier, 2010).
One needs to get used to it, life here is very hard. One goes 
out in the street and [people] look at you and say: ‘Look 
at the guerrillero’ [guerilla boy] even though you don’t 
look like that anymore … people who know [that I was 
in an armed group] treat me badly and say that I will be 
a terrorist, a guerrillero (male child soldier, 2010).
In response to the varied reactions, children and 
youth appeared to develop strategies to cope and 
manage the reactions. In many cases, respondents 
made efforts to conceal their past in order to pre-
vent physical harm to themselves or their families, 
and to avoid blame and rejection:
Society can help. I think they are already helping….try-
ing to defend us and providing us with support because 
if  you come from there, it is very hard to find employment 
but they do help us and train us (female child soldier, 
2010). 
Maybe I don’t talk about it because of  what people think 
...people know that you are a killer and they are mean 
and people think you are mean. They don’t give a job to 
someone like me (male child soldier, 2010).
I came here today camouflaged, I brought this small hat 
and these glasses (male child soldier, 2010).
Importantly, former child soldiers in our sample 
were not trying to obliterate, negate or deny their 
violent past.  However, they made attempts to hide 
their former identities as child soldiers in order to 
protect themselves. They made efforts to adjust to 
civilian life and to see themselves as good citizens, 
and they also wanted to be perceived as such. Par-
ticipants viewed their lives within the illegal armed 
groups as part of  a learning experience that they 
did not wish to repeat. However, they realized that 
their “biographical past as unchangeable and in-
alienable” (Gimenez, 2002, p.5). 
Given the realities of  stigma and rejection in the 
post-conflict lives of  former child soldiers, process-
es of  reconciliation are vital. Agape por Colombia, is 
a reconciliation program run by volunteers (many 
of  them victims of  the armed conflict themselves) 
and involves the participation of  former child 
soldiers and other war victims, including victims 
of  forced displacement, refugees, people who suf-
fered kidnappings, as well as members of  civil 
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Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the complex and often painful realities of  former child soldiers and their coura-
geous struggle to determine who they were during recruitment, who they have become, and how they are 
perceived as they adjust to civilian life, alone and far away from their families. Our work supports the idea 
that these youth have the capacity for reflexivity and the ability to examine themselves, their actions, their 
options for the future and to make choices that reflect the lessons learned through recruitment, demobiliza-
tion and reintegration. 
society. Within the context of  this reconciliation 
program, these diverse groups meet for three days, 
during which they are encouraged to share their 
wartime experiences in a secure environment. 
Contact among the former child-soldiers, other 
victims and members of  the civil society takes 
place in a supportive atmosphere that invites dia-
logue capable of  changing perceptions and mu-
tual stereotypes. 
The presence of  former child soldiers in the rec-
onciliation process is essential to the program, as 
it contributes to the increased awareness in the 
Colombian community with regards to the reali-
ties of  child recruitment. Through their contri-
butions, the former child-soldiers are no longer 
passive subjects of  institutional attention: they ac-
tively contribute to enhance the Colombian social 
fabric and help other participants to reflect collec-
tively on the impact of  the war on everyone’s lives. 
In this sense, former child soldiers become active 
agents and promoters of  reconciliation. Their life 
stories and their experiences give invaluable testi-
mony of  the complexities and damages caused by 
the armed conflict. Their input is crucial in the 
exchange dynamics that is established between the 
former child-soldiers, other victims and members 
of  civil society. 
Furthermore, former child soldiers have often 
never had the opportunity to personally meet 
those who have been direct victims of  the armed 
groups. Former child soldiers have often never be-
fore heard the stories and perspectives, of  civilians 
and the impact of  the war on their lives.  Getting 
to know first-hand the ravages caused by the illegal 
armed groups has, in our experience, repeatedly 
provoked instances of  spontaneous reconciliation 
initiated by former child soldiers, who have asked 
for - and have often been granted - forgiveness. 
Significantly, Agape has reported and document-
ed these spontaneous reconciliation experiences in 
virtually every reconciliation gathering.
The presence of  civil society has proven to be cru-
cial as, for the most part, victims share their ex-
periences among other victims. The presence of  
civil society can lead to an awareness on the part 
of  those participants for whom the war has not 
touched their lives directly.  In many cases they 
have come to realize that in one way or another, 
all citizens are in some way responsible for the on-
going armed conflict in a society that is character-
ized by profound social and economic inequality. 
Members of  civil society can also bear witness 
and lend support to the plight of  the victims, fa-
cilitating the restoring of  victims’ dignity through 
recognition and support and also through the re-
lationships established through Agape’s program. 
The reconciliation gatherings present an opportu-
nity for all to clarify concepts, and experience the 
benefits of  forgiveness and reconciliation. Impor-
tant networks have also been established through 
the Agape’s reconciliation gatherings and the re-
lationships established have continued through 
time. Ultimately, these experiences further illus-
trate the evolving character of  the identities of  
former child soldiers and the enormous possibili-
ties to overcome adversity and to become healthy 
and productive members of  society. 
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Through the narratives of  these youth, we can see how the idea of  “who I am” and “how I am perceived” 
evolves in multiple contexts. Values learned during training and becoming a warrior, as well as through 
demobilization and reintegration are learned and unlearned. Throughout their stories and experiences, 
we get a glimpse of  the reality of  the “making” and “unmaking” of  child soldiers and the many aspects of  
their lives that have been impacted by the horrors of  war (Denov, 2010). 
While former child soldiers appear to make no effort to negate their past, they do conceal it in order to 
protect themselves from the stigma associated with their former affiliations.  Moreover, they appear to re-
construct their identities as civilians and worthy members of  society, precisely because of  their past experi-
ence during the recruitment and in opposition to it.  
There are valuable lessons to be learned through the demobilization experiences of  Colombian former 
child soldiers. It is particularly important to understand the conditions that make possible not only their 
reintegration but also their de-radicalization. Besides well designed government reintegration programs, 
one of  the key ingredients of  de-radicalization is the presence and help of  a supportive community, that 
allows children and youth to reflect on their identities and social representations that are different to the 
ones they had acquired during recruitment. 
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Family Counselling, De-radicalization and Counter- 
Terrorism: The Danish and German programs in context
daniel Koehler
Director, German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS)1 
CHAPTER 14
Family matters far more in de-radicalization and counter-terrorism work than typically realized. Stable 
social bonds and relationships are considered to be essential for desistance focussed probation and rein-
tegration work (e.g., Gadd, 2006; Garfinkel, 2007; Laub & Sampson, 2001), effective treatment of  PTSD 
(e.g., Grossman, 2009, p. 288), as well as the success of  terrorist de-radicalization programs (e.g., Bjørgo & 
Horgan, 2009; Fink & Haerne, 2008; Horgan, 2009). The social environment  and within it more specifi-
cally close friends and family,  is arguably one of  the spaces in which violent radicalization takes place and 
becomes visible in early stages. Even concerning the phenomenon of  the lone wolf  terrorists that has previ-
ously been considered to be inaccessible, the social environment of  the later perpetrator was well aware of  
the radicalization process taking place: 
In 82.4% of  the cases, other people were aware of  the individual’s grievance that spurred the terrorist plot, 
and in 79%, other individuals were aware of  the individual’s commitment to a specific extremist ideology. 
In 63.9% of  the cases, family and friends were aware of  the individual’s intent to engage in terrorism-
related activities because the offender verbally told them. (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014, p. 429).
This astonishing high percentage of  family and friends knowing about a terrorist’s intentions (63.9%) does 
find support in other in-depth studies of  terrorist networks. For example, Marc Sageman (2004) found in 
his seminal analysis of  172 jihadist terrorists that in 75% of  the cases with reliable information pre-existing 
friendship bonds and kinship were essential to an individual’s radicalization process in joining Jihad (Sage-
man, 2004, p. 111-113). In a similar study of  242 European jihadists, Edwin Bakker (2006) found that 
“in more than 35 percent of  the sample social affiliation may have played a role in recruitment” (Bakker, 
2006, p. 42). In other words, the close social environment is most likely the place to recognize the on-set 
of  violent radicalization, and prevent further involvement or intervene in advanced radicalization. Con-
sequently, family and friends – the social environment of  radicalized individuals – are most important for 
early prevention and intervention work, and this fact needs to be addressed with a specifically designed 
methodology focussing on the role of  the family in radicalization processes and counter-terrorism work. 
This methodology – as designed by the author – needs to rely on strengthening the family as a counterforce 
against radicalization in an equal partnership with the support provider, and not on using the family as a 
source of  information and intelligence for the authorities. During the last years several highly specialized 
family counselling programs were developed and started working around Europe mostly motivated by 
the pressing need expressed by families affected by jihadist radicalization, and the devastating impact of  
witnessing their relatives leaving to join the violent jihad in Syria and Iraq. These family counselling pro-
grams are seen as highly effective, at least in reaching a large proportion of  the relevant target groups and 
approaching the problem of  violent home-grown radicalization from a new and innovative perspective 
KEYwoRdS: family counselling, counter-terrorism, de-radicalization
1 
1 www.girds.org
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the theory of Family Counselling and 
de-radicalization
Previous comparative studies of  various de-radi-
calization programs were able to identify several 
levels of  impact, which de-radicalization strategies 
and programs need to address. These levels can 
be differentiated along three dimensions: affective, 
pragmatic and ideological (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, 
Ghez, & Boucek, 2010, p. 42 et seq.). 
Regarding the ideological dimension, any de-
radicalization (in contrast to “disengagement” 
programs not focusing on ideology, see Horgan, 
2008) program should emphasize the delegitimi-
zation and invalidation of  an individual’s or a 
group’s narratives and interpretations. It should 
also dismantle the previously adopted radical ide-
ology during the de-radicalization process and 
reach a critical self-assessment of  the individual’s 
past (see Köhler, 2014a). 
However another important aspect needs address-
ing: the different concepts of  “violent” and “non-
violent” radicalization. “Violent radicalization,” 
meaning the “radicalization that leads to vio-
lence” and “non-violent radicalization,” referring 
“to the process by which individuals come to hold 
radical views in relation to the status quo but do 
not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity” (see 
Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 2 italics in original) are 
usually used to describe legitimate and illegitimate 
(i.e. illegal) forms of  radicalization. In need for a 
sharper concept of  the process of  radicalization, 
which security agencies and de-radicalization pro-
grams are typically looking at, another approach 
is used here: 
Radicalization can be understood as a process of  
individual depluralization of  political concepts 
and values (e.g. justice, freedom, honour, violence, 
and democracy) according with those concepts 
employed by a specific ideology (see for in detail: 
Koehler, 2014; Köhler, 2014b). 
The more individuals have internalized the no-
tion that no other alternative interpretations of  
their (prioritized) political concepts exist (or are 
relevant), the more we can speak (and show) a 
degree of  radicalization. This may happen with 
varying degrees of  intellectual reflection, for exam-
ple quoting a fascist thinker to explain certain be-
haviour or merely stating to do something because 
it seemed right within the cognitive framework or 
collective identity. However, this means that, in 
accordance with the international debate, a high 
level of  radicalization does not necessarily equal 
a high level of  violent behaviour or extraordinary 
brutality. Radicalization in this sense is a rather 
normal phenomenon in society, for example in 
sports, animal rights movement or dietary prefer-
ences such as veganism. The important link here 
is the fusion (and combination) with a certain type 
of  ideology that inherently denies individual freedom (or 
equal rights) to persons not part of  the radical person’s in-
group, and thusly the degree of  ideological incompatibility 
with the mainstream political culture. Thus, it is pos-
sible to understand how individuals need to act 
and behave illegally according to the degree of  in-
ternalized and monopolized political concepts of  
their ideology, simply because at a certain point 
no other option is visible to them. This process in 
fact creates a kind of  ticking time bomb: a rapidly 
decreasing amount of  alternatives and options in 
combination with an increasing amount of  ideo-
(Gielen, 2014; Koehler, 2013, 2015; Ranstorp & Hyllengren, 2013; Vidino, 2014). However, more in depth 
evaluations and methodological development are necessary to ensure the durability and sustainability of  
these initiatives. Two models from Germany and Denmark have received a high level of  international 
media attention and are widely seen as inspirations for other programs around the globe. This essay intro-
duces and compares these two models and sets them in context with theoretical and practical implications 
for family counselling programs as de-radicalization and counter-terrorism tools. 
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logical calls for action.  
To break this ideologically inherent determina-
tion of  behaviour constitutes a central task in 
every de-radicalization strategy and program.  At 
the pragmatic level, emphasis is placed on the dis-
continuance and/or prevention of  courses of  ac-
tion that individuals or groups have established in 
order to achieve their goals. This pillar typically 
is comprised of  what is usually called “disengage-
ment.” Providing for example capacity building, 
job training, drug treatment, family therapy, and 
numerous other practical assistance necessary 
to discontinue the old and start a new life. The 
pragmatic level also includes matters of  personal 
safety but primarily focuses on the practical basis 
of  changed behaviour. 
The affective level addresses the need for individu-
als to be emotionally supported, and the require-
ment to establish an alternative reference group. 
In this regard, family counselling is considered a 
vital instrument. Family members or friends that 
are opposing the respective ideology are being 
empowered in their argumentation and their ca-
pacity to take action and provide alternative per-
spectives. Family counselling is, thus, an important 
framework factor in de-radicalization processes 
and supporting attachment figures (in relation to 
emotions, values, opinions and interest of  the rad-
icalized person) greatly increases the chances for a 
successful de-radicalization.
Family counselling programs – as individual de-
radicalization programs – need to address all these 
three levels. Starting of  course with the affective 
(i.e. the family) level, practical needs of  the poten-
tially radicalized individual need to be addressed 
and – through the family or close friends – ideo-
logical references can be countered. The aim of  
the counselling process is to determine the indi-
vidual driving factors for the relative’s radicaliza-
tion (if  there is any) and to bring in targeted and 
highly specific intervention through the close af-
fective social environment. This needs to be done 
with extreme caution and expertise. It should be 
noted however, that there are fundamental meth-
odological differences between family counselling 
programs and individual de-radicalization pro-
grams. First of  all most individual de-radicaliza-
tion programs start with persons willing to leave 
radical milieus or at least being at some form of  
potential point of  access (e.g. prison). In contrast, 
family counselling programs typically get in touch 
with the family of  a person right in the middle 
or in advanced stages of  violent radicalization 
processes. Therefore, the major goal of  these 
counselling programs is to slow down and stop 
the relative’s radicalization and induce a potential 
de-radicalization process. In this case a very dif-
ferent methodology focusing on the whole family 
as social unit needs to be deployed. Once the in-
dividual de-radicalization process starts another 
program focusing on the individual’s needs should 
step in ideally. Another important aspect is the fact 
that family counselling programs can be seen as 
hybrids – both working as prevention or counter-
radicalization programs (when the program steps 
in during early phases of  radicalization) and inter-
vention programs (e.g., when the family contacts 
the program in an advanced stage of  the relative’s 
radicalization process). If  designed effectively 
these programs are highly flexible and dynamic 
being able to shift from an early prevention to in-
tervention and counter-terrorism methodology.
the danish model
Dating back to the 1980’s the Danish model builds 
upon the SSP (school, social services, police) 
model, which is well established in the community 
of  Aarhus. After 9/11, the model was extended 
to deal with religious radicalization, when previ-
ously youth gang related problems were the main 
focus. The Danish model is located in full within 
the Danish police (for an in depth explanation 
about the Aarhus model see: Agerschou, 2014). 
Mixed teams of  police officers and social workers 
are located within “info houses,” which exchange 
information on potentially radicalizing individu-
als in all directions, for example with schools. This 
means that either teachers or parents can go to 
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these “info houses” and report their  concerns, or 
the employed police officers and social workers 
can reach out to schools if  they learn about prob-
lematic cases through police channels. The “info 
houses” are steered by a “task force” comprised 
of  representatives from government agencies and 
mentors placed under the directorate of  the police 
commissioner. This task force tries to provide po-
tentially de-radicalizing help and contacts for in-
dividuals when necessary. Ranging from early pre-
vention, such as problems securing employment 
or with drugs, to psychological assistance with re-
integration and de-radicalization after returning 
from fighting in Syria. Naturally, these task forces 
are very well integrated into every aspect of  social 
life within Aarhus and can rely on a very short 
and effective chain of  communication with part-
ners from government or civil society to provide 
the necessary support. The Danish model is not a 
family counselling program as such, but includes 
a family support group as one of  many possible 
intervention methods. This family support group 
provides counselling, social services and miscella-
neous practical help for returnees or in the case 
of  the relative’s death. As highly effective in terms 
of  sorting out security relevant cases demanding 
judicial or police action from cases where social 
work methods need to be deployed, the Danish 
model can be seen as a traditionally grown contact 
and communication hub within the police regard-
ing youth radicalization. As the level of  mistrust 
on the side of  the population is very low, police 
officers can freely approach and interact with civil 
society and other partners. 
Being built on a very long tradition of  cooperation 
between police, social services and civil society in 
a small community, the Danish model is excep-
tionally effective but also unlikely to be transferred 
successfully to other contexts because of  the exten-
sive time necessary to establish an equal amount 
of  legitimacy. Although many other countries 
would prefer the Danish model as it is effectively 
run by the police and ensures control through gov-
ernment authorities, a very high degree of  mis-
trust and critique would be most likely the result if  
police forces would try to exert this level of  institu-
tional control in other countries. Data protection 
and privacy concerns might also be very difficult 
issues in other contexts, and as soon as the com-
munities are so large that the employed officers or 
social workers cannot any longer rely on their per-
sonal networks the program’s advantage as being 
located within the police might actually backfire. 
In this case a similar program might for example 
be perceived as criminalizing or spying on Muslim 
communities. Research on reporting mechanisms 
for deviant behaviour has shown that family and 
friends resist from reporting to the police directly 
out of  a sense of  loyalty and love for their rela-
tives. In addition the concern of  consequences has 
proven to be a very high obstacle for contacting 
police run programs (Borum, 2013; Rowe, Wil-
cox, & Gadlin, 2009).  
the German model
Germany is one of  the European states with the 
largest numbers of  citizens having travelled to the 
Syrian/Iraqi battlefields. Currently about 700 
individuals (the unofficial estimations are much 
higher) have left to fight abroad and about 225 
have returned2 reaching the limits of  the law en-
forcement authorities.3 However, Germany devel-
oped one of  the most innovative approaches to 
tackle home-grown radicalization even before the 
foreign fighter problem became widely evident.
Having started in 2012 the German model relies 
on a strong public private partnership hosted and 
financed by the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugee Affairs (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge BAMF) as part of  the Ministry of  the 
Interior (Endres, 2014) and partially based on the 
theoretical and methodological concepts designed 
by the author. Running a nationwide phone hot-
line for families and concerned persons (teach-
ers, employers, social workers) the BAMF hotline 
1  
2   See for example: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/mehr-terrorbraeute-aus-deutschland-a-1039716.html (accessed July 16, 2015).
3   See for example: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Dec-12/280758-jihadis-stretch-german-justice-to-the-limit.ashx 
     (accessed January 4, 2014).
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provides a free of  charge, and if  needed anony-
mous first line counselling before referring the 
case to a local non-governmental partner within 
its own network, which currently comprises of  
four NGOs. These NGOs are then responsible 
for the actual counselling. Families and concerned 
persons could also contact one of  the NGOs di-
rectly. Thusly the counselling network relies on a 
dual contact structure aiming to reach the maxi-
mum of  the affected target group. Some families 
for example prefer contacting government struc-
tures, and some strictly refuse to do so. As all 
NGOs have their own methodological character 
and approach, this creates a high level of  flexibil-
ity for the counselling network and the ability to 
shift cases according to the best fit in regards to 
approach and counsellor. As the need for close 
cooperation and case based consultation between 
these NGOs and the BAMF as part of  the govern-
ment is evident regular meetings are held among 
the network partners. Having received more than 
1500 calls since 20124 resulting in more than 420 
counselling cases5 this model can be seen as highly 
successful in reaching the target group. 
One of  the network’s strengths is also a weakness: 
the multiple different approaches and methods of  
the NGOs involved, make it difficult to achieve 
and hold equal standards in counselling and to 
create the necessary internal transparency. Within 
the network there are no clear-cut guidelines on 
how exactly the counselling should be done, as 
every NGO more or less follows their own philoso-
phy. This requires a great deal of  communication 
and coordination as well as institutional learning. 
Building trust between the NGOs (which might 
not share each other’s methods or have competi-
tion based differences) is another point that needs 
to be overcome. In general, the German model 
relies on a constant case-by-case negotiation of  
necessary approaches, the role of  government 
authorities and the correct methods. Neverthe-
less the combined action of  government and civil 
society results in a high grade of  flexibility and 
adaptability making it possible to utilize the full 
potential of  both actors’ (government and civil so-
ciety) strengths and minimizing their weaknesses. 
Another aspect to keep in mind about the Ger-
man model is that it was designed to work with 
the family. The majority of  counselling cases do 
not involve the radicalized individuals themselves, 
but the program works instead through the family. 
Although the number of  cases with direct involve-
ment of  the radicalized person has grown over the 
last months, the German model nevertheless tries 
to focus on the family.    
Keys to Achieving Impact
Although it is too early to see long term effects 
of  these family counselling programs, it is never-
theless possible to deduce some pivotal key lessons 
from the two models in Denmark and Germany. 
These lessons can be seen as inspirations or guide-
lines for other programs trying to work in the field 
of  family counselling as well and are of  course 
only very abstract. More in depth studies and 
practical guidelines need to follow.
1. Family counselling programs need to focus on 
the family as a social unit, and at the same time 
understand the internal family dynamics and 
individual driving forces behind violent radi-
calization. These programs need to address 
these individual factors through the family 
without compromising the family’s integrity. 
However, it should be clear that the ultimate 
goal of  these programs is to avert dangers (e.g., 
acts of  violence) and reduce risks to the family 
and society.
2. The family should not be seen as a source of  
intelligence and information for the authori-
ties, but as partners in early prevention and 
even intervention work.  
3. Clear and transparent procedures and stand-
ards are absolutely essential to gain the trust 
1  
4   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-18/berlin-muslims-battle-potential-jihadists-in-their-midst  (accessed May 30, 2015).
5   http://www.hessischer-landtag.de/icc/Internet/med/3b9/3b923b4e-2b4c-a41d-669b-1c202184e373,11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111. 
      pdf  page 26, (accessed May 30, 2015).
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of  the families to achieve any impact. In this 
regard the main elements are multiple report-
ing channels, anonymity, accessibility, safety, 
and credibility.
4. As these family counselling programs are 
working in a potentially highly security rel-
evant area, a very close cooperation with all 
responsible governmental agencies is critical. 
For example this is built into the Danish model 
by design. In other models such as the German 
case, government relies on the capabilities of  
the partner NGOs to make the correct risk as-
sessments and follow the protocols in terms of  
when and which governmental partner needs 
to be brought in. In every case the key to suc-
cess is to find the correct time for the counsel-
lor to switch from preventative to intervention 
methods. Special expertise, training and expe-
rience based on a coherent methodology and 
theory are also necessary. So far the German 
model is lacking this special training in risk 
assessment and counter-radicalization on the 
side of  the NGO partners. Specialized expert 
training courses like the ones offered through 
the German Institute on Radicalization and 
De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS) have so far 
not been made mandatory for the counsellors 
in the German network. 
5. Family counselling programs are no stand-
alone efforts but deeply rely on networks and 
partners in every level of  society, e.g., religious 
authorities, probation services, social workers, 
youth agencies and schools. The role of  the 
counsellor can in many ways be described as a 
communication and network broker, bringing 
in the targeted help at the right time.
6. The counselling needs to be flexible and able 
to work from a very early prevention phase un-
til classical counter-terrorism. The necessary 
knowledge and expertise needs to be available.
7. Counselling should be available for every per-
son concerned, not just the family. Multiple 
languages, freedom of  charge, and anonymity 
need to be guaranteed if  required.
8. If  the program is civil society based data pro-
tection and privacy are top priorities for the 
counsellor. However, there should be a mecha-
nism or procedure in place to ensure that a 
correct risk assessment leads to the involve-
ment of  the responsible authorities at the right 
time. For example case managers should un-
dergo specialized training in risk assessment 
tools on a mandatory basis and the perfor-
mance and expertise of  the counsellors should 
be regularly evaluated by external experts. 
9. Standards in training and evaluation need to 
be set and monitored.    
Conclusion
Specifically designed family counselling programs within the area of  de-radicalization and counter-ter-
rorism are a very promising and innovative approach to tackle the issue of  home-grown radicalization 
processes leading to violence and terrorism. The two best established field programs in Germany and 
Denmark have offered a great deal of  insight into the key mechanisms necessary to make family counsel-
ling work as de-radicalization tool, and the first numbers of  cases as well as the visible impact has led to 
the creation of  similar initiatives worldwide (e.g., Canada, Netherlands, Great Britain, Australia, Austria). 
However, a lack of  coherent standards and methods has resulted in a wide variety of  structural designs and 
approaches. In addition it is still far too early to give academically sound evaluations of  these programs’ 
impact and long term effects, as only a few in-depth studies about family counselling have just started. 
Nevertheless, well designed family counselling programs can easily be seen as one of  the most important 
innovations in counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism during the last years. 
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PaRT IV
Involving the Community in Countering Violent Extremism

Research Summary: Lessons from a U.S. study revealing 
the critical role of “gatekeepers” in public safety 
networks for countering violent extremism1
michael J. williams, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, Center for Terrorism & 
Security Studies 
John G. horgan, Georgia State University
william P. Evans, University of Nevada, Reno
CHAPTER 15
Despite their best efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE), neither law enforcement nor intelligence 
agencies can be everywhere at all times.  Furthermore, many potentially worrisome behaviors (e.g., ex-
pressing sympathy for a terrorist-labeled group) are not necessarily illegal; thus, intervening through arrests 
is often not an acceptable option in most western societies.2 This highlights that radicalization, and any 
associated level of  risk for committing violence, are not dichotomous, but exist on a continuum (Sedgwick, 
2010).  Therefore, interventions with individuals occupying different points along such a spectrum call for 
different approaches to mitigating that risk (Klinke & Renn, 2002).  Additionally, given the low per capita 
base rate of  terrorists, and self-selection biases that would tend to dissuade those in favor of  extremist ide-
ologies from choosing to participate in a presumably wide range of  CVE programs, the odds of  would-be 
violent extremists volunteering to participate in CVE programs—much less, subsequently diverting them-
selves from malevolent trajectories—is slim (Black, 2004).
For all of  these reasons, it is immensely important to identify “gatekeepers:”3 those, by definition, best 
positioned to notice, and refer, individuals deemed at-risk of  engaging in a given undesirable behavior (in 
this case, an act of  violent extremism) to resources that might help divert those individuals from engaging 
in such behavior.  Equally important is to discover barriers preventing those gatekeepers from connecting 
with CVE-related safety networks so that those connection may be facilitated.
As part of  an ongoing study, empirical evidence was found for the belief  that peers of  would-be violent 
extremists might be the gatekeepers most likely to be aware of  their peers’ violent intentions.  However, 
findings also revealed evidence of  a potential, and critical, disconnect between those peers and local CVE-
relevant resources (e.g., law enforcement and social services).  That disconnect can be considered a barrier 
to what may be called “vicarious help-seeking:” seeking help for someone other than oneself.  This work 
discusses the source of  that disconnect, in addition to key implications, and a prospective part of  the solu-
tion to bridge that disconnect.
KEYwoRdS: countering violent extremism, CVE, gatekeepers, networks, help-seeking
1 
1   This research is based upon work supported by the National Institute of  Justice, under grant #2013-ZA-BX-0003, and the National 
     Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, under grant #1320-123-0053.  Also, this publication is based upon both a research 
    brief  submitted, by the authors, to the National Institute of  Justice (“Research brief: The critical role of  gatekeepers in public safety 
    networks for countering violent extremism”) and their forthcoming article to be published in Behavioral Sciences of  Terrorism and 
       Political Aggression (“The critical role of  friends in networks for countering violent extremism: Toward a theory of  vicarious help-seeking). 
      Corresponding author: Michael J. Williams, mickwilliamsphd@gmail.com. 
2   The legality of  any given expression or behavior varies by nation.  Therefore, the point at which law enforcement agencies are entitled to 
     intervene similarly vary.
3   In academic literature, the term gatekeepers is often reserved for teachers, physicians, or other professionals that are in a position to detect 
      problems and make referrals.  We use the term to apply not only to such individuals, but to anyone positioned to notice early signs of  others’ 
     problematic behaviors.
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Participants
The above-mentioned disconnect was revealed 
through analyses of  original data: collected in both 
Los Angeles (L.A; in partnership with the LAPD) 
and the metro Washington D.C. area (as part of  an 
NIJ-funded research project), from 2013 - 2014. 
Participants in L.A. (n = 33) included members of  
the LAPD’s liaison unit, Muslim community lead-
ers, and other adult members from several L.A. 
based Muslim communities.  Participants from 
metro D.C. (n = 139) included members of  the 
Montgomery County Department of  Police, the 
Montgomery County Faith Community Working 
Group, and community members from Mont-
gomery County (both adults and youth of  various 
faith backgrounds).  
Procedure
Data from L.A. were obtained by two means: a) 
semi-structured interviews with members of  the 
LAPD, and Muslim community leaders, and b) 
online surveys of  the other L.A. based Muslim 
community members.  Data from metro D.C. 
were obtained through focus groups with each 
subgroup of  participants. Participants, comprised 
of  the general community, were compensated by 
$25 to complete an online survey, or $50 to par-
ticipate in a focus group ($75, in the case of  focus 
group participants comprised of  those from the 
Montgomery County Faith Community Working 
Group): all paid in the form of  Amazon gift cards. 
Those who participated in semi-structured inter-
views (including members of  the LAPD), were not 
offered compensation.
Preliminary data from the above sources were 
initially assessed (i.e., bracketed) for emergent 
themes by one of  the three members of  the re-
search team.  Subsequently, those themes were 
assessed and verified by the other two team mem-
bers.  These emergent themes gained further 
verification as they continued to emerge through 
subsequent waves of  data, and across each mode 
of  data collection. Therefore, the following results 
were triangulated across multiple waves of  data, 
and from multiple sources, enhancing our confi-
dence in the findings reported here.
Key Findings
The	 best	 gatekeepers.	  Participants were in 
consensus regarding their belief  that those best 
positioned to notice early signs of  individuals con-
sidering acts of  violent extremism likely would be 
those individuals’ peers: perhaps more so than 
teachers, clergy, or even family members.  This 
does not suggest that other gatekeepers are of  
little, or no, importance for CVE.  However, in 
contrasts to assumptions that teachers, clergy or 
family members are well-positioned as gatekeep-
ers, it suggests that peers might be in a critical 
gatekeeping position for intervention. 
A	critical	disconnect.	  A common theme was 
that despite broad and well-established CVE-rele-
vant safety networks, in both major metropolitan 
areas, and despite robust partnerships between law 
enforcement, social service agencies, and the com-
munities they serve—still—participants expressed 
reluctance to reach out, as gatekeepers, to those 
safety networks.  In short, such fear generalized 
not only to participants’ reluctance to reach out 
to law enforcement personnel, but also to other 
members of  CVE-relevant safety networks (i.e., 
religious officials, friends, or family members). 
The predominant reason cited for such reluctance 
was fear, and the three most-cited sources of  that 
fear, in reference to help-seeking, on behalf  of  ei-
ther a friend or family member, were the following.4 
1. “I could get myself  in trouble.” 
2. “I could get my friend/family member in 
trouble.”
3. “I could be identified.”
As with the previous finding, this does not suggest 
1 
4  The frequencies with which these three reasons were cited did not differ significantly from each other (p > .05).  Therefore, these reasons 
      are not listed according to any rank order of  importance, or prevalence, in the data
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that CVE-relevant safety networks—including 
initiatives such as community policing—are un-
important.  However, it suggests that comprehen-
sive CVE-relevant public safety networks, includ-
ing community policing initiatives, will fall short 
of  their potential to counter violent extremism, 
at least, in part, to the extent that gatekeepers re-
main unwilling to engage with such networks. 
Recommendations
Circumvent	 individuals’	 fears. Individuals 
tend to base decisions on emotional or heuristic 
(vs. rational/deeply considered) criteria (see Ariely, 
2008; Haidt, 2001; Zajonc, 1980).  Therefore, one 
should not expect gatekeepers to overcome their 
(perhaps well-justified) fears easily, to refer their 
peers to law enforcement agencies or other social 
services, however reasonable that decision might 
seem.  Instead, to circumvent gatekeepers’ fears, 
a more psychologically-grounded strategy would 
be to offer gatekeepers control over a channel of  
communication to a relatively neutral, safety-net-
worked organization (i.e., other than law enforce-
ment or intelligence agencies; see “Prospective 
Piece of  the Solution,” for one such suggestion). 
Make	 the	 solution	 convenient.	 Individuals 
tend to “follow the path of  least resistance,” in 
their choices and behaviors (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008, p. 83).  Therefore, prospective communica-
tion channels that aim to connect gatekeepers to 
CVE-relevant safety networks, should be ones that 
gatekeepers (youth, especially) are familiar with 
and accustomed to using.  Furthermore, if  those 
communication channels involve the use of  tech-
nology, they should consist of  technologies that 
are readily available to gatekeepers.    
Prospective Piece of the Solution
One possibility, to bridge the divide between gate-
keepers and CVE-relevant safety networks, is 
based on recent community-based crisis interven-
tion models.  Following such innovative models, a 
texting-based crisis service could be initiated and 
promoted for youth to seek help for their peers 
who might be considering acts of  violent extrem-
ism.  Such a service preserves users’ confidenti-
ality, and—consequently—reduces prospective 
users’ reluctance to access the service (Evans et 
al., 2013).  Indeed, a similar service was launched 
(for crisis/suicide prevention), in 2011, in the U.S. 
state of  Nevada, resulting in a remarkable 38% 
increase in youth utilization of  the crisis service 
(Evans et al., 2013). That equated to approximate-
ly 3600 texts, from 137 unique youth texters, per 
month (Evans et al., 2013). 
Establishing such a texting-based service, how-
ever, should be accompanied by appropriate and 
focused marketing efforts, including savvy mes-
saging, to attract youth gatekeeper service users. 
Evans et al. (2013), provide descriptions of  inex-
pensive, effective examples of  such marketing ma-
terials.  Such a service can be relatively inexpen-
sive, and cost-effective if  built into a preexisting 
crisis prevention phone-in hotline (as was done in 
Nevada; Evans et al., 2013).  Though, in Nevada, 
the texting-based crisis service is interconnected 
with first responders, including law enforcement, 
it is not marketed as a crime “tip line,” nor is that 
its intended function.  Instead, the texting ser-
vice—and, by extension, its primary application 
for CVE, if  so adapted—is to encourage proactive 
help-seeking for those concerned about those who 
might be on the verge of  committing violence.
Generalizability
From a strict perspective, the findings from this 
summary of  an ongoing study can generalize only 
to the population from which they were sampled: 
individuals willing to volunteer in such research 
(for modest monetary compensation, or none), 
from the communities in which they were sam-
pled.  However, the psychological basis of  the 
study (i.e., fear of  getting one’s self, friends, or 
family members in trouble with authorities), seems 
highly unlikely to be unique to the present sample. 
Therefore, the findings could be expected to gen-
eralize to people more broadly.  Additionally, the 
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Conclusion
Participants were in consensus regarding their belief  that those best positioned to notice early signs of  
individuals considering acts of  violent extremism likely would be those individuals’ friends: perhaps more 
so than school counsellors, clergy, or family members.  Furthermore, participants indicated that the pre-
dominant reason, underlying their reluctance to reach out to CVE-relevant service providers, was their 
fear of  the potential repercussions for doings so.  Additionally, that fear generalized not only to a reluctance 
to reach out to law enforcement agencies, but to others within prospective CVE-relevant networks (i.e., 
religious officials, friends, or family members).
It is encouraging to realize that a potentially powerful ally in the effort to counter violent extremism may be 
found in peer networks of  would-be violent extremists: someone willing to seek help for such individuals. 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the remainder of  society, not only to build comprehensive CVE-relevant 
safety networks, but to reduce the barriers between gatekeepers and those networks.  Fortunately, as ex-
emplified by the aforementioned texting-based crisis service, a potentially effective piece of  the solution is 
not only cost-effective, but psychologically well-founded.  Though cutting-edge, high-tech solutions should 
be explored for their applications to CVE, the elegant simplicity of  a technology as straightforward as 
texting already offers the potential to empower the critical role of  gatekeepers in public safety networks 
for countering violent extremism.  In texting, for example, we have a prospective piece of  the solution that 
is—literally—readily at hand.
findings did not appear to be dependent upon a 
time-sensitive event (e.g., a historical event signifi-
cantly related to the study’s outcomes).  Therefore, 
it seems plausible that the findings might general-
ize into the indefinite future.
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Developing CVE Programs through Building Community 
Policing Capacities
Stevan weine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago
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CHAPTER 16
To counter violent extremism (CVE), the White House has been advocating a community resilience ap-
proach.  They stated:  “the best defense against terrorist ideologies is strong and resilient individuals and 
communities” (McDonough, 2011) and “Our best defenses against this threat are well and equipped fami-
lies, local communities, and institutions” (White House, 2010).  One key challenge of  CVE is to make these 
declarations manifest among real world conditions of  diverse communities and the law enforcement and 
government agencies that serve them.
This requires a better understanding of  the meanings of  resilience in particular U.S. communities under 
the threat of  violent extremism. We conducted research on Somali Americans in Minneapolis St. Paul 
(Weine & Ahmed, 2012) and asked what would it mean to build resilience to violent extremism in this com-
munity, one of  the most disadvantage communities in the history of  US refugee resettlement.  We argued 
that resilience has to be characterized in relation to risks.  Our findings described how risk could be un-
derstood not just individually, but as a property of  the community and family.  We looked at risk from the 
vantage point of  the opportunity structure which is defined as opportunities for behavior that are provided 
by a given social context.  We identified 43 protective resources that could mitigate against those oppor-
tunities and built a model called DOVE.  This included organizing those protective resources in terms of  
three prevention goals which corresponded to the opportunity structure of  risk for potential involvement 
in violent extremsim.  The implication for CVE is that prevention programming should seek to enhance 
modifiable protective resources that can mitigate against multilevel risks. 
The CVE policies currently being implemented in the U.S. involve the following four dimensions: 
1. building safe, secure, resilient, crime-resistant communities; 
2. training, information sharing, and adopting community-oriented law enforcement approaches; 
3. applying community oriented policing practices that focus on building partnerships between law 
enforcement and communities; 
4. fostering community‐led preventative programming to build resilience against violent extremist radi-
calization (White House, 2011).
Our current research focuses on #3 which may be understood as law enforcement’s work to integrate 
building resilience into their CVE practices through community policing. We are studying the Los Angeles 
Police Department’s (LAPD) innovative work to apply community policing to CVE.  In 2008, the LAPD 
established a “Liaison Section” of  its Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau. Deputy Chief  
Michael Downing, its commander, has described their mission as, “to improve the quality of  life and public 
KEYwoRdS: countering violent extremism, prevention, intervention, resilience
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methods
This study used ethnographic methods includ-
ing in-depth interviews and focused-field ob-
servations. Focused field observations, involve 
observations of  community policing that focus 
on activities which are likely to shed light on the 
research questions (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010; Em-
erson, Fretz & Shaw, 2011). In-depth interviews 
conducted with the informant begin with a small 
number of  introductory questions that proceeds 
in whichever direction that allows the informant 
to speak most meaningfully to the research ques-
tions with concrete and personal details (Charmaz 
& Belgrave, 2002). Thus far, we have carried out 
more than 70 in-depth interviews in Los Angeles 
with either police officers, community leaders/
advocates, parents, or youth (age 18 and above). 
We have also conducted more than 40 hours of  
observations.  Each interview and observation was 
transcribed, coded and is being analyzed using At-
las/ti 7.0 (Friese, 2013) to yield particular themes 
and an overall model using a grounded theory ap-
proach (Charmaz, 2006). At this point we are able 
to share some preliminary results of  the analysis 
which is still underway, as is data collection.
Preliminary Results
Based upon the analysis in progress, we have come 
up with the following provisional findings.
1.	 CVE	 community	 policing	 differs	 from	
traditional	 community	 policing,	 both	
structurally	 and	 operationally. CVE 
community policing is centralized in one 
unit of  25 officers that covers the entire city, 
rather than traditional community policing, 
which has a Senior Lead Officer in each of  
21 divisions. CVE holds one quarterly Muslim 
Forum rather than 21 monthly Community 
Police Advisory Boards as part of  traditional 
community policing. This means that CVE 
community policing is much more diffuse in 
terms of  service to a geographically bound ed 
community than is traditional community po-
licing.
2.	 CVE	 incorporates	 both	 traditional	
community	policing	and		CVE-oriented	
community	policing	components	across	
seven	 practice	 domains	 (see table 4 at 
the end of  the chapter).  We identified both 
traditional community policing and CVE-ori-
ented components across 7 practice domains 
(engage, educate, partner, problem solve, risk 
mitigation, organizational change, measure). 
Here are illustrative quotations of  several dif-
ferent themes (and sub-themes) from the table: 
Engage	 (Dialogue	 &	 Information	
Sharing):		
I believe in breaking bread. That means just sitting 
down and just eating together.  And that diffuses a 
lot of  issues right there.  We work on commonalities 
versus on differences. Tolerance.  Acceptance (Com-
munity leader, 2014).
Partner	(Building	Mutual	Trust):	
At the onset, it was pretty rocky, partly because we 
were approaching communities that have really not 
been engaged in the past.  We are approaching com-
safety within diverse communities by building mutual partnerships and trust through coordination and col-
laboration of  all department entities, government stakeholders, public/private/faith-based organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations with local communities”(LAPD, 2015).   
Our study began with these two research questions:  1) How is community policing being applied to 
CVE and how might it be further enhanced through incorporating psychosocial preventive intervention 
strategies? 2) How can criminal justice agencies and communities collaboratively develop policies, 
programs, and initiatives to enhance resilience in communities under threat? 
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munities who look at government in general with 
kind of  a mistrust.  Their starting point are in-
ternational and not necessarily local because these 
are immigrant communities who are also coming in 
with their own biases, with their own experiences 
that don’t necessarily translate.  So at the onset 
when we try to bring some of  the community groups 
with the government, it was almost as though they 
were speaking two completely different languages 
(city government official, 2014).
Organizational	 Change	 (Capacity	
Building):
We as organizations that are in our communities 
should be receiving funding and grant money to 
work with our communities.  All of  the people that 
get grants about us are not us or the organizations 
of  our communities (community leader, 2014).
3.	 Community	policing	driven	partnership	
is	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	for	CVE. 
Partnership can be regarded as  CVE preven-
tion in a conceptual sense in that it makes com-
munities a part of  the solution.  Partnership 
allows for division of  labor between commu-
nity, law enforcement, and non-law enforce-
ment (LE) government in undertaking preven-
tion programs.  This creates opportunities for 
communities to be active in aspects of  pre-
vention and intervention which law enforce-
ment could not conduct due to constitutional 
requirements.  However, there were needs to 
go beyond current levels of  community polic-
ing CVE programming to develop targeted 
prevention and intervention programs with a 
sound basis in theory, evidence, and rigorous 
design. 
4.	 CVE	 should	 include	 targeted	 preven-
tion	and	intervention	activities	that	fo-
cus	on	enhancing	modifiable	protective	
resources	 and	 risk	 factors. One of  the 
LAPD’s major partners is the Muslim Pub-
lic Affairs Council (MPAC). MPAC designed 
“Safe Spaces,” an innovative community-led 
CVE initiative for communities across the 
U.S.  Safe Spaces aims to increase Muslim-
American communities’ resilience against 
violent extremism through community-led 
prevention and intervention activities (“Safe 
Spaces”, 2014).  Safe Spaces is built on the 
PI model which advocates for: 1) community 
adoption of  social and religious programs that 
mitigate environmental factors that raise the 
risk of  individuals adopting extremist world-
views, known as “Prevention”; 2) community 
adoption of  multi-disciplinary “Crisis Inquiry 
Teams” that seek to intervene in situations 
where an individual is believed to be at risk 
of  engaging in violent behavior, labeled “In-
tervention.” CVE community policing could 
do more to help develop community-led 
prevention and intervention, including espe-
cially through capacity building of  communi-
ty-based organizations.
5.	 Pushback	 to	 CVE	 appears	 multifacto-
rial,	widespread,	and	dynamic.	This in-
cludes advocacy organizations (CAIR, ACLU, 
Stop LAPD Spying Coalition) who claim that 
CVE, “…says that Muslims are more prone to 
violence than any other faith” (CAIR, 2012). 
They oppose, “The manufacturing of  terror” 
(Osman, 2013) through surveillance and me-
dia. Another source is academics, including” 
Prof. Sahar Aziz of  Texas A&M) who has ar-
gued that community policing is “the ‘velvet 
glove’ covering the ‘iron fist’ of  more militant 
styles of  policing” (Aziz, 2014).  For many com-
munity members, CVE:  1) Uses language that 
is primitive, developing, and not articulated in 
a clear way to the community; 2) Reinforces 
negative identities of  Muslim Americans; 3) 
Demonstrates a lack of  respect and trust by 
LE/government; 4) Demonstrates that Mus-
lims aren’t being treated as equal citizens; 5) 
Exacerbates historical trauma from countries 
of  origin; 6) Is based on misinformation spread 
by media and LE; 7) Endangers civil rights, 
especially related to surveillance and stings. 
Those who oppose engagement with  LE say 
that the community does not have an extrem-
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ism problem. They believe that the threat 
of  violent extremism is greatly exaggerated 
by an Islamophobic media and LE agencies 
who have been whipping up informant-centered 
terrorism cases since the attacks of  September 
11, 2001. Here are some illustrative quota-
tions of  select dimensions of  the pushback.
The	Threat	is	Exaggerated.	
A lot of  people look at violent extremism as something that 
is really a media phenomenon. This is something that, you 
know, we just don’t really have.  It’s not a problem for us 
and for that reason the media is putting this thing on us. 
(Community leader, 2014)
Because of  ISIS etc there is once again a great misunder-
standing of  Islam throughout the country- what is the gov-
ernment doing on countering this reality and how can we 
help? (Community leader, 2014).
They	Regard	Us	As	Suspects.  
Government agencies, specifically the FBI, have created 
more extremists than Al Qaeda and ISIS. FBI exploits 
these people’s sickness to manufacture terrorism cases.  We 
won’t work with the government until they stop treating us 
as suspects.(Community leader, 2014).
The	Community	has	Other	Priorities.	
Even keeping radicalization in mind that’s not even Top 10 
on the priority list. I would say one for sure is youth leav-
ing Islam. Sometimes you have girls marrying outside of  
religion. Sometimes you have guys partaking in drugs and 
end up keeping them away from their religion and just doing 
their own thing. So I would say losing our youth should be 
one of  our biggest priorities, because if  you lose your youth 
you lose your future (College student, 2014).
Islamophobia	Will	Kill	Us.		
The Islamophobia industry will kill us if  we don’t stand 
up…We need to defend our religion. Everything they do 
defiles everything that is dear to us. The reality is that there 
is an Islamophobia industry. We owe it to the Prophet to 
clear his name (Community leader, 2014). 
discussion
Based on our preliminary findings, community policing in CVE: 1) Incorporates both traditional com-
munity policing and CVE-oriented community policing practices; 2) Plays a vital role in CVE through 
engaging the community and forming partnerships that pro-actively and mutually build trust, challenge 
misinformation, educate, promote transparency, defuse conflicts, open communication channels, solve dai-
ly problems, and capacity building; 3) Faces new challenges regarding developing targeted prevention and 
intervention programs, and;  4) Faces strong pushback from the community. 
Reflecting on what we studied in Los Angeles and also learned about in other cities, we drafted a CVE	
Pyramid	Model (see Figure 2). The figure addresses: Who does it? What must they first do? What should 
it lead to? The first level depicts the multiple different types of  organizations that must be involved, which 
include law enforcement, non-law enforcement government, and community-based organizations.  The 
middle level depicts how they must first work together through engagement and partnership.  The top level 
depicts specific CVE prevention and intervention activities, which are necessary, but only possible if  the 
first two levels are properly addressed.
Figure 3 illustrates how community policing can cut a path to CVE.  It is certainly not the only path, but 
it is a path which appears underway in Los Angeles. Other localities, such as Montgomery County, are less 
focused on community policing per se, and instead more focused on a coalition between county govern-
ment and faith based organizations (WORDE, 2015).  There is no one path to CVE.
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On the basis of  the preliminary findings we offer three key recommendations for accelerating CVE:  1) 
Promote the development and evaluation of  effective targeted prevention and intervention programs for 
at-risk individuals & communities through public and private initiatives; 2) Promote the packaging of  ef-
fective interventions together into multilevel programs that are tailored to fit the local context; 3) Promote 
FIGuRE 3: CP Path to CVE
FIGuRE 2: CVE Pyramid Model
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the assessment of  the effectiveness and implementation of  CVE initiatives so as to build scientific evidence 
to support the programs’ sustainability with officials and the public.
However it is also clear that none of  these recommendations are likely to succeed unless law enforcement, 
other government agencies, and communities find productive ways to respond to the pushback to CVE.   A 
critical number of  persons completely reject the building resilience to violent extremism narrative because 
for them the threat is exaggerated and built on a false premise which regarded their community as suspect. 
The implication of  these findings is that there needs to be major changes to CVE, including a reframing 
that includes:  1) move beyond criminal justice approaches to CVE to build a broader approach to com-
munity safety that utilizes public health and psychosocial approaches;  2)	shift to developing healthy, resil-
ient communities that are resistant to a spectrum of  violent threats; 3) expand beyond a focus on radicali-
zation to violence to a focus on a spectrum of  targeted violence inclusive of  radicalization to violence, but 
also other violent threats such as gang violence, workplace violence, hate crimes, and domestic violence; 
4) draw on the collaborative resources of  community members, educators, mental health professionals, 
and law enforcement. 
tAbLE 4: Traditional CP and CVE oriented CP components across seven practice 
                  domains
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This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. The Conference, hosted by Hedayah, Curtin University and People 
against Violent Extremism (PaVE), provided a platform for researchers, policymakers 
and practitioners to discuss and disseminate cutting-edge research on countering violent 
extremism (CVE). The resulting publication begins to fill a gap in the literature related 
to CVE by providing insights into some of the local push and pull factors that lead 
to radicalization and recruitment in different contexts, and suggest some policy and 
programming recommendations to better counter these factors. The essays in this 
volume also highlight existing programs in countering the narrative of violent extremists, 
deconstruct programs related to disengagement, deradicalization and reintegration 
of former violent extremists, and provide case examples of CVE programming at the 
community level.
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